[lit-ideas] Popper's Trialism: Chapter III
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 17:34:37 -0500
My last post today!
In a message dated 1/29/2015 2:43:47 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
D**
(Who publishes in non-redacted and redacted)
L**
We may still need to answer Omar K.'s question about the spatial location
of spatial location.
Omar K. was noticing that psychological states occur in time, yet time
belongs in the physical world.
I read at
http://vixra.org/pdf/1307.0077v1.pdf
"According to philosopher Osho, there are three types of time, namely
chronological time,
psychological time and real time"
and I wouldn't be surprised if Popper held a similar view -- "even if his
surname doesn't rhyme with "Osho" as Geary would add").
Cheers,
Speranza
McEvoy:
"I agree it would appear contradictory to argue (1) pain belongs to W2
but
(2) that pain also is located within the W1 brain and (3) W2 is located
in
a way distinct to anything located in W1 [i.e. W2 events, like conscious
pain, do not share the identical spatio-temporal location of any W1
events].
I also agree that there is a large and unresolved problem as to the
'location' of consciousness, and thus of W2. I would also agree there is
a large
and unresolved problem as to the 'location' of W3 or W3 contents. But
these
admittedly large and unresolved problems are far from conclusive arguments
against the independence of W2 and of W3 from W1.
I don't intend to suggest a solution to these large problems but here
clarify that Popper's position is that W3 "exists but exists nowhere" and
that
W2 is located not within W1 but somehow adjacent to the W1 brain.
It seems that we have no obvious model for locating anything in space and
time except in the way we seek to locate W1 objects within W1: and this
creates an admitted problem, for there is a lack of any clear model for
how we
'locate' W2 or W3 in these terms.
Despite this, it seems overwhelmingly the case that consciousness exists;
and though it is less overwhelming, the strong case is that consciousness
is distinct from being a mere W1 process - for there is no analogue of
consciousness in any W1 processes as these are conceived by science.
So we quickly reach one of the immense and weird imponderables of the
mind-body problem, that have given rise to very different reactions -
including
that radical materialism, a la Quine, that takes consciousness to be
merely an illusion. But if consciousness is not simply an illusion, the
mind-body dichotomy surfaces in all its presently unsolvable strangeness.
There is
no present possible position without strangeness - the radical
materialist,
in denying consciousness, is one of the strangest. Against the
strangeness
of these alternative positions [e.g. panpsychism] it might seem less
strange to accept the admitted strangeness of accepting a W3 and a W2 that
cannot readily be 'located', and certainly not 'located' in W1 terms."
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