[lit-ideas] Popper: In Praise of Ignorance
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 26 Dec 2013 07:12:25 -0500 (EST)
In a message dated 12/24/2013 7:45:44 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
Newtonian physics is studied, I think (though I am not a physicist), for
more than historical or pedagogical reasons. It is studied in part because,
though strictly false, it is still a stupendously successful physics in
that it passes many, many tests. It also sets the ground for understanding the
physics that advances upon it.What Eddington’s results appeared to show
was that the Newtonian physics under test was false. That meant that physics
was false even in the myriad cases where it was proven consistent with the
experimental outcome. .. Now that is something with potentially
revolutionary impact on the direction of scientific theorising, testing and
research.
It also had a revolutionary impact on philosophy via Popper's philosophy of
science and theory of knowledge.
Hear, hear!
Or as Geary's spelling prefers:
"Here! Here!" (Geary submits that it's the deictic element that permeates
the 'auditory' use of 'hear': "It's me, here, claiming that you should
_hear_ this or that" which becomes the central implicature.
It may do to reflect on McEvoy's points above, vis-à-vis these other by
Walter O. and Omar K. Walter had written:
"I submit that the idea of "false knowledge" is self-contradictory. If I
k-that
P, then P can't be false. If P is false, then I don't/can't k-that P.
(Although
I can of course k-that P is false.)"
So let us focus on:
I know that p is false.
I submit that we need an operator, which is the converse of Frege's
'assertion' sign:
⊢p
for
i. I assert that it is raining
Conversely
-/ p
ii. I deny that it is raining.
More importantly, while one seems to ENDORSE what one knows to be true (or
what one knows, since 'to be true' I hold, with Ramsey, to be
_redundant_), one has a DUTY to reject what one knows to be false.
In his reply to Omar K., McEvoy elaborates on verosimilitude, and again
stresses the importance of falsiability in Popper's philosophy of science. One
important episode here being the
Newton/Eddington
interface. To requote McEvoy:
"Newtonian physics is studied, I think (though I am not a physicist), for
more than historical or pedagogical reasons. It is studied in part because,
though strictly false, it is still a stupendously successful physics in
that it passes many, many tests. It also sets the ground for understanding the
physics that advances upon it.What Eddington’s results appeared to show
was that the Newtonian physics under test was false. That meant that physics
was false even in the myriad cases where it was proven consistent with the
experimental outcome. .. Now that is something with potentially
revolutionary impact on the direction of scientific theorising, testing and
research.
It also had a revolutionary impact on philosophy via Popper's philosophy of
science and theory of knowledge."
We may need an elaboration, then, on operators, not just like
Kp
for Agent knows that p.
But something for 'Agent ignores that p'.
We may consider that 'to ignore' (literally, to un-know) corresponds to
'not-know', and would, in symbols, incorporate
~
-- i.e. the negation sign.
So, we may want to identify the theses (or propositions), since as Omar K.
notes, they may be various, as held by Newton to (wrongly -- if you excuse
the split infinitive) hold. This set we may label "Newton's IGNORANCE".
By stressing on this Popper ends up indeed offering a praise of ignorance,
in an 'early' modern manner. "Praises" seem to have been a typical genre by
then in early modern philosophy. Cfr. Erasmus's praise of folly (1509).
Erasmus's praise essay is filled with classical allusions delivered in a
style typical of the learned humanists of the Renaissance.
Folly parades as a goddess, offspring of Plutus, the god of wealth and a
nymph, Freshness.
Folly, Erasmus claims, was nursed by two other nymphs Inebriation and
Ignorance, her faithful companions include Philautia (self-love), Kolakia
(flattery), Lethe (forgetfulness), Misoponia (laziness), Hedone (pleasure),
Anoia (madness), Tryphe (wantonness) and two gods Komos (intemperance) and
Eegretos Hypnos (dead sleep). Folly praises herself endlessly, arguing that
life
would be dull and distasteful without her.
Note again the identification of Folly's nurse, Ignorance.
Ignorance Popper should possibly locate in W3 -- his parlance for "World
3", the world of 'objective' products of humanity (including what we, in his
manner, may regard as 'false knowledge').
Strictly, ignorance is a state of being uninformed (lack of knowledge).
