: ) Mike Geary On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 5:21 PM, carol kirschenbaum <carolkir@xxxxxxxxx>wrote: > Ya take the table to the guy who took your wife, when you said, "Take my > wife...please!" > > ck > > On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 2:25 PM, Mike Geary <jejunejesuit.geary2@xxxxxxxxx > > wrote: > >> Or as Lenny says: >> "…I’ve got a couple of friends of mine, we often sit around the Ritz Bar >> having a few liqueurs, and they’re always saying things like that, you know, >> things like: Take a table, take it. All right I say, take it, take a table, >> but once you’ve taken it, what you going to do with it? Once you’ve got hold >> of it, where are you going to take it?" >> >> Mike Geary >> Memphis >> >> >> On Wed, Jul 28, 2010 at 9:27 AM, Donal McEvoy >> <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote: >> >>> Clarifying what may in any case remain unclear:- >>> >>> > when I see a table, the content of >>> > what I see is not an actual table but my perception of a >>> > table. [Try setting down supper on the content of what I see >>> > and you'll see Kant's point]. >>> > >>> > But surely even if we accept this, it leaves open the >>> > question of whether that content accurately corresponds to >>> > some non-p R that lies beyond it? >>> > >>> > If so, we may accept "one can’t perceive R" without >>> > having to accept the view that 'One can never compare p with >>> > R, for there is no way of perceiving R.’ >>> >>> Though the quotations are lifted from RP's post, given the distinction >>> drawn between pR (the aspects of Reality that are perceived) and non-pR (the >>> aspects of Reality that lie beyond or outside of what exists in perception), >>> it should be emphasised that in the paragraph above the meaning of R is >>> "non-pR" - for clearly we can and do perceive what exists as a matter of our >>> perception e.g. what is presented to me now as my visual field is something >>> that exists as a presented visual field and so is part of pR which can be >>> perceived. >>> >>> Amplified further:- the contention of the above paragraph is that, from >>> the assumption that we cannot perceive non-pR, it does not follow that we >>> cannot compare [or contrast] the content of p with a [conjectured] non-pR. >>> For example, while my senses may deceive me that the table I am writing >>> at is a certain colour in its 'non-pR' ding-an-sich state, they may be on >>> better ground in telling me that its solidity is such that it would hurt my >>> forehead more than writing this post were I to smash my head down on it. >>> >>> Whether we regard this as a definitional truism or a truth of substantive >>> metaphysics may be left aside for the moment. >>> >>> >>> Donal >>> Shropshire >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------------ >>> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, >>> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html >>> >> >> >