God it seems to me blows the hell out of philosophy. He would, according
to my catechism, have to be omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, (see
Aquinas) that is to say for God to be God, God would have to be
ominiomnium, everything that is and everything that isn't. If there is a
God how could there be any not-God? If there is no not-God, how could
there be a God? Nothing else exists. "C'est moi" says God in everything
that is and that isn't. God? C'est moi. says I.
On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 7:46 AM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza for DMARC <
dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
In a message dated 2/2/2016 5:08:54 A.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
But does Speranza know whether this all-powerful God/god can do an act
they cannot undo? D (Logician to the gods)
In "Vacuous Names" (Grice's discussion of the implicatures of "Pegasus
doesn't really exist"), Grice mentions that his approach (System Q, in
honour
of Quine) "does not create a Meinongian jungle."
But Popper's third realm might, for 'square triangle,' may have been the
output of some infamous mathematician, and as such, qua product of
'objective
knowledge' (in Popper's rather loose use of 'knowledge') it might well be
that Popper would claim that some mathematician thinks that a square
triangle "is a thing to behold," and as such an item of w3.
By the time Grice and Popper were discussing this, Meinong had left this
realm.
Before dying, Meinong found the time to discuss with Baron Russell.
Russell had chiefly objected to Meinong's theory as inconsistent because
of the
following:
(1) Some propositions about impossible objects (e.g., “The round square is
round and not round”) are contradictory.
(2) Although it is a fact that the existent present King of France/the
round square does not exist, one also has to conclude (using the
characterization principle) that he/it does exist.
Russell told Meinong in an infamous letter -- written in a rather poor
German -- that he can provide a radical cure for Meinong's inconsistencies
by
applying his theory of descriptions, which treat definite (and indefinite)
descriptions as incomplete symbols that are to be eliminated in favor of
existential quantification and predicates.
According to Russell, the problems involved stem from the mistaken view
that the grammatical form of language always corresponds to its logical
form,
and that if an expression means something, there must always be some thing
that it means.
But while denoting phrases such as “The so-and-so” look like referring
expressions they are, in fact, nothing of the sort. It is because Meinong
wrongly assumes that such expressions are referring expressions whose
meaning
is what they refer to that his theory is apt to infringe logical laws.
Meinong never opened that letter.
Cheers,
Speranza
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