I submit, to follow Walter O., that we should distinguish between
ignorant-that and ignorant-of. Further, I submit that the IMPLICATURE (but
_never_
logical implication) of
"He is ignorant of p"
is that
p
does hold.
It's only Eddington (and after him, his followers) who can point what
Newton was ignorant of.
It would be antimoral to pose that Newton held a certain proposition 'p' as
part of his pride in being ignorant about p. Only in the 'light' of
knowledge can a proposition 'p' be dubbed a piece of an agent's ignorance.
So, ignorance is both a state and a propositional attitude -- of sorts.
The word "ignorant", in English, is best used as adjective describing a
person in the state of being unaware. While it is often used as an insult to
describe individuals who deliberately ignore or disregard important
information or facts, this should not be so. To allow for VOLITIONAL
ignorance, we
need a further state of mind, or propositional attitude, "W", for will.
For if Newton deliberately disregards important information and defends his
ignorance, the logical form seems to be something like
nW~Kp
-- where 'n' is short of 'Newton'. Surely Eddington never criticised Newton
for this. So, the weaker ascription, to the effect that Newton _ignored_
(simpliciter and even involuntarily) this or that seems a more charitable
approach.
On top of that, "ignoramus" is commonly used in Ireland and other places as
a term for someone who is willfully ignorant. Strictly, there is a
plurality in the construction ''--mus" (modern Italian, -"mo") that may have
Popperian implicatures: it may be held that if subjects A and B are ignorant
of
p, and willfully so (and they both say in unison, 'ignoramus') they may
construct a 'belt' to protect their false beliefs (or absence of truth
beliefs) against possible justification.
Ignorance, it should be pointed out, should be distinguished from what
English authors refer to as "stupidity", although both can lead to "unwise"
acts, in G. E. M. Anscombe's use of 'act'.
Ignorance, to echo Pynchon, is not thus just a blank space on a person's
mental map.
Pynchon, if not Popper, notes that Ignorance may have contours and
coherence, and what Pynchon goes on to call "rules of operation" as well.
Pynchon, if not Popper, goes on to note that as a corollary to the advice
of writing about what we know, maybe we should add getting familiar with our
ignorance.
Eddington in this sense may be said to have put in clear evidence (for all
to see) what, after Pynchon, we may dub the 'rules of operation' of
Newton's ignorance.
There is, incidentally, a "legal", as it were, principle, appropriately
formualted in Latin (from a time when lawyers studied Roman law and followed
Lit. Hum. courses at Oxford):
Ignorantia juris non excusat.
While the object of 'excusat' is merely IMPLICATED ("ignorance of the law
is no excuse"), the principle can be genearlised to non-legal cases:
Ignorance not excusat.
-- as, mutatis mutandis, curiosity did not excuse the cat of his death.
The legal principle (often uses in pieces of legal reasoning) stands for
the proposition that the law applies also to those who are unaware of it. In
the more general application,
"Ignorance is no excuse"
the corollary would seem to be that, say, the laws of physics apply even
for those who are UNAWARE of them, as Newton was.
I.e. Newton cannot stick, wilfully, to his ignorant beliefs (or lack of
true beliefs) ONCE Eddington, at a later time, proved Newton 'ignorant' of the
(true -- redundant) facts of things.
One corollary of this is that individuals with what we may informally dub
"superficial knowledge" (if not partial knowledge) of a topic or subject may
be worse off than people who know absolutely nothing.
It's because Newton attempted a system of physics, rather than his
neighbour back in Lincolnshire, who just _farmed_, that led Newton to errors,
but
not his neighbour.
Indeed, we owe to Charles Darwin (the inventor of natural selection) the
apt observation:
"Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than does knowledge."
He was referring of course to his arch-enemy:
Samuel Wilberforce, the English bishop in the Church of England, third son
of William Wilberforce, was, for some reason, known as "Soapy Sam".
One of the greatest public speakers of his day, he is probably best
remembered today for his opposition debate with Huxley.
Wilberforce asked Thomas Henry Huxley whether it was through his
grandfather or his grandmother that he claimed his descent from a monkey.
