[lit-ideas] Re: Popperians and Griceians
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 24 Feb 2016 19:10:58 +0000 (UTC)
McEvoy:
"My quoted points are directed against an account like Steven Pinker's in
"How the Mind Works". His few pages on Wason are in many ways excellent but
they address Wason Tests as if these show that sometimes "we"/most of us think
logically and sometimes not - as if we have a sometimes 'logical
psychology' and sometimes an 'illogical psychology'. That is a questionable
assumption, even a dubious one: it seems much more likely that when "we" get a
Wason Test wrong our psychology is getting it wrong but it is the same
psychology when we get it right. It is unlikely the correct understanding of
Wason Tests is that we have two or more different W2 psychologies in any
appropriate sense."
I agree. Or as Grice would say, 'do not multiply w2 psychologies beyond
necessity'. >
We may agree but perhaps for very different reasons.
My side of the agreement is not based on applying a version of the Razor: it is
not clear how "beyond necessity" should be judged here (the central weakness in
Razor arguments), and clearly there are many different W2 psychologies that
could be distinguished. So why not here?
My assumption is only a provisional one and to be abandoned if evidence, like
tests, went against it: nevertheless my provisional assumption is based on
looking at the four card example - an 'A', 'D', '4' and '7' (where each card
has a number on one side and a letter on the other) and the rule to be tested
(by turning over cards) is "If a vowel on one side then an even number on the
other". This example was used in my earlier post but perhaps I should amplify
the point.
What are we to say about the psychology of the v. many people who correctly say
we should turn over 'A' and then incorrectly say the other card we need to turn
over is '4' [when the correct other card is actually the '7']? It is not
plausible that (psychologically) they went from 'logical' re 'A' to illogical
as they scanned across to '4', and also illogical as they scanned on '7' and
failed to see its logical relevance: it seems to me much more plausible that it
is all the same individual psychology in relation to the whole set of cards.
It is therefore more plausible to think that just as they are wrongly choosing
'4' on the basis that a vowel on the other side would confirm the rule (which
it would, its just that a consonant would not disconfirm the rule, and so '4'
is logically irrelevant and its confirmatory potential is logically irrelevant)
so they are choosing 'A' for the wrong reason - they are likewise choosing 'A'
because an even number on the other side would confirm the rule (which it
would, its just that an odd number would disconfirm the rule, and it's only
this potential disconfirmation that makes 'A' logically relevant, and its
confirmatory potential is logically irrelevant).
I don't think JLS really understands this - particularly the italicised point
that "confirmatory potential is logically irrelevant". For this point is at the
logical heart of the matter. Yet JLS goes on to make a whole series of claims
that could hardly be made by anyone who properly understands the logic here:-
It is believed that scientists should focus on falsifying their hypotheses.
However this does not tend to happen.>
It really does tend to happen: and you will see scientists quite explicitly
state what it is that would falsify a theory, as well as criticise theories
because they are not in a falsifiable form as against competitors, as well as
improve on investigations into a theory by specifying new tests which could
falsify the theory. Etc. All this is the very lifeblood of scientific
investigation and its method. It happens, a lot - and it is characteristic of
valuable science.
Do not believe philosophers in armchairs who suggest otherwise. They are
outnumbered and logically outclassed by the many scientists who understand
scientific method and the "Logic of Research" in the terms Popper explained.
By comparison to the valuable role of "falsifiability", "confirmability" is not
valuable at all except insofar as its constitutes a success for a falsifiable
theory where it passes a test that could falsify it. This is the
falsificationist version of "confirmation" or "confirmability", and it is
non-inductive. The falsificationist version of "confirmation" or
"confirmability" is, logically and correctly, the only version that explains
their value properly - and then only in terms of how they serve as an adjunct
to falsifiability [i.e. the only valuable "confirmation" is where the
"confirmation" is a success in the face of attempted falsification].
Why is confirmation not otherwise valuable? We've already seen why: its because
mere "confirmatory potential is logically irrelevant" in any logical sense of
testing.
Nearly all reasoning in everyday life is inductive rather than deductive.
Hypothesis testing is a form of inductive reasoning.>
These bare assertions are just inductive make-believe that do not withstand
careful scrutiny. It is possible to write screeds of stuff based on this
make-believe and many philosophers have done so: with very few exceptions
(Quine may be one) it is because they do not understand - as Wason did
understand - that mere "confirmatory potential is logically irrelevant" in any
logical sense of testing.
What may be said is that 'confirmation bias' plays a part, a negative part, in
everyday "reasoning": but this is different from pretending 'confirmation bias'
and the like are a form of logic and that "Nearly all reasoning in everyday
life is inductive."
DL
Who apologises that once I have used italics they seem to have mind of their
own.
Other related posts:
