When St. Paul's Cathedral was being constructed, it was the people at
Westminster (patron saint: Peter) who had to pay. Hence the idiom. According to
Geary, it refers to the time-honoured polemic between Peter F. Strawson and H.
Paul Grice ("Both have Episcopalian names, so the implicature is tricky.")
McEvoy is, however, afraid:
"I'm afraid you're all too in love with Grice and have drifted off into another
point-missing homage to him."
I guess I can emphatise with McEvoy's fears (Geary says that the "Brits," as he
calls them, use "am afraid" _figuratively_ -- i.e. implicaturally. I disagree).
McEvoy goes on:
"So sorry, [Speranza], this really does not explain why in university exams
some colleges regularly do well and others markedly and consistently not so
well (in the same subjects) - it's explanation of comparative success and
failure that my post raised: this is not addressed by explaining why Grice
might have been a successful tutor (which by the way is not so much explained
as assumed by JLS).
Yes, or 'implicated,' if you must. Only of course 'success' is 'ambiguous' (if
monosemous):
i. My husband was, all in all, a successful tutor back in Oxford but he'd
rather be seen dead than teaching undergrads in the USA!
ii. Lady Anne Strawson: "My husband had the most successful of all Oxonian
tutors, one Paul Grice."
Note that
iii. H. P. Grice is a university lecturer at Oxford.
So one may need a conceptual analysis for 'tutor' and 'university lecturer'. On
top:
iv. Grice was HARDLY a fellow at St. John's.
Apparently, on his appointment, a background check was taken and found out that
v. He does not return library books.
This was from the time he was a student at Corpus and a research fellow at
Merton.
Eventually, he would became emeritus at Berkeley.
McEvoy goes on and sticks to the Popperian verb, 'to explain':
"But even if explained, how does this explain other's lack of comparative
success over such long periods and assuming an intake of mostly comparable
students?"
I think 'student' is the wrong word -- perhaps Grice was right when he called
Strawson 'pupil'. In Christ Church, admittedly Oxford's most prestigious
college, it's teachers who are called _students_ (But as Geary observes,
"Students are not called teachers. Odd, that.").
McEvoy goes on:
"I posted about [the renowned Dutch football player] Cruyff, partly to offset
all this negative stuff about people who are inadequate at providing education,"
and then there's Michael Caine, who, in a film shot at Trinity, Dublin, tries
to educate Rita -- and ends up being 'educated'. The playwright wrote: "The
implicatures of 'educating' are Chomskyan in nature". He is referring to
vi. Flying planes can be dangerous.
vii. Educating Rita can be successful.
O. T. O. H., there's Waters's paradox:
viii. We don't need no [sic] education.
In "Standard English", Honey writes that "not need no" is dialectal, not wrong.
"But Waters's implicature is still paradoxical."
McEvoy:
"but there is a difference between soccer and Oxford philosophy exams:- soccer
is (mostly) not a rigged game (and to rig it you need a corrupt player or
official, and even then there's only so much can be rigged), whereas exams and
what they reward may easily be 'rigged' (and without any conscious corruption).
Cruyff proved his ideas in unrigged soccer, but never would Karl Popper get a
First from Oxford in their philosophy exams - not in any blind testing. (I
suspect neither would Wittgenstein unless marked by a Wittgensteinian - but
even they might fail him badly in a blind test). Explanation? Rigged game. Not
'genius of Oxford'."
Well, Anscombe was an Oxonian of sorts, even if J. L. Austin never invited
neither HER nor Murdoch to the Saturday Mornings. I find Cantab. examinations
MORE rigged. The very idea of Witters "reciting" his already published book,
the infamous "Treatise" and earning a PhD degree (as marked by Moore) is "mad
tea party" at its best. In "The enigma," with Cumberbatch, a similar point is
made as to how Turing got his doctorate. And then there's "The guy who knew
infinity," with Jeremy Irons as another Cantab. professor who liked to give
away doctor degrees like candy! (Grice loved Hardy, though).
As for soccer, I'm not so sure. G. J. Warnock led the discussion on 'rules of a
game' for four Saturday mornings with J. L. Austin. "Is there a distinction
between playing football correctly and playing football wrongly?" Warnock's
implicature is, if there is a rule, it can be broken. Searle was in attendance,
which gave him the otiose idea of a 'regulative' rule and a constitutive rule.
If Cruyff had not followed the 'constitutive' rules of football, we would not
call him a football player. But regulative rules Cruyff can break and still be
called a football player.
With 'philosopher' it is slightly different, as Helm might agree with regard to
Spinoza (whom he dislikes).
