Popper and Grice on the closed/open distinction.
Grice and Popper on the society, morality and knowledge.
It is said (this seems a safer wording, surely, than "Popper once said") that
Popper's concept of an open society is 'epistemological,' rather than
political, as in Soros, or moral, as in Bergson. And then there's Kant (that
Bergson quotes) and and Grice (who spent seven semesters teaching Kant’s moral
theory).
I mention this because Grice had a thing for literal vs. figurative uses of
lexemes.
He once spent a whole seminar on the word ‘between’ (“Jones is between Smith
and Roberts”): “It doesn’t matter if this is in a physical dimension – e.g.
height – or moral character. “Between” has only ONE sense.”
The same he would say about closed/open.
Now, not Kant, but Bergson, first applied the close/open distinction to
'morality' (although "the open society" -- in the French vernacular -- occurs
in Bergson's 1933 opus (tr. to English in 1935 -- and which Popper read) and
Bergson thought that Kant's morality was "pretty closed" (the adjective
"pretty", or its French counterpart, is used by Bergson often). Grice of course
disagreed in his seminars.
This is in the context of discussing isms and ismism, and Popper’s criterion
(or conceptual analysis) of a society (be that “S”) to be called “C” (closed)
or “O” (open) – or, if we prefer, Bergson's original conceptual analysis of a
closed morality (that “M”) versus an open morality (Bergson sees the
application of the close/open distinction to 'society' as secondary and not
prior).
It seems that in Popperianism, since again we are talking of isms and ismisms,
the presence or absence of this or that ism is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for a "S" (or a "M", where "M" as Bergson would prefer) to
be either close or open.
As McEvoy notes in his exegesis:
"I don't think Popper once said any such thing like isms are the mark of a
closed society.”
McEvoy gives a couple of arguments for this thought of his. First,
"There must be plenty of isms in [an open society] also." Second, while
"[w]e might characterise a closed society in terms of certain -isms [e.g.
tribalism, authoritarianism], and those -isms may mark a closed society, … that
does not mean -isms as such are peculiar only to closed societies."
Point taken – and thanks for the clarification.This seems terribly complex,
though. So there is a good case to think that isms have nothing to do with
Popper’s criterion of demarcation (to borrow from his philosophy of science)
between the close and the open.
Problem with tracing what Popper said on this and that is analogous to the
problem philosophers of ancient philosophy find themselves when tracing what
Socrates is alleged to have said (vide “Socrates’s unwritten doctrines”).
But is interesting that Popper dislocates the Bergsonian prior idea of a closed
morality (vs. an open morality) and qualifies a _society_, rather – as Bergson
admittedly does secondarily -- as being either closed or open. But Kant and
Grice may argue that conceptual analysis in terms of morality (rather than
society) seems to bear more philosophical import.
Unlike Popper, who, like Kant, spoke in German, Bergson did it in French
(Grice, whose surname is Anglo-Norman – and means ‘grey’ in Old French –
preferred the Birminghamian dialect of English.
A few quotations in the original Frenchh Bergson may clarify, or not:
Proche d’Émile Durkheim à cet égard, Bergson considère que la première morale,
la MORALE CLOSE, est tout le système d’habitudes qui règlent notre conduite en
fonction des exigences sociales et que l’on appelle ou que l’on rattache à
l’obligation morale mais qui procède en réalité de la vie. Elle correspond,
écrit William Marceau “à ce qu’est l’instinct animal ; elle répond pour l’être
intelligent à cet instinct qui unit entre elles les abeilles d’une ruche et les
fourmis d’une fourmilière, aux habitudes qui assurent aux cellules d’un
organisme un bon fonctionnement : les mœurs de l’homme sont inscrites dans sa
nature comme celles de l’abeille et de la fourmi.” La société qui fait pression
sur nous de cette façon n’est pas l’humanité en général mais la famille, le
clan, la tribu, bref une société close dont les impératifs loin de valoir comme
ceux de la morale kantienne par exemple, pour tout être raisonnable en général,
ne valent que pour des groupes à part et fermés. Elle est étrangère à l’élan
vital dont est sortie l’humanité globale. Au contraire, la MORALE OUVERTE est
l’appel du Héros, de l’homme supérieur, du saint ou du mystique “qui a soulevé
d’un élan puisé par lui au contact de la source de l’élan vital même et qui
tâche d’entraîner les autres hommes à sa suite. Tels furent Socrate,
Jésus-Christ surtout et les saints du christianisme. Ce n’est plus une
pression, comme la société, qu’ils font peser sur les individus, pour les figer
dans la routine et constituer une morale statique, c’est un appel qu’ils font
