[lit-ideas] Rudy and the Myth of Origin
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 4 May 2014 13:04:35 +0100 (BST)
All human cultures have an ‘origin-myth’. Famously the Bible
begins with the official version of Creation - setting the bar high for future
builders, God gets the universe up and running in a working week with Sunday
off. All these myths only push the story so far. Probably for good reason – for
the child’s equivalent of an ‘origin-myth’ begins with “Where did I come from,
mummy?” and the official ‘origin-myth’ may only go as far as “You came from
mummy’s tummy.” For, pushing further, “How did I get in your tummy, mummy?” is
like “What was God doing before He made the universe?” Only worse. Much, much
worse.
Though not au fait with the all-pervasiveness of ‘origin-myths’ in human
culture and still only
three, Rudy has been in pursuit of his own ‘origin-myth’, off and on, for
several years now. Recently Rudy reached
“How-did-I-get-in-your-tummy-mummy?”-stage.
Mummy has always noticed an amazing object or urgent task that has so far
interrupted
the answer.
Pushing further in another direction, Rudy has inquired how
he got out of mummy’s tummy (which he’s noticed appears sealed). Mummy has
explained that she pushed him out. “How did you push me out?” Like you push
anything out. “Like a poo?” Not like a…well, may be like a… “Where did you push
me out?” From my
tummy, silly…
At this point Rudy lifts mummy’s shirt to examine her tummy
and adopts a facial expression that shows it is mummy who is being silly – as a
simple visual check shows there is nowhere for Rudy to be pushed out. Unless
(Rudy points): “Did I come out from your belly button?” No, you didn’t. “Mummy,
did I really come from your tummy?” Yes,
of course… “But did I?” repeats Rudy
with a worldly-wise tone.
This isn’t going to go away. It doesn’t go away. Rudy’s
researches are relentless. Mummy one day relents. Before she knows what she’s
saying, she says “Mummy pushed you out of mummy’s Minnie, Rudy”. If mummy could
do it, she would now suck Rudy backwards in time up her Minnie so he could not
hear what she just said.
Rudy knows what “Minnie” means. It is a term devised by his
elder sister – one she has long used to part-explain key differences between
them. Rudy goes silent. He does not laugh like this is a joke. He does not
smile with pleasure at knowledge gained. He looks solemn. Rudy reaches into his
language kit for what he thinks is an appropriate response – he alights on a
phrase he has copied from adults admonishing him and which he now uses to
admonishes others: “That’s not very nice, mummy.”
The theological niceties of Rudy’s origins are abandoned.
Rudy’s researches are not pursued further. In medieval times, Rudy and his
mummy would have fields to till that would help them forget. But Rudy and his
mummy live in post-Freudian times. Mummy thinks Rudy’s silence on the matter
might mean Rudy now has a “complex”.
A day after mummy has related this to Donal and her own
mummy, Rudy is in the car with Donal and mummy’s mummy. This is yesterday. Rudy
is singing to Hello, Goodbye,
interspersed with comments about the passing world. Rudy sees some sheep in a
distant field and comments: “Sheeps.” He then adds: “Those sheeps have babies
in their tummies.” At this distance, this comment cannot possibly be based on
empirical observation. It is possible that this comment reveals the cataclysmic
psychic disturbance that Rudy now endures about “tummies” and “babies” – that
“sheeps”
operates as a means of “transference” for a disturbance that may now possibly
cripple Rudy into adulthood and beyond.
To check this, Donal asks a few questions.
“Rudy…” “Yes.” “Rudy, you know about sheeps, but do you know
where you come from?” As in standard
therapeutic practice, this is an open question – giving Rudy ample scope to
steer in whatever direction Rudy feels. It does not raise the possibly fearsome
term “babies” or the possibly loathsome term “tummies”. It’s designed to create
a port of calm before gently setting out to explore the high seas of Rudy’s
psychic
fury.
Rudy looks surprised, perhaps slightly startled, at the
question. His matter-of-fact answer explains. “I popped out of mummy’s Minnie.”
