Amazing how tenacious some people can be... >>Moreover, what about the many, many cases where "legal reasons" are given - >>how does this second point show that in those cases "legal reasons" are "not >>necessary or essential"? >> >*Let's see. Many people drink coffee with milk. Still, some drink it without >milk, and call it coffee. I would infer from this fact that milk is not an >essential or necessary ingredient of coffee, wouldn't you ?> Was wondering when coffee would come into it (rather than drawing on the vast reservoir of "any legal ruling ever"). What this analogy ignores is the arguments given: >>The second point made is that (apparently) "In many cases, a court may >>decline to issue reasons for its orders or judgment". This _might appear_ to >>offer Omar some support, namely that in those cases "legal reasons" are "not >>necessary or essential". But how "many cases" are like this? And what kind of >>case are they? Perhaps, they are exceptional in some way. Indeed, my >>suggestion is this: even where "legal reasons" are deemed "not necessary or >>essential", there will always be "legal reasons" why they are deemed "not >>necessary or essential" (in contrast with the many cases where they are >>deemed necessary and essential) - so, even 'understanding the law' as to >>where (exceptionally) "legal reasons" are not required, requires >>understanding the "legal reasons" for why they are not required. This is >>enough to destroy the second point as any support for Omar's view that "legal >>reasons" are "not necessary or essential" to the law or to understanding the >>law.>> If we stick to coffee, the analogy would be more like this: there is an EC directive as to what may be offered for sale as "coffee" - the directive stipulates that something may only be offered "coffee" if milk is used or that it may in some circumstances be offered as "coffee" though no milk is used: in either case "coffee" has to comply with the relevant "milk" requirements, so that even when milk is not required in the drink it is only in circumstances permitted by the "milk" requirements. Therefore satisfying the "milk" requirements is always "necessary and essential" if something is to be offered for sale as "coffee" (whether milk is used in the coffee or not is a separate question). Therefore it is true that compliance with the "milk" requirements is always "necessary and essential"; and it is false to deny this - and it is false to suggest the "milk" requirements do not always apply because they permit something to be offered as "coffee" in certain specified circumstances though no milk is used. Anyone familiar with "any legal ruling ever" might be lawyer enough to know this. >As to the above, it might have some validity if you can provide some evidence >to support it and not expect us to take your word for it. > This is rich from someone who (a) complains they are weary of length as soon as an example [Pilcher v Rawlins] is discussed (b) acts like they are familiar with "any legal ruling ever" (c) offers the contention that in "many cases" legal reasons are not required without a jot of evidence in support (the quote is not self-corroborating btw, as any lawyer might explain for a fee). Where is Omar's evidence of "many cases"? Omar's post does not even make clear whether the "many cases" include those where reasons are "reserved" - i.e. the court announces the result but defers giving reasons until a future date: these are cases where legal reasons may be "necessary and essential", it is simply the giving of them that is deferred. So perhaps Omar should give some examples that back up his views - though I have already indicated they will not sustain his POV because (a) those examples will not explain away the cases where legal reasons are given and appear "necessary and essential" (b) even those cases will have to be explained in terms of "legal reasons" why legal reasons are not required for the decision in those cases. D Ldn