entendre, une émotion qu’ils communiquent et qui pousse derrière eux les
multitudes enflammées, avides de les imiter.” Ce qu’ils fondent est la morale
ouverte. William Marceau, Jean Lebrec, Jacques Chevalier considèrent qu’il y a
une influence de la pensée bersgonienne chez Joseph Malègue, en particulier
dans son roman inachevé Pierres noires. Les classes moyennes du Salut, à
travers notamment ce concept éponyme qui vise tant la morale close que la
religion statique —morale close et religion statique que les saints, par leur
vie même, appellent à dépasser. Citant Bergson, Alain Bouaniche écrit que
l'émotion ici en cause est différente de l'émotion superficielle qui ne
concerne que nos “nerfs” ou encore du choc, de la sidération. Elle est plutôt,
dit-il, “une totalité dynamique qui nous envahit, au point de se confondre avec
notre volonté.” Ce qui est perçu au contact du héros ou du saint, n’est pas du
même ordre que l’obligation dans la morale close. C’est ici de la morale
ouverte, une obligation d’une toute autre nature, dont il est question” “ce
n’est pas la société qui pèse du poids de l’habitude sur l’individu, mais
l’individu écoutant, en lui-même, les résonances d’une émotion le libérant de
ses habitudes, c’est-à-dire aussi bien de la société que de lui-même.»
And now for a short of a summary of the type that Grice, and the
English-language Popper might better understand. As usual, Bergson starts by
differentiating within a mixture.
Under the word “morality” or under the phrase “moral obligation,” there is a
mixture of two kinds of morality.
There is the “closed” morality, whose religion is static, and there is the
“open” morality, whose religion is dynamic.
“Closed” morality and static religion are concerned with social cohesion.
Nature has made certain species evolve in such a way that the individuals in
these species cannot exist on their own.
They are fragile and require the support of a community.
One quickly thinks of bees, and Bergson, of course, refers to them.
We can see again that there are bodily needs which must be satisfied.
The force of these needs is the source of the “closed” morality.
Because of these needs, there is a rigidity to the rules of “closed”
moralities.
Kant's moral philosophy has its source in such needs.
The survival of the community requires that there be strict obedience: the
categorical imperative.
Yet, although Kant's categorical imperative is supposed to be universal, it is
not, according to Bergson.
It is limited and particular.
“Closed” morality really concerns the survival of a society, MY society.
Therefore, it always excludes other societies.
Indeed, for Bergson, a “closed” morality is always concerned with war.
And static religion, the religion of a “closed” morality, is based on what
Bergson calls the “fabulation function.”
The fabulation function is a particular function of the imagination that
creates “voluntary hallucinations.”
The fabulation function takes our sense that there is a presence watching over
us and invents images of gods.
These images then insure strict obedience to the closed morality.
In short, they insure social cohesion.
But, there is another kind of morality and religion, according to Bergson.
The “open” morality and dynamic religion are concerned with creativity and
progress.
They are not concerned with social cohesion, and thus Bergson calls this
morality “open” because it includes everyone.
The “open” morality is genuinely universal and it aims at peace, not war.
It aims at an “open society” (an expression which Popper translated to
Austrian).
The source of the “open” morality is what Bergson calls “creative emotions.”
The difference between creative emotions and normal emotions consists in this.
In normal emotions, we first have a representation which causes the feeling (I
see my friend and then I feel happy).
In creative emotion, we first have the emotion which then creates
representations.
So, Bergson gives us the example of the joy of a musician who, on the basis of
emotion, creates a symphony, and who then produces representations of the music
in the score.
We can see here that Bergson has also finally explained how the leap of an
intuition happens.
The creative emotion makes one unstable and throws one out of the habitual mode
of intelligence, which is directed at needs.
Indeed, in The Two Sources, Bergson compares creative emotions to unstable
mental states as those found in the mad.
But what he really has in mind is mystical experience.
For Bergson, however, mystical experience is not simply a disequilibrium.
Genuine mystical experience must result in action; it cannot remain simple
contemplation of God.
This association of creative emotions with mystical experience means that, for
Bergson, dynamic religion is mystical. Indeed, dynamic religion, because it is
always creative, cannot be associated with any particular organized set of
doctrines. A religion with organized – and rigid — doctrines is always static.
Cheers,
Speranza
