Walter Okshevsky quotes me: "What makes this such an ideal defence of liberal democracy is the manner in which [it]orients reason within the political realm. In a liberal democracy, reason has its proper end and it is that end that guides the proper use of reason." and then replies: "I believe the Sage of K. would insist (rightly) that no particular end is able to itself determine the autonomous use of practical reason. Ends, conceived as goods, are of moral worth only as cases of universalizable maxims or policies. Democracy, considered as such an end, is but an institutional version of rational/universalizable speech and thought; the former is consequent upon the latter, not its original or guiding source. Without practical reason, we would lack an understanding of autonomy, illegitimate self-exemption, persons as ends-in-themselves and a Republic of Ends." The proper end of reason that I refer to above is not liberal democracy but peaceful social relations, a claim I made earlier in the same post. I agree that no particular end is able to itself determine the autonomous use of practical reason, but the autonomous use of practical reason requires the condition of freedom. Further, since ideal conditions of freedom do not exist, the use of practical reason aims towards expanding the degree of freedom as found in particular social arrangements. The advance of enlightenment resulting from practical reason, the understanding of autonomy, illegitimacy of self-exemption, persons as end-in-themselves and a Republic of Ends, is an advance towards an ideal of peaceful social relations. Sincerely, Phil Enns Glen Haven, NS ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html