[lit-ideas] Re: Plato's Regress
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 18 May 2013 18:25:41 -0400 (EDT)
We should recheck, "Keywords: Popper Plato "World 3" Idea --.
I'm glad Popper discussed the issue. Meanwhile, a commentary on McEvoy (who
"must dash" as he wrote the bit which, appropriately, I'm also providing a
"running commentary" -- I've always loved the philosophical usage of
"running commentary" since I learned it from the subtitle to a book on Plato:
"Interpretation of Plato's doctrines: a running commentary". Cfr. Sillitoe,
"The loneliness of a long-distance runner".
In a message dated 5/18/2013 12:32:18 P.M. UTC-02,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx quotes from Wikipedia (which we find offensive in it
being _Anonymous_)
and rightly points that "extra meaning" has no meaning. Cfr. Grice,
"Meaning", and the utterance by newspaper vendors: "Extra! Extra!" -- and
combine.
For Wikipedia writes (or 'wrote' -- last accessed sometime):
"The World 3 objects, although extant in World 1, are embodied and given
extra
meaning by World 3."
and McEvoy corrects:
"W3 objects are embodied [SURELY] in W1 and not in W3 [Who _is_ this
Wikipedia writer? And then to have me QUOTING him/her!].
McEvoy hastens (or 'dashes' as he'd prefer) to correct:
"[B]ut I did *not* endorse the somewhat opaque claim that W3 objects are
given "extra meaning" by W3.:
Good.
"Its W3 content is not given some "extra" content by W3".
It may do to do some google on "Extra Meaning". For we consider the
Vittoria di Samotracia. The well-known sculpture now in the Louvre.
As is well known, Marinetti objected to her beauty.
There's the Vittoria di Samotracia, qua piece of stone, and the IDEA of
Beauty that such a Vittoria represents.
Marinetti said,
4.Noi affermiamo che la magnificenza del mondo si è arricchita di una
bellezza nuova; la bellezza della velocità. Un automobile da corsa col suo
cofano adorno di grossi tubi simili a serpenti dall'alito esplosivo... un
automobile ruggente, che sembra correre sulla mitraglia, è più bello della
Vittoria di Samotracia.
Article 4 of Futurist Manifesto
From Wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Winged_Victory_of_Samothrace
"The Victory soon became a cultural icon to which artists responded in many
different ways. For example, Abbott Handerson Thayer's A Virgin (1892–93)
is a well-known painted allusion. When Filippo Tommaso Marinetti issued his
Futurist Manifesto in 1909, he chose to contrast his movement with the
supposedly defunct artistic sentiments of the Winged Victory:
"... a race-automobile which seems to rush over exploding powder is more
beautiful than the 'Victory of Samothrace'.""
--- and it may do to apply different "meanings" (qua Meinong objects even)
of "Victory of Samothrace', and, for that matter, 'a race-automobile'.
Never mind "[being more] beautiful" qua item in World 3.
McEvoy:
"The point is that the W3 content of a W3 object, though it may be
embodied in W1, is never reducible to its W1 embodiment - and, in this sense,
if
we confine ourselves entirely to World 1 we have no access to World 3 objects
in purely World 1 terms. Rather we have to think in terms of objects of
the following sort:- (a) either W3.1 or W1.3 objects - that is, W3 objects
that are embodied or instantiated in World 1. Here W3.1 = W1.3 and both
denote that section of World 3 content that is physically encoded - for
example,
in physical brain states [including content encoded as memories], in books
and in recordings. (b) either W3.2 or W2.3 objects - that is, W3 objects
whose content is grasped by W2 and which exists at this World 2 level. We
may here leave aside the potential overlap between W3 content that is grasped
by W2 and content that is physically encoded in the W1 brain: for example,
a W2 thought may have content that is W3.2 but this content may also be
paralleled by a W3.1 brain state: Popper's position allows that much
mind-body or W2/W1 relations will be a parallelistic, however he wishes to
defend
the view that additional to this kind of parallelism there is also downward
and upward causation between W1 and W2]. (c) either W3.3 or W3.3 objects -
this the section of World 3 whose contents have not as yet been grasped by
W2 or encoded in W1."
Perhaps an illustration might do.
The Victory of Samothrace is surely an unique object.
"Discovered on the island of Samothrace (in Greek, Σαμοθρακη —
Samothraki) and published in 1863, the Victory was erected by the Macedonian
general Demetrius I Poliorcetes after his victory at Cyprus between in 289 BC.
The Archaeological Museum of Samothrace continues to follow these originally
established provenance and dates."
