[lit-ideas] Re: Reductive vs. Reductionist
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 6 Mar 2013 17:41:38 +0000 (GMT)
Based on the article your reading may be right, especially that "tradition" is
not a God-word for Oakeshott, and indeed that Oakeshott is not so much
anti-rationalist as himself a rationalist who opposes a kind a
pseudo-rationalism: yet the distinction between "abstract theorizing and
practical wisdom" is surely that the latter is grounded in 'concrete reality',
and thus in "tradition" where this is a key component of 'concrete reality',
whereas the first is not. I do not recall Oakeshott's work well enough to be
sure, but I suspect Oakeshott does take the view that there is a 'greater
wisdom' in tradition thanOakeshott's so-called 'rationalist' typically assumes.
When Popper says he does not agree with Oakeshott's "strictures"
it may be that one of these is this kind of distinction between "abstract
theorizing and practical
wisdom" that Oakeshott draws - a distinction we might think plausible
given a certain kind of 'common sense theory of knowledge' or perhaps 'the
common man's theory of knowledge'. But the 'theory of knowledge' that likely
lies at
the back of such an approach is one Popper would reject: rather than draw a
distinction between "abstract
theorizing and practical wisdom", we might more usefully contrast two
kinds of thinking - one that directly addresses practical or concrete problems
and seeks a practical or workable solution to them [perhaps akin to
"practical wisdom" if the solution proves successful] and a kind of
thinking that has the defect that it does not address practical or concrete
problems in a
way that speaks of a practical or workable solution to them [akin to
"abstract theorising"]. But both kinds of thinking involve
'theorising' and theorising is always "abstract": it is simply one is
focused on actual problem-solving and may be more easily translated into
practical action whereas the other is not e.g. should we take marked
disparities of income as a problem, we might engage in "abstract
theorising" that this arises because of the class system or the
inegalitarian ethos of capitalism and we could harp on about these kind of
evils and that we must root them out [without any practical proposal for how we
do so] - or we could focus on the best ways to reduce such marked disparities,
for example by using the tax system or putting controls on incomes. But in the
second kind of case there is still theorising and it is still abstract
theorising, albeit that theorising may be tested by evidence, including
evidence as to the actual consequences of any policy adopted. Even something as
straighforward as assuming that if we lower the cost of public transport it
will be used more [an assumption we might put in a more quantified form, so
that we predict if cost is lowered by x custom will increase by y] constitutes
a theory of sorts -
and an abstract one, albeit one that may be tested: it is clear it is a theory
when we accept it may be falsified, especially in its more quantified versions
- for we may find that, for whatever reasons and contrary to the experts in
"practical wisdom", lowering the cost does not increase custom. The
idea that we will get things right in the second case because we have
"practical wisdom" and have abandoned "abstract theorising"
is a naive and inaccurate view of how our knowledge works in practical matters:
for our knowledge in practical matters is fallible as well as being unavoidably
'theoretical'. Hence my suggestion that the "theory of knowledge" is
an area where Popper would differ from Oakeshott, and from strictures that
think we can draw a telling contrast between so-called "abstract theorizing and
practical wisdom". If a politician seeks your vote because of their "abstract
theorising" you might want to check your wallet, but ditto if they put
themselves forward because of their "practical wisdom".
Donal
________________________________
From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Wednesday, 6 March 2013, 13:39
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Reductive vs. Reductionist
Thanks, Donal. Now I do wonder what Walter or Robert Paul will have to say. I
must say that my second-hand take on Oakeshott based on the review doesn't
accord with treating "tradition" as another God-word on a par with "Reason" or
"Truth." My reading, not claiming it's right or wrong, saw the relevant
contrast as that between abstract theorizing and practical wisdom, with
Oakeshott's position being that the latter is usually more valuable than the
former when actually engaged in politics, business or life in general.
John
On Wed, Mar 6, 2013 at 7:44 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Thank you for this article, John, which raises many issues as to the
application of Oakeshott to US politics and constitutional law on which others
may have more to offer than myself.
>
>
>Some comments on Oakeshott's POV from a Popperian POV:-
>
>
>Popper's view of Oakeshott may be gleaned from his essay "Towards a Rational
>Theory of Tradition", which as Popper had to emphasise in rebutting a later
>critique of this essay by Peter Winch [Wittgensteinian of sorts] was not an
>essay "Towards a Traditional Theory of Rationality". This essay is Chapter 4
>of Conjectures and Refutations and at p.121 Popper writes: "Quite a number of
>outstanding thinkers have developed the problem of tradition into a big stick
>with which to beat rationalism. I may instance Michael Oakeshott, a Cambridge
>historian, a really original thinker, who recently...launched an attack on
>rationalism. I largely disagree with his strictures; but I have to admit that
>the attack is powerful one. When he launched it there was not much in the
>rationalist literature which could be considered an adequate answer to his
>arguments. Some answers may exist, but I very much doubt their accuracy. This
>is one of the reasons why I feel that this
subject is important."
