>"We don't attribute "knowledge-that" to someone who doesn't have the right kind of evidence or reasons for her belief, or who simply eschews the requirement of having any evidence or reasons for her knowledge-claims> This is just the make-believe of a certain philosophical tradition that admittedly has a certain intuitive appeal and which is so deeprooted a tradition its very questionable status becomes invisible to many under its sway (but then some people for years took it as self-evident that the sun went round the earth). In another tradition, we can attribute "knowledge-that" even to a tree, though a tree lacks evidence and reasons and even beliefs. A tree that is short of water has "knowledge-that" one possible solution is to extend its roots: this solution is a kind of knowledge built into the tree without evidence or beliefs or reasons in the sense of Justified True Belief (we may say it is built in by "natural selection"). A bee has "knowledge-that" if it follows certain cues it will get back to the hive, though it is stretch to think it has Justified True Belief of the kind some hidebound philosophers would claim is indispensable to "knowledge-that"(we may say the bee's "knowledge-that" is a result of "natural selection"). The world of nature cannot be understood without understanding the "knowledge" of organisms, even if this "knowledge" is to be understood as "knowledge" constituted by World 1 dispositions and falls short of World 3 "knowledge" of the kind humans have. Human knowledge, according to a theorist like Popper, is no more Justified True Belief than animal knowledge. Knowledge just doesn't work the way of JTB. It is a kind of illusion that it might appear so. But then it appears the sun does go round the earth, though this is an illusion (i.e. relative to our inertial system, that the sun moves round the earth is much more obvious, though an illusion, than the truth that the earth is hurtling round the sun). But at least deciding whether knowledge should be equated with JTB or understood quite differently (for example as Popper, the greatest theorist of knowledge since Kant, understands "knowledge") raises serious issues. The following by contrast is just cod-Wittgensteinian blather that explains nothing: > If 'believing-that' is a language game not determined by individuals but > rules and use, then arguing that beliefs do or do not require reasons or evidence functions within the 'believing-that' game. One can, of course, try to influence people to adopt a rule that limits the effectiveness of one's opponents, like pushing for the Gretzky rule or insisting that beliefs should be accompanied by reasons or evidence, but this is politics. So, yes, I agree that no individual has any kind of privileged authority over determining the truth of what counts as a belief. What counts as a belief will be determined by the rules of the various kinds of games we engage in, and when we prefer that the rules change, we cannot change them by fiat, but only through politics.> We need only ask - (a) please state "What are these "rules of the various kinds of games we engage in"?"; (b) please state "How do they "determine" "what counts as a belief"?" Wittgenstein's view is that such cannot be stated but only shown, and this is because of the "limits of language". This is key to his view and anyone who presents Wittgenstein as if his aim is to answer the above kinds of question, by making statements or propounding theses to answer these questions, simply does not understand Wittgenstein who makes clear this is not what his philosophy aims to do. Further Wittgenstein does not suggest these rules change "only through politics" (which would seem to imply they are established by "only through politics"), and indeed would be disgusted by this kind of suggestion, which he would find unbearably crass. His view is worlds away from suggesting "only through politics" do "rules" change: his view, roughly, is that what constitutes "belief" is not something that can be said but is something that may be shown by examining different language-games within which "belief" plays a role. And one will search in vain for any reference in Wittgenstein's work to where "politics" comes into this, and it is crass misinterpretation to bring such a term into play here without being clear that in so doing one is offering not a Wittgensteinian viewpoint of any sort but merely a cod-Wittgensteinian viewpoint. Donal Sounding harsh but actually fair (as usual) Why the face? On Saturday, 7 December 2013, 12:19, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: Walter O. wrote: "We don't attribute "knowledge-that" to someone who doesn't have the right kind of evidence or reasons for her belief, or who simply eschews the requirement of having any evidence or reasons for her knowledge-claims, so I'm not clear why we don't demur from attributing beliefs to persons who think they don't need to have reasons or evidence for their beliefs." I don't understand how holding a belief about beliefs would make a difference in any way. Imagine someone offers all sorts of familiar beliefs but then adds that they also believe that there is no requirement to have reasons or evidence for their beliefs. If the other beliefs did all the work that beliefs normally do, then what is changed by adding the belief about beliefs? Do we need to ascertain people's beliefs about beliefs before we consider their beliefs? And this is without even considering the question of whether there is a need for the appropriate beliefs about beliefs about beliefs. It seems to me that beliefs about beliefs are just other beliefs, and have no special powers to either legitimize or de-legitimize other beliefs. I may believe that my beliefs have some special quality, given either by God or Reason or Facts, but that doesn't change my other beliefs in any way. Either they get the job done or they don't. Walter continues: "'Believing-that' seems to me to be a particular kind of language game in which no individual has any kind of privileged authority over determining the truth of whether she actually believes-that." I whole heartedly agree with this. If 'believing-that' is a language game not determined by individuals but rules and use, then arguing that beliefs do or do not require reasons or evidence functions within the 'believing-that' game. One can, of course, try to influence people to adopt a rule that limits the effectiveness of one's opponents, like pushing for the Gretzky rule or insisting that beliefs should be accompanied by reasons or evidence, but this is politics. So, yes, I agree that no individual has any kind of privileged authority over determining the truth of what counts as a belief. What counts as a belief will be determined by the rules of the various kinds of games we engage in, and when we prefer that the rules change, we cannot change them by fiat, but only through politics. Sincerely, Phil ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html