Perhaps 'the' analysis, rather than 'an' analysis seems presumptuous, but I guess I'm trying to be provocative. (Recall that when Strawson published his analysis of 'entails', he called his work: Introduction to Logical Theory, and NOT as it is often quoted, AN introduction to logical theory. McEvoy seems to be opposing a problem-solving approach (to legal matters, but this is irrelevant) to a conceptual-analysis approach. In particular, as I see it, he endorses a Popperian approach to a problem-solving approach! And that may be in need of analysis! In "All Life is Problem Solving" (implicating All _of Popper's life *has been* problem solving) Popper seeks to explain the alleged progress of knowledge – that is, how it is that our understanding of stuff seems to *improve* (optimism) rather than not (pessimism). What was the life that Popper saw as solving a problem. Was he having a particular problem in mind? Well, yes, Popper's problem (and his life can be seen as attempt to solve this) is that some stuff simply does not lend itself to being shown to be false, and therefore, is not falsifiable. If so, then how is it that some allege a growth of knowledge? In Popper's view, the alleged advance (or growth, or progress) of knowledge is just yet another evolutionary process. Only unlike Darwin, Popper was more of an analytic mind, and looked for symbols. Popper's formula runs: PS1 --> TT1 --> EE1 --> PS2 In response to a given problem situation ("PS1"), a number of competing conjectures, or tentative theories ("TT"), are systematically subjected to the most rigorous attempts at falsification possible. This process of subjection, error elimination ("EE"), performs an ANALOGOUS role for knowledge that Darwin's natural selection (of finches, for exmaple) performs for biological evolution (of finches) -- See: Darwin's Finches. Yes, a stretch of an analogy, but not for Popper! Theories that better "survive" (where the verb is used totally figuratively) the process of refutation are not more true, but rather, more "fit" — Popper borrows, but never returns, the phrase that Darwin borrowed but never returned from the analytic philosopher, _avant la lettre_, Herbert Spencer! In other words, 'fit', which is figurative enough as used by Darwin -- cfr. criticism of survival of the fittest as an ananlytic adage -- "the fittest survives" -- here means: more applicable to the problem situation at hand, i.e., the initial PS1. By 'more applicable' Popper means that the theory that survives is the _best_ solution to the problem. Since we HAVE to use 'solution', when the keyword is "Problem Solving". Or even better, the theory that survives _solves_ the problem. Consequently, just as a species' biological fitness (e.g. the finch's fitness) does not ensure continued survival, neither does rigorous testing protect a theory from eventual refutation. Yet, as it appears that the engine of biological evolution has, over many generations, produced adaptive traits equipped to deal with more and more complex problems of survival, likewise, the evolution of theories through the scientific method may, in Popper's view, reflect a certain type of progress: toward more and more interesting problems: the problem situation "PS2" in the formula. And so ad infinitum. For Popper, it is in the interplay between the tentative theories (conjectures) and error elimination (refutation) that knowledge advances toward greater and greater problems -- never mind greater and greater solvings of these problems. For Popper, it's a process very much akin to the interplay between genetic variation and natural selection. But of course the keyword: problem-solving has been understood variously. Consider: Amsel, E., Langer, R., & Loutzenhiser, L. Do lawyers reason differently from psychologists? A comparative design for studying expertise. In R. J. Sternberg & P. A. Frensch (Eds.), Complex problem solving: Principles and mechanisms (pp. 223-250). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. The keyword there, 'complex problem solving', seems to vary from Popper's interpretation of simple 'problem-solving'. I hope we may return to the thread: "The Philosophy of Law" under this light. Indeed, we can add the keyword: 'problem solving'. The point would be how it proceeds and how Popperian we want to be. I don't think, from the reading of McEvoy's approach to Pilcher, that he is committed to the 'evolutionary' view. If so, it may be termed 'utilitarian', perhaps and ultimately moralistic. But there is problem solving and there is problem solving. Another problem solving approach may proceed more 'analytically', and since I only want to play the Hartian, alla Hart. It would proceed by examining certain keyterms in the case, such as 'legitimate', 'legal', and so forth. And when the court decision is held, it may be viewed as a mere application of those rules that Hart saw as meta-rules, rules of rules, i.e. legal rules of legal rules. The evolutionary approach by Popper, as W. W. Bartley, III, well knew, is 'ad infinitum'. As the formula above shows. There is a PS1, and a PS2, but that is just an abbreviation for PSn. I.e. --> ... PSn. As Bartley would say, 'everything is convroversial, including this claim'. So it's not like we reach a definite solving of a problem. In which case, we may term a Popperian approach utilitarian (since it relies on the 'survival of the fittest', which is Spencerian and utilitarian or consequentialist in essence?) and relativistic, in that it entails that the solving of the problem now reached is not the _ultimate_ (in all the senses of this word -- fortunately, it only has one!). The bibliographical reference to this compilation: "Complex problem solving" is to show that a Popperian approach is JUST one of them. And while those who read this sort of stuff are hardly to be philosophers (the intended audience, as the backcover blurb usually has it), I allow that the keyword: problem solving may have a general philosophical interest. It may relate to Peirce's idea of ab-duction. Not in-duction, not de-duction. In this case, the branch of philosophy on which 'problem solving' falls is no more no less than the keyword by that brilliant book by [THIS PHILOSOPHER I LIKE]: aspects of reason. For we are talking of a form of reasoning. We are talking of assumptions, and we are talking of premises, and we are talking of 'conclusions' (the 'decision' in the court room). Hart, admittedly, was not that much into legalistic REASONING -- but when it came to the 'grits', if that's the expression -- his debate with Lord Devlin -- he could, but I'm not sure how much Hart's contribution to the debate (as a legal philosopher) had a practical effect on the real world (other than illuminating his privileged Oxonian students, that is -- especially those law students that saw philosophy 'in the working' for the first time). But there were and are OTHER influences to legalistic reasoning in Oxford: anyone who follows Toulmin's book on inference notices the legalistic approach --. We sometimes confuse a legalistic approach with a moralistic approach, but some see 'moralistic' as a term of abuse! (I know Nowell-Smith, in "Ethics" did: "I'm NOT a moralist: I'm a meta-ethicist, if you mustn't!"). R. M. Hare was perhaps a different animal, figuratively. His examples of moral reasoning may be compared to Hart's examples: just replace 'moral' by 'legal' everytime Hare uses 'prescription'. One big difference is that Hare had some sympathy for deontic (his debates with Kenny on "Practical Inferences", for example) and Hart would rather be seen dead than using a symbol of formal logic --. When he speaks of "A logician landscape" it seems as if Hart has just come from an exhibition of Turner* at the Royal Academy! (But I love him!) Cheers, Speranza * After the British landscape painter -- NOW PLAYING. Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html