[lit-ideas] Problem Solving: The Analysis

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2015 05:10:27 -0500

Perhaps 'the' analysis, rather than 'an' analysis seems presumptuous, but I 
 guess I'm trying to be provocative. (Recall that when Strawson published 
his  analysis of 'entails', he called his work: Introduction to Logical 
Theory, and  NOT as it is often quoted, AN introduction to logical theory.

McEvoy  seems to be opposing a problem-solving approach (to legal matters, 
but this is  irrelevant) to a conceptual-analysis approach. In particular, 
as I see it, he  endorses a Popperian approach to a problem-solving approach! 
And that may be in  need of analysis!

In "All Life is Problem Solving" (implicating All _of  Popper's life *has 
been* problem solving) Popper seeks to explain the alleged  progress of 
knowledge – that is, how it is that our understanding of stuff seems  to 
*improve* (optimism) rather than not (pessimism). 
What was the life that  Popper saw as solving a problem. Was he having a 
particular problem in  mind?

Well, yes, Popper's problem (and his life can be seen as attempt to  solve 
this) is that some stuff simply does not lend itself to being shown to be  
false, and therefore, is not falsifiable. 

If so, then how is it that  some allege a growth of knowledge? 
In Popper's view, the alleged advance (or  growth, or progress) of 
knowledge is just yet another evolutionary  process.
Only unlike Darwin, Popper was more of an analytic mind, and looked  for 
symbols. Popper's formula runs:
PS1 --> TT1 --> EE1 -->  PS2
In response to a given problem situation ("PS1"), a number of competing  
conjectures, or tentative theories ("TT"), are systematically subjected to the 
 most rigorous attempts at falsification possible. 
This process of  subjection, error elimination ("EE"), performs an 
ANALOGOUS role for knowledge  that Darwin's natural selection (of finches, for 
exmaple) performs for  biological evolution (of finches) -- See: Darwin's 
Finches. 
Yes, a stretch  of an analogy, but not for Popper!
Theories that better "survive" (where the  verb is used totally 
figuratively) the process of refutation are not more true,  but rather, more 
"fit" — 
Popper borrows, but never returns, the phrase that  Darwin borrowed but never 
returned from the analytic philosopher, _avant la  lettre_, Herbert Spencer!
In other words, 'fit', which is figurative enough  as used by Darwin -- 
cfr. criticism of survival of the fittest as an ananlytic  adage -- "the 
fittest survives" -- here means: more applicable to the problem  situation at 
hand, i.e., the initial PS1.
By 'more applicable' Popper means  that the theory that survives is the 
_best_ solution to the problem. Since we  HAVE to use 'solution', when the 
keyword is "Problem Solving". Or even better,  the theory that survives 
_solves_ 
the problem.
Consequently, just as a  species' biological fitness (e.g. the finch's 
fitness) does not ensure continued  survival, neither does rigorous testing 
protect a theory from eventual  refutation.
Yet, as it appears that the engine of biological evolution has,  over many 
generations, produced adaptive traits equipped to deal with more and  more 
complex problems of survival, likewise, the evolution of theories through  
the scientific method may, in Popper's view, reflect a certain type of 
progress:  toward more and more interesting problems: the problem situation 
"PS2" 
in the  formula. And so ad infinitum.
For Popper, it is in the interplay between the  tentative theories 
(conjectures) and error elimination (refutation) that  knowledge advances 
toward 
greater and greater problems -- never mind greater and  greater solvings of 
these problems.
For Popper, it's a process very much akin  to the interplay between genetic 
variation and natural selection.
But of  course the keyword: problem-solving has been understood variously.  
Consider:

Amsel, E., Langer, R., & Loutzenhiser, L. 
Do lawyers  reason differently from psychologists? A comparative design for 
studying  expertise. 
In R. J. Sternberg & P. A. Frensch (Eds.), Complex problem  solving: 
Principles and mechanisms (pp. 223-250). 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence  Erlbaum Associates. 
The keyword there, 'complex problem solving', seems to  vary from Popper's 
interpretation of simple 'problem-solving'. 

