[lit-ideas] Re: "Promissory Materialism" [was: the first lines are the argument referred by]
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 9 Nov 2011 11:35:31 +0000 (GMT)
________________________________
From: John Wager <jwager@xxxxxxxxxx>
>Here's one way to test this: If scientists succeed in creating a
>non-phenomenal way to induce the theory of materialism into the brain that
>does not require a logical analysis of an argument, then the theory should
>hold true. "Theories" are phenomenal, after all, not material. So "in
>theory" if materialism is true, its truth should be independent of its
>phenomenal status; it should be possible to "cause" truth by material changes
>in the structure of the brain independent of the arguments proposed for that
>truth.>
There is a very important anti-materialist argument that is perhaps similar to
this but might be put as follows: a thorough-going materialist theory of the
brain cannot ever be shown to be true by virtue of being true but can only
appear true because "material changes in the structure of the brain" make it
appear true. Even this argument needs careful handling, for the
counter-argument is that materialism could be both true and yet only appear
true because of "material changes in the structure of the brain." How Popper
would prefer to put it is that standards of validity in argument (including
logical standards, like consistency), and even the truth-relation 'where p is
true iff p corresponds with the facts', are not physical or World 1 entities
but World 3 entities: and in TSAIB he presents a dialogue with a
physicalist/materialist that is meant to bring out how such standards, though
they can be physically embodied (say, in a computer programme), are
not reducible to their physical embodiment.
For now I will give a simpler example to bring out the point using two
propositions, a p and a non-p:
A. Here there is snow.
A. Here there is no snow.
Assuming "Here" refers to same point in space-time, these A and B contradict.
B and A are physically embodied and their content may be said to only exist
because it is physically embodied; yet the content is not reducible to its
physical embodiment. We know this because the content remains the same
[invariant] even if we change the physics of its embodiment, whether by
changing the font size, writing it down in crayon on paper or translating it
into another [physically distinct] language. This invariant content is World 3
content and it is only this World 3 content that gives rise to logical
relationships like contradiction - for no two physical entities can in their
merely World 1 physical 'actuality' contradict each other (otherwise they would
show a contradiction exists, which logic forbids); only the World 3 content
embodied in World 1 entities (like written or spoken propositions) can give
rise to a contradiction and then the contradiction will not be with the World 1
content of another entity but only with its World 3
content. The contradiction between B and A is obvious, but it is not embodied:
it is an abstract (though real) relation between the World 3 content of B and A.
Indeed, the World 3 content cannot give rise to a contradiction with a World 2
mental state but only with the World 3 content that may be 'embodied' or
expressed in that World 2 mental state: if Peter believes "Here there is a
snow" and Paul believes "Here there is no snow" there is no contradiction or
logical impossibility in both these psychological states existing, and their
existence as World 2 states gives rise to no contradiction qua World 2 states:
it is only the World 3 content of those World 2 psychological states that gives
rise to a contradiction, so that while Paul and Peter may have contradictory
beliefs, we know the content of those beliefs [qua World 3 content] cannot both
be true.
Now we can see the scale of the task the materialist or physicalist faces [we
might call them 'World Oneists', as they assert all explanation can be made in
World 1 terms]. The materialist or physicalist may suggest that we have been so
far scientifically very successful in explaining many, many things in purely
physical or materialist terms, so in time we will explain all these things that
do not appear purely physical [like mental states and logical relationships] in
purely physical or materialist terms. But we can see that what they need is a
theory that accounts fully for World 2 and World 3 in purely World 1 terms. As
logical validity and 'truth as correspondence with the facts' are not
themselves merely World 1 entities [they did not come into play with the Big
Bang, for example], it is very difficult to see how a logically valid and true
materialist theory can account for its own status in purely materialistic terms.
However, Popper the strict logician would admit that while thorough-going
materialism is self-defeating as a rational position (since the canons of
rationality cannot be reduced to World 1), that does not make it self-refuting.
His imagined dialogue with the materialist will be put forward for discussion
soon I hope.
Donal
England
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