Huxley rhetorically replied:
"I would not be ashamed to have a monkey for my ancestor [implicature:
either from the maternal or paternal said; further implicature: Wilberforce's
request for specification here belies ignorance], but I would be ashamed to
be connected with a man who used his great gifts to obscure the truth."
While Huxley never STATED this, it is assumed that we wanted to "IMPLICATE"
(in Grice's use) the Reverend Wilberforce in the proceedings.
In short, what Popper may seem to be stressing in his copious writings, is
that Ignorance can stifle learning, especially if the ignorant person
believes that they are not ignorant.
There is a logic to this:
~K~Kp
The agent does not know that he does not know that p.
This should be clearly distinguished from 'ignorant' Socrates's dictum:
K~Kx
(I know I know nothing)
(cfr. Geach, quoting, "Plato is an enemy of mine, but falsity is a greater
enemy").
A person who falsely believes he or she is knowledgeable will not seek out
clarification of his or her beliefs, but rather rely on his or her ignorant
position.
And it would NOT be surprising that this person ends up writing "In praise
of ignorance". This is NOT Popper's case. Popper seems to see a virtue in
the REFUTATION of past ignorance by present wisdom. There seems to be a
regressus in that, since knowledge is never infallible, such a refutation is a
constant possibility.
Unlike cases mentioned by McEvoy, like
2 + 2 = 4
we have more substantial claims like
e = mc2
which the future (or SOMEONE in the future, more strictly) may prove to be
an item of the 'ignorance' of physics.
The willful ignorant may also reject valid but contrary information,
neither realizing its importance nor understanding it.
Again, this rejection may be either willful or not, and the cases call for
subtleties in the application of the adage, 'ignorantia not excusat'.
For example, one may _ignore_ 'ignorantia non excusat' or challenge it, in
a meta-linguistic fashion.
This concept of meta-linguistic replication of ignorance has been somewhat
elucidated by Justin Kruger and David Dunning in their brilliant:
"Unskilled and Unaware of It:
How Difficulties in Recognizing One's Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated
Self-Assessments,"
where they identify what they call, "for lack of a better, wiser, label",
the Dunning–Kruger effect.
In Vedanta, avidyā, is a concept that requires eluciation.
It is opposed to Vidya, knowledge.
Literally, Avidya is not knowledge. But metaphorically, it may be something
else -- even something good.
As Thomas Gray once said,
Where ignorance is bliss 'tis folly to be wise.
The phrase, from Ode on a Distant Prospect of Eton College, is Grice holds,
possibly one of the most misconstrued phrases in English literature in
terms of its 'conversational implicature'.
Gray is not promoting ignorance at Eton, but is reflecting with nostalgia
on a time when he was allowed to be ignorant, his youth (more or less: circa
1742, while attending Eton).
By transitiveness, he may be implicating that his Eton tutors were
ignorant. Or not.
General Ignorance, the final round of the BBC Quiz show QI is aptly called
"General Ignorance" (an irony on "Common knowleddge"). "General ignorance"
which focuses on seemingly easy questions which have obvious but wrong
answers -- such as "Does God exist?"
The Encyclopaedia of General Ignorance (now in paperback) is a derivative
from the BBC QI Quiz show .
The encyclopedia aims to address the comprehensive and humiliating
catalogue of all the misconceptions, mistakes and misunderstandings in 'common
knowledge'.
Popper turns Fallibilism into the philosophical principle that human
beings could be wrong about their beliefs, expectations, or their understanding
of the world, and yet still be justified in holding their incorrect beliefs.
Ignorance management, a knowledge management practice that addresses the
concept of ignorance in organizations.
Innocence, a term sometimes used to indicate a naive lack of knowledge or
understanding. Blake does this, while realising that "He is innocent", and
"He is ignorant" may trigger diverse (he does not use the term)
implicatures.
Jahiliyyah is the Islamic concept for "ignorance of divine guidance". The
phrase has a restricted use, and, as Geary notes, "it presupposes that of
divine guidance, most of us are ignorant of, anyways".
Finally, what some 'ignorant' philosophers call "rational ignorance" is a
voluntary state of ignorance that can occur when the cost of educating
oneself on an issue exceeds the potential benefit that the knowledge would
provide.
Cheers,
Speranza
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