I hope we may return to the thread: "The Philosophy of Law" under this  
light. Indeed, we can add the keyword: 'problem solving'.
 
The point would be how it proceeds and how Popperian we want to be. I don't 
 think, from the reading of McEvoy's approach to Pilcher, that he is 
committed to  the 'evolutionary' view. If so, it may be termed 'utilitarian', 
perhaps and  ultimately moralistic. But there is problem solving and there is 
problem  solving. 
 
Another problem solving approach may proceed more 'analytically', and since 
 I only want to play the Hartian, alla Hart. It would proceed by examining  
certain keyterms in the case, such as 'legitimate', 'legal', and so forth. 
And  when the court decision is held, it may be viewed as a mere application 
of those  rules that Hart saw as meta-rules, rules of rules, i.e. legal 
rules of legal  rules. 
 
The evolutionary approach by Popper, as W. W. Bartley, III, well knew, is  
'ad infinitum'. As the formula above shows. There is a PS1, and a PS2, but 
that  is just an abbreviation for PSn. I.e. --> ... PSn. As Bartley would 
say,  'everything is convroversial, including this claim'. So it's not like we 
reach a  definite solving of a problem.
 
In which case, we may term a Popperian approach utilitarian (since it  
relies on the 'survival of the fittest', which is Spencerian and utilitarian or 
 
consequentialist in essence?) and relativistic, in that it entails that the 
 solving of the problem now reached is not the _ultimate_ (in all the 
senses of  this word -- fortunately, it only has one!).
 
The bibliographical reference to this compilation: "Complex problem  
solving" is to show that a Popperian approach is JUST one of them. And while  
those who read this sort of stuff are hardly to be philosophers (the intended  
audience, as the backcover blurb usually has it), I allow that the keyword:  
problem solving may have a general philosophical interest.
 
It may relate to Peirce's idea of ab-duction. Not in-duction, not  
de-duction. In this case, the branch of philosophy on which 'problem solving'  
falls 
is no more no less than the keyword by that brilliant book by [THIS  
PHILOSOPHER I LIKE]: aspects of reason. For we are talking of a form of  
reasoning. We are talking of assumptions, and we are talking of premises, and 
we  are 
talking of 'conclusions' (the 'decision' in the court room).
 
Hart, admittedly, was not that much into legalistic REASONING -- but when  
it came to the 'grits', if that's the expression -- his debate with Lord 
Devlin  -- he could, but I'm not sure how much Hart's contribution to the 
debate (as a  legal philosopher) had a practical effect on the real world 
(other 
than  illuminating his privileged Oxonian students, that is -- especially 
those law  students that saw philosophy 'in the working' for the first time). 
 
But there were and are OTHER influences to legalistic reasoning in Oxford:  
anyone who follows Toulmin's book on inference notices the legalistic 
approach  --. We sometimes confuse a legalistic approach with a moralistic 
approach, but  some see 'moralistic' as a term of abuse! (I know Nowell-Smith, 
in 
"Ethics" did:  "I'm NOT a moralist: I'm a meta-ethicist, if you mustn't!"). 
R. M. Hare was  perhaps a different animal, figuratively. His examples of 
moral reasoning may be  compared to Hart's examples: just replace 'moral' by 
'legal' everytime Hare uses  'prescription'. One big difference is that Hare 
had some sympathy for deontic  (his debates with Kenny on "Practical 
Inferences", for example) and Hart would  rather be seen dead than using a 
symbol 
of formal logic --. When he speaks of "A  logician landscape" it seems as if 
Hart has just come from an exhibition of  Turner* at the Royal Academy! (But 
I love him!)
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
 
* After the British landscape painter -- NOW PLAYING. 
 

Cheers,

Speranza
 
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