Following on RP and John Wager, who have done the heavy lifting, let me come
cheerleading. I think I understand Lawrence's perspective -- that autonomy
is autonomy only in the instantiation of a self standing in opposition to
community or power structure norms. Well, that argument has it's charm, but
as both RP and JW point out, autonomy doesn't imply opposition only
independence of judgment. Lawrence seems to me to be conflating autonomy
and moral courage. I recommended _Contingency, irony and solidarity_ to him
not because that's the only philosophical work I've ever read, but because I
think Rorty presents the conflict between our desire to be a radically
independent, authentic self in the world but all the while knowing that
every thing we are, every thought we have is the product of the community
that raised us (except for x), and that we know that and we know then that
the norms of our community are only norms, contingently derived. We are
free to be who we want to be all they while condemned to be our history. I
love it. How we turn out depends on x.
Mike Geary xxx in Memphis
Robert Paul wrote:
Lawrence Helm wrote:
. . . . A member-in-good-standing at a local church is going to be one who conforms to the beliefs and practices of that church. To call a church member “autonomous” is almost a contradiction in terms. If someone disagrees with the doctrine and practices of his church, he will almost certainly not remain a member. He cannot be /utterly /autonomous and be a conscientious member at the same time.
I'm not sure why not. A person could certainly choose to be the sort of person who adheres to the beliefs and carries out the practices of a church to which she belongs. (Or not.) To be autonomous doesn't entail that one be a rebel or an iconoclast. Suppose I'm on a committee to revise the dress code for Mutton College, and that the committee's decisions are arrived at by a simple majority vote. I favor green socks and purple waistcoats but eventually the committee decides on purple socks and green waistcoats. Have I somehow lost my autonomy if I abide by this decision, or must I, to preserve it, wear green socks and a purple waistcoat anyway?
A bit of Kant might help here (but only a bit):
"Nomous" is related to "norm." To be "auto nomous" is to give the norms or laws to one's self, that is, to follow them rationally rather than out of habit, or out of belief, or out of hope for reward. For Kant, an autonomous person might very well be the LEAST rebellious person around, if by rebellious one meant not following a rational argument to its rational conclusion in action. It would be extremely difficult to tell from the outside whether a person was following a norm "autonomously" or "heteronomously."
To take the issue of the Mutton Dress Code as an example: One could autonomously decide that abiding by the majority's decision is the proper action. Or one might autonomously decide that the issue of garish colors was more fundamental and NOT abide by a majority vote; both of these could be autonomous decisions, because they were derived from a logical analysis of duties. But if, when it came time to emerge from the closet and show those purple socks to the world, one decided to abstain from purple out of fear of ridicule, or out of the promise of financial reward, or out of an irrational whim, then one would not be acting autonomously.
--
-------------------------------------------------
"Never attribute to malice that which can be explained by incompetence and ignorance." -------------------------------------------------
John Wager john.wager1@xxxxxxxxxxx
Lisle, IL, USA
------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