Then there's the _appreciation_ (or failing to have it) of the beauty of
the "Victory" -- say, by Mrs. Marinetti. In the case of Marinetti, we may
need to find an exemplification of the Platonic idea, "a race-car", as to
which MAKE he found more beautiful than the above piece of stone. I submit he
meant "any", as per "(x)" -- "any car" -- rather than "(Ex)" ("there is some
specific car which...")
--- And then we may have Popper thinking that there is a "Victory of
Samothrace" somehow as a World-3 specimen or item.
---
McEvoy continues:
"In the case of Russell's finding a flaw in Frege's system of logic, that
flaw was in W3.3 before it entered Russell's W2 mind and before it was
encoded in W1 when Russell wrote about it. Popper is clear that, in his view,
the content of World 3 extends to this W3.3 [...]: that is, World 3 extends
beyond its own physically encoded section in World 1 [above described as
W3.1 or W1.3] and the section that is grasped in World 2 [above described as
W3.2 or W2.3]. That is: W3 > W3.2 and W3.1 - which is also to say there is a
W3.3.
And Popper would explain Russell's finding of the flaw as an example of
the "downward causation" of W3.3 on W3.2 and W3.1 - and in this way an example
of World 3 having downward causation on World 2 and World 1. But when we
look at a physically encoded work of art or science purely in terms of its
physics or other World 1 attributes then we are looking at such objects only
as W1.1 objects. Looked at as such, such objects are devoid of any World 3
content."
And in which ways does Popper argue that this _deprives_ things of meaning?
In the case of Fermat's conjecture being explained without reference to
Fermat, or to use McEvoy's example, Russell's Paradox _not_ in terms of the
Lord of Monmouthshire (*) seems slightly rude vis-à-vis their discoverers.
It's somewhat different with what the Americans call "Columbus Day", in
memory of Columbus (as discoverer of America) seeing that America was,
allegedly -- as by proofs, etc -- well there before Columbus had any
'discovery'
or saying on the matter.
(* Monmouthshire, sometime part of England, today Wales) (Wiki: "Bertrand
Russell was born on 18 May 1872 at Ravenscroft, Trellech, Monmouthshire,
Wales, into an influential and liberal family of the British aristocracy."
-- (Keywords: English, Welsh, philosopher))
McEvoy then continues to 'quote' from Wikipedia ("To use 'quote'
simpliciter is rude, vis-à-vis someone who would not have chosen to quote from
it"):
"the intrinsic value of Hamlet as a World 3
object has many embodiments in World 1, the physical world. This idea
would
be something along the lines of a meta-object, or a form of a being."
-- which I had referred to as "uncomplicted".
McEvoy comments:
"[I]t is clear this is not "uncomplicated" but rather highly problematic
prose."
I was referring to the pretty good reference to this relating to a 'form'
(or as I'd prefer "mode") of 'being. Surely the phrase 'meta-object' is
possibly nonsensical. But then, recall that for Carnap, 'nonsense' lies at the
'heart' (he said metaphorically) of 'metaphysics'. There is a slight
difference between a metaphysical statement and a nonsensical one and an
analytically false one (if the metaphysics is wrong) -- as in "Fermat's
conjecture
exists without Fermat having ever conjectured it."
---- Keyword: MODES OF BEING, Meinong. -- and Grice's remark that one has
to avoid a "Meinongian ontological jungle" (He opted for Warwickshire
prairies).
McEvoy:
"Not everything can be explained at once, but it is wrong to suggest there
is an "intrinsic value" of Hamlet as a W3 object - or at least problematic
- for the fact something has World 3 status tells us nothing as to its
"intrinsic value". We may speak more accurately by saying that the given
content of Hamlet may be embodied in World 1 (and this leaves open what object
we
designate by Hamlet as having such given content) but it is then vital to
see that this World 3 content does not become World 1 content - all that is
happening is that World 3 content is being encoded in World 1, but without
its content losing its World 3 character. This is clear when we see that
World 3 content when embodied in World 1 forms is properly understood as
being a W3.1 object and cannot ever be properly understood a W1.1 or merely
World 1 object."
OK. Next would be to doublecheck Popper/Plato, and Popper/Meinong, and then
perhaps back to overpopulation of the, thus called by Popper, "World 3".
It's good Popper is not alone on this. There's McEvoy -- and Ikka
Niniluoto:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/38155-categories-of-being-essays-on-metaphysics-and-
logic/
"Ilkka Niiniluoto paints a somewhat similar picture in his essay 'On Tropic
Realism': properties, as classes of similar tropes, are for him
inhabitants of Popper's world 3. This is Platonic realism, contrasted with the
moderate realism espoused by David Armstrong."
Cheers,
Speranza
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