McEvoy writes:
"These short comments are on the thought/language relation, and may all be
wrong."
Or some of them may.
"1. We can distinguish 'thoughts' that are linguistically formulated from
'thoughts' that are not: and there may very important differences between them
- for example, even where a 'thought' formulated in language is a formulation
of a non-linguistic 'thought' (or an attempt at formulating the non-linguistic
thought), the formulation in language gives the 'thought' an 'objective' form
where it is better able to be criticised or assessed."
On the other hand, the "languaging" of the "thinking" (to use Geary's verb,
"languaging") may SPOIL and even destroy the thought. Cfr. Witters in one of
his aptest aphorisms:
Try to describe the aroma of coffee.
It might be argued that if you work in the coffee industry you need to have
THOUGHTS about the aroma of coffee ("This blend stinks"). But "describing" or
"languaging" this thought is another matter (cfr. Eliot, on a similar vein,
"The naming of cats is a difficult matter.")
McEvoy emphasizes the "better able to be criticised" because he is having
Popper in mind. I'm having Georgia (and Grice) in mind.
"2. We can avoid making the distinction at 1. - for example, by denying the
term 'thought' to anything not lingustically formulated. But a terminological
position - which defines 'thought' in terms of 'language' - offers no
substantive solution and only shifts the problem: which becomes are there, say,
'mental states' that are not linguistically formulated?"
Well, when Frege (Gottlob, if you must) published his "Thought" (tr. by Geach
and Black and published in "Mind") he was having a different thought in mind.
"3. If there are unconscious mental states, it is implausible that these are
all linguistically formulated (though some may be: 'thoughts', in the form of
dialogue, while asleep)."
A mental state is different from a thought. If I say:
i. Grice thinks that he should stop smoking for good.
that's surely different from Grice UTTERING:
ii. I should stop smoking for good.
If Grice 'dreams', "in the form of a dialogue", to echo McEvoy:
iii. Grice's guardian angel: You should stop smoking for good.
Grice: You too.
this begs the question as to how unconscious is unconscious. The point is
further elaborated by D. F. Pears, a disciple of Grice, in "Motivated
irrationality", where he argues AGAINST the idea of the unconsciousness, anyway.
"4. We could challenge anyone to state a 'thought' that is not linguistically
formulated and from their failure argue that there are no such 'thoughts'. But
this would be invalid - the alternative conclusion would be that 'thoughts'
that are not linguistically formulated cannot be expressed as such in language.
This alternative conclusion is compatible with a further conclusion that at
least some of these non-linguistic 'thoughts' may nevertheless be approximated
by a linguistically formulated 'thought' (though others may not) - and this
further conclusion may be supported by recognising the sometimes tortuous
(conscious) process by which non-linguistic 'thought' [or mental state] gets
'converted' into a linguistically formulated 'thought' [or mental state]."
In general, thought is PRIOR to lingo. Lingo is defined (or conceptually
analysed, rather) in terms of thought. Consider Grice:
iv. The word 'dog' means dog because the English-speaking population use 'dog'
to make others believe that they are entertaining a thought that includes the
component of a propositional complex that we refer to as 'dog'.
v. "The dog is on the mat" means that the dog is on the mat if and only if by
uttering "The dog is on the mat", the utterer intends his addressee to believe
that he (the utterer) believes that the dog is on the mat, and further attain
this belief (that the utterer thus believes) by the addressee's recognition
that this is the utterer's intention. (Grice, "Meaning").
Grice uses 'psi', the Greek letter, for a psychological state or attitude (he
disliked talk of PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES), and there's disjunctive thinking (a
hawk who is doubting whether to kill a pigeon or a squirrel, to use Grice's
example) and modus-ponens thinking that animals engage in while they never
verbalise them. Parrots don't count -- but pirots do.
Cheers,
Speranza
Grice, How pirots karulise elatically: some simple ways.
Grice, Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre:
presidential address (Pacific Division), American Philosophical Association,
repr. in Grice, "The concept of value," Clarendon.
Peacocke, C. A. B. Thought and language (in "Thought) -- for the idea of a
propositional complex out of which a 'thought', in Fregeian terms, is
conceptually analysed in terms of perceptual input to the 'thinker'.
Ryle, Thinking.
Rodin, The Thinker.
Wundt, Language and Thought.
Popper, This and That.