>
>
>
>In Popper's view "tradition" is an important and even inescapable
>starting-point for rational or critical thought, and so a 'rationalism' that
>seeks to apply itself to "everything on its own merits" must not be simply
>hostile to "traditions" but must consider the merits of "traditions": a
>properly 'critical rationalism' will acknowledge that it itself forms part of
>a "tradition" (an evolving "tradition" with demerits as well as merits). In
>short, we should adopt a critical rather than uncritical attitude towards
>tradition [as towards any source of knowledge, such as observation or
>intuition] - but an attitude that is inherently biased against "tradition", or
>blind to the role and value of "tradition", is uncritically 'anti-tradition'.
>Where a stance that is uncritically 'anti-tradition' claims itself as
>'rationalist' we might view it rather as a kind of pseudo-rationalism, for it
>does not stand up to rational scrutiny.
>
>
>
>That essay does not say so, but I suspect the primary differences between
>Popper and Oakeshott may lie in two interlinked areas; (a) the theory of
>knowledge [here what Oakeshott puts forward as 'rationalism' is, given
>Popper's theory of knowledge, a kind of pseudo-rationalism]; (b) the extent to
>which "tradition" has some inherent value. Oakeshott seems to takes the view
>that "tradition" has an inherent value and that it embodies a kind of 'greater
>wisdom' - whether we unpack this as some kind of invisible hand or the 'wisdom
>of crowds' - and this 'greater wisdom' should be respected more than the
>fault-finding of 'rationalists'. There is a kind of onus of proof on anyone
>seeking to modify or reform or change or abandon a "tradition", for this
>'greater wisdom' of tradition is often hidden to us and so we should only
>alter tradition where it is clear-cut that it lacks this 'greater wisdom'.
>
>
>
>In Popper's view, I suspect, there is much in this, including the 'greater
>wisdom' aspect of tradition: this may become obvious where we have something
>that works well enough in some traditional fashion but we alter it because of
>some 'rationalist' plan of improvement only to find that the result does not
>work as well and to perhaps see in hindsight there was some hidden or greater
>value in how things worked in the traditional fashion.
>
>
>
>In World 3 terms, a "tradition" [both by accident and design] may embody all
>kinds of valuable World 3 knowledge even though the merits of that knowledge
>may not be much consciously understood at a World 2 level by those operating
>within that tradition: the knowledge embodied in a traditional 'way of
>working' may solve many problems that would otherwise be left unsolved or
>require a conscious solution - and traditions may themselves be understood as
>resulting from some attempt to solve a problem that, because it is successful
>enough, then 'takes hold' as a tradition.
>
>
>Nevertheless, this does not mean we should view "traditions" as inherently
>valuable irrespective of the characteristics of that tradition, nor does it
>put traditions beyond rational evaluation and criticism. We might have to
>learn that rational evaluation and criticism of 'tradition' or the status quo
>can appear to ground a case for change that turns out not to be as strong as
>it looked: that we over-estimated our understanding of that 'tradition' and
>its merits and demerits. But, for Popper, the rationalist is rightly
>interested in pursuing this kind of evaluation and criticism, and learning
>from its mistakes, rather than taking a 'hands-off' or deferential approach to
>tradition or an approach that might seem to suggest that the shortcomings of
>traditions are self-correcting by the same 'greater wisdom' that traditions
>embody.
>
>
>
>Donal
>London
>
>
>
>
>
>
>________________________________
> From: John McCreery <john.mccreery@xxxxxxxxx>
>To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Sent: Tuesday, 5 March 2013, 11:38
>
>Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Reductive vs. Reductionist
>
>
>
>Small change of subject, possibly too tangential. Walter, Donal, I would like
>to hear what you each, from your own perspectives, make of this description of
>the thinking of Michael Oakeshott.
>
>
>John
>
>
>On Tue, Mar 5, 2013 at 7:21 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>________________________________
>> From: Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
>>To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx; Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
>>Sent: Monday, 4 March 2013, 20:50
>>Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Reductive vs. Reductionist
>>
>>
>>>Why would we need a "metaphysical explanation" of the irreducibility of moral
>>rightness to (empirical) facts? >
>>
>>As we have survived without one, "need" may not be the right word:
>>nevertheless without some such explanation, the irreducibility is left
>>unexplained. At the end of my post I made the point that it may be in the
>>very character of 'irreducibility' that it cannot be explained - but that
>>itself does not amount to an explanation either.
>>
>>
>>>I ask this, in part, because I don't know what
>>such an explanation would look like.>
>>
>>Neither do I. But not knowing what an answer would look like does not make a
>>question illegitimate or vacuous. Perhaps the 'problem(s) of consciousness'
>>might be raised here by way of comparison. There is a problem in giving an
>>explanation for 'consciousness' (if we take it as irreducible to physical
>>brain states, as Popper does): this problem does not mean consciousness is
>>reducible to biology, chemistry and physics, though doubtless this problem is
>>one of the motivations for taking the view that a mental state is to be
>>identified in some way with a physical brain state. In Popper's view this
>>problem is not going to be solved any time soon (if ever) - though of course
>>a kind of pseudo-solution of explaining consciousness away in terms of
>>something unconscious like a physical brain state, or of trying to produce an
>>'identity' theory of mind and brain, is already with us.
>>
>>In Popper's view the universe is full of miraculous events that defy full
>>scientific explanation - some of these are even more miraculous than others.
>>The emergence of human consciousness is one of these most miraculous events -
>>though, as above, we can deny this by attempting to explain human
>>consciousness away in terms of its identity with brain states or as an
>>epiphenomenon (though such explaining away also takes away the evolutionary
>>function of consciousness and so clashes with a Darwinian understanding of
>>the evolution of the brain and mind).
>>
>>Do we "need" a better explanation for the emergence of
consciousness than saying that at a certain stage of brain evolution it
emerged? Intellectually, yes: and the absence of such an explanation - even if
we don't know what it would look like - should not be viewed with a dismissive
shrug because we don't know what such an explanation would look like.
>>
>>In Popper's schema there is irreducible emergence from physics to chemistry
>>to biology - but even beyond the natural sciences there is irreducible
>>emergence of a World 2 from this World 1 of physics and chemistry and
>>biology. We may give a partial explanation of this emergence both by
>>explaining the evolutionary advantages of a World 2 and by explaining how
>>certain World 1 developments [in the evolution of brains] may give rise to
>>consciousness. But there is still much unexplained.
>>
>>In Popper's view full human consciousness depends also on World 3: and we can
>>give a partial explanation of the emergence of
World 3 both by explaining the evolutionary advantages conferred by World 3
and by explaining how certain World 2 developments [in the evolution of mental
states, both conscious and unconscious] may give rise to a World 3. But there
is still much unexplained.
>>
>>From Popper's POV what we may be prone to is an illusion that we have
>>explained much more than we have. Or that what there is to be explained is
>>co-terminous with what we have explained or may easily enough explain in due
>>course. In Popper's view we should not assume that what there is to be
>>explained is co-terminous with our ability to explain - after all, the world
>>and its evolution was there to be explained long before humans evolved to see
>>the existence of the world and its evolution as problematical in terms of its
>>explanation, and the conjectural character of our knowledge should warn us
>>against the complacent view that there is no more to the
universe than we are capable of understanding.
>>
>>In this schema, morality emerges only after the emergence of World 2. Its
>>status is World 2 dependent - without mental states, especially conscious
>>ones, there could be no genuine 'morality'.
>>
>>But if morality is World 2 dependent its status is at least as metaphysically
>>problematic as that of World 2. Indeed, its status is perhaps more
>>problematic than that of mental states generally - for these we might account
>>for in terms of evolutionary advantage and in terms of some merely 'factual
>>matrix': but what is the right moral action, given conscious reflection, may
>>not be what confers any evolutionary advantage.
>>
>>It seems to me the above goes some way beyond Hume's 'naturalistic fallacy'.
>>Pointing out a 'NF' does not amount to an explanation of the status of
>>morals: indeed, pointing out a 'NF' does not
explain why it is fallacy in the more fundamental sense which is raised when
we ask questions like what is the explanation of the "irreducibility of moral
rightness to (empirical) facts"? [I would leave out the qualifier 'empirical',
for the facts on which we make moral decisions may not be 'empirical' in any
strict sense.] The 'NF' provides an argument for the irreducibility but not an
explanation of it. Even as an argument it is inconclusive, and its weight
depends on a broader metaphysics within which that irreducibility may be more
fully explained and its importance made clearer.
>>
>>Donal
>>London
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>--
>John McCreery
>The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
>Tel. +81-45-314-9324
>jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
>http://www.wordworks.jp/
>
>
--
John McCreery
The Word Works, Ltd., Yokohama, JAPAN
Tel. +81-45-314-9324
jlm@xxxxxxxxxxxx
http://www.wordworks.jp/
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