Donal is stuck for words. He mumbles “Eh…that’s right.” Now warming to his
theme, Rudy further clarifies –
stating in a more considered tone: “I popped out…of my mummy’s
Minnie.” Before Donal interjects, Rudy rushes ahead to a further clarification –
now in a chirpy tone with the last words drawn out for emphasis: “I popped out
of my… mummy’s …Minnie.”
It turns out all this ‘myth of origin’ stuff is very straightforward,
really.
On Sunday, 4 May 2014, 12:52, "dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx"
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
We were wondering about virtual impossibilities (Popper) and nonvirtual
unnecessities (Grice) in the Oxonian curriculum, vis-à-vis, a claim by McEvoy:
"I seriously think, due what we might call 'institutional bias', it would
be virtually impossible to get a First Class degree in philosophy from
Oxbridge by arguing as Popper would argue, even though Popper is a far greater
philosopher than anyone who gains such a First Class degree."
I proposed to track the issue methodically, and notice that while Popper
did teach philosophy in Canterbury (New Zealand), in his London years he was
chair to "Logic and Scientific Method", as I recall, for the LSEPS (London
School of Economics and Political Science).
On the other hand, there would be core Philosophy as understood in Oxford,
covered by the two Ws: the Waynflete chair of metaphysical philosophy and
the White chair of moral philosophy.
I now search for 'philosophy of science' as practised in Oxford. The
Faculty pages keep quite a complete record of faculty, visitors, etc., with
descriptions of their research interests, and I was looking for someone who may
display an interest in Popper. I come across with a more institutionally
oriented page at:
http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/admissions/graduate/mst_in_philosophy_of_phys
ics
This is a course towards a MSt in Philosophy of Science and comprises what
the programme refers to as
a
Philosophy of Science component
It informs the potential candidate:
"Philosophy of science concerns both scientific method and the
philosophical examination of the nature and scope of scientific knowledge, as
well as
the content of specific sciences, principally physics, but also
mathematics, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and linguistics."
It should be pointed out that Popper never actually taught "Philosophy of
Science" but "Scientific Method" -- as part of his course "Logic and
Scientific Method" and there IS a difference. A pedantic student might
challenge
Popper or might have challenged Popper back then:
Popper: And then Carnap, in "Logical Syntax..."
Student: Sir, excuse me, sir, but the course is on Scientific Method, not
PHILOSOPHY of science as such, isn't it? That's what I enrolled for! I don't
want no stinking philosophy!
Popper: Excuse _me_!?
The Oxonian page above continues:
"As such it ["philosophy of science"] overlaps with metaphysics and
epistemology, in which it has always played a central role, particularly in the
early modern period, and in the history of analytic philosophy."
The mention of "metaphysics" may be a nod to the Waynflete professor of
metaphysical philosophy, with the attending implicature: "So it may do you
good if you go and attend one lecture or two by the Waynflete, you know".
The note ends with: "It [Philosophy of science] is taught with special
emphasis on this context in philosophy."
which may have Popperian implicatures: philosophy of science is what a
PHILOSOPHER does. If he taught Scientific Method, this -- an examination of
scientific method -- may NOT be what a philosopher does, necessarily. For
example, many philosophers have criticised Kuhn for doing 'sociology of
science', which, alas, he took as a compliment!
The note concludes: "This subject [of philosophy of science'] is taught
via (i) the undergraduate lecture courses in philosophy of science; (ii)
individual supervisions; and (iii) a graduate class in philosophy of science,
to
be held regularly during the second term."
And it is expected that Popper will be properly discussed.
The other area that McEvoy was considering was Popper's work in the
'philosophy of mind'. Oddly, it's again a W that pops up in Oxford, with one
mere
Wilde readership in the philosophy of mind. But things have advanced since
then... Then there's of course the whole field of the "History of Ideas",
as per The Visiting Professorship in the History of Ideas ("made possible by
the generous support of Francis Finlay," and which "takes place during
Hilary Term and is hosted by Merton College"), to where Popper's work on the
poverty of historicism may best belong.
Cheers,
Speranza
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