The best philosophy teacher ever is said to be Socrates -- but his students
(Alcebiades and friends) laughed at him. This was so irritating that was made
the topic of a ballet now playing, "Serenade on Plato's Symposium".
Graeme saw this in "The Wind in the Willows" when he has a character
systematically and dialectically using 'learn' when he means 'teach'!
McEvoy:
"Let's not kid ourselves: we had a long debate on this list about JBT and
Popper's non-JTB view of knowledge. A Professor who runs a course on 'knowledge
as JBT' posted (before he took himself off in a huff), but never never
suggested a non-JBT view would ever be introduced to his course - never mind
given serious consideration. Afair he made clear that a non-JBT approach would
remain blocked from his course on 'knowledge' as JBT. This rigging of games is
happening before our eyes. Did anyone call him out (except me of course)? No,
he's a Professor. He's entitled."
Well, as Geary notes, the strict spelling is 'professer,' one who professes. To
profess is what Austin calls a 'performative' ("I hereby profess that the soul
is eternal." was one of his favourites) so one has to be careful.
Performatives, for Austin, lack truth value.
McEvoy:
"Imagine a 'Driving School' where the pass rates were higher and another where
they were much, much lower? Would we say the explanation lay in the greater
driving talent in students at the more successful school? But Oxford colleges
are each in a position to choose the 'creme de la creme' (apart from the creme
that don't apply): they choose their clients and are not at the mercy of
clients thrust upon them. Would we say it was 'quality of teaching'? But how
could this be if teachers were properly competent - how could 'quality of
teaching' be so impactful - given the standardised nature of the 'Driving
Test'? What could justify it? Let's not pretend the difference between a
'Driving School' and Oxford Finals in Philosophy is that those who get Firsts
aren't producing something 'standardised' - let's not fantasise that their
essays on agenda-led topics"
or 'hidden curriculum'?
"somehow amount to staggering works of heart-breaking philosophical genius
rather than something more competent than average standard. Not only are the
students not doing this in Finals but no Professor at Oxford - whether Strawson
or Ayer or Ryle - is any kind of contender for major significance in advancing
the subject when judged by the standards of Locke, Hume, Kant, Descartes. Not
one."
Well, Grice, when he ceased being an Oxonian, was invited to give the John
Locke Lectures, the most prestigious philosophical lectures in Oxford. The
committee explained: "It is obvious that it would be condescending on us to
nominate an Oxonian to give the lectures." When Grice stoop up in the podium he
explained, "I must explain that I _am_ Oxonian -- once an Oxonian always an
Oxonian -- but I will play the non-Oxonian during these prestigious lectures.
It is also a reminder that I once applied for the Locke fellowship and failed!"
(Laughter from the audience).
It should delight a Griceian that Grice managed to give the Immanuel Kant
Memorial Lectures at Kant, too -- on precisely the same topic as his John Locke
Lectures. "I won't think the audience will grasp the difference -- both Locke
and Kant are great philosophers by any measure," he explained.
McEvoy:
"Only Wittgenstein and Popper could be claimed to be this level of contender
within twentieth century Britain (and Popper was quietly blocked from an Oxford
professorship whereas Wittgenstein despised most of the academic lot at
Cambridge where he was a kind of reluctant Professor [see Ray Monk's book, that
[Helm] talks about]). Anyone running or inspecting a
less-than-averagely-successful 'Driving School' could not easily blame the
'Driving Test' itself, might struggle to shift blame to the clients."
Part of the problem with the Driving School is in the VERY CONVOLUTED British
"Highway Code". In fact, Grice gives this example at Harvard. "Suppose I
correct the Highway Code into a "New Highway Code". I set new rules. And I
follow them. Does this make me a Griceian utterer?" He thought it did. And IT
DID!
McEvoy:
"The 'Driving School' might have to face their own inadequacies; the same
applies to a college lagging in university exams."
Arnold once said that only the poor learn at Oxford. I think his implicature
was NOT that only the poor get examined at Oxford. The sad thing is that he saw
himself as one of 'poor,' while he'd rather be playing!
McEvoy:
"But facing these kinds of inadequacy is not done. A question remains why the
university doesn't do anything about it (using a handicap system - 'Ah, I can
tell this one was tutored by that useless old duffer, Jenkins.' ' Well, given
that handicap this essay really is First Class, then')."
Indeed. Or, as Grice answered Warnock at Collections:
Warnock: But what is your honest opinions about him, then?
Grice: He has beautiful handwriting.
His implicature (having seen Spinoza's handwriting at the Bodleian) is that if
someone displays a handwriting that embodies 'beauty' (Plato's favourite idea),
she is a philosopher _regardless_. Or not.
Cheers,
Speranza
