[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction

  • From: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
  • To: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
  • Date: Fri, 6 Dec 2013 14:15:25 -0330

Which reminds me. Last spring, a student came to see me in my office about her
midterm test in the required phil of ed. course in her Primary/Elementary BEd
programme. She had received 38%. 5 others in the class of 23 students also
failed. Most scored between 70 and 85. (I was actually quite generous in
grading.) 

Slumping in the chair, expressing total dejection and not an inconsiderable
amount of incredulity at receiving her first failing grade in 4 years of
university, she said: "Walter, thinking is just not my forte."

Now stop reading for a second and think about that.  Take a full
minute..................


OK, we continue: As she had brought Starbucks coffee and pralines 'n cream
muffins with her for the two of us, I reined in my initial, somewhat less than
delicate and understanding response, and simply
replied: "I see. What then are your strengths, Rebecca?" 

Well, we took it from there and she ended up with a solid B in the course. 

Rebecca (not her real name) is now teaching in an elementary
school in N Alberta, with a large native population. She works hard at heping
her students develop critical thinking abilities and dispositions. As she said
in her last postcard: "Hell, if I can do it, anybody can."

It all starts up again in January with 3 courses. We live but to serve.

Walter O
MUN




Quoting "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>:

> Erratum: My imaginary interlocutor in the last sentence of my post below
> should
> have exclaimed: "Who are you to tell me *whether* I believe?"
> 
> Walter O
> MUN
> 
> 
> Quoting "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>:
> 
> > Phil replies with some interesting and important ideas. But I think he
> > misses
> > the significance of the specific case I'm considering.
> > 
> > Strategies for getting a person to examine her belief and change it on
> > grounds
> > of evidence and contradictory behavior presupposes that the person accepts
> > the
> > evidentiary nature of belief. So I can try to get you to change your
> belief
> > via
> > appeal to reasons. But that's not the case I am considering. I'm asking
> > whether
> > a person who claims to hold a belief-that (believing-in, faith, thus not
> > under
> > consideration) and yet admits she has no reason(s) for holding that
> belief,
> > and
> > moreover claims she doesn't need to have any reasons or evidence for
> holding
> > the
> > belief is really believing-that. 
> > 
> > We don't attribute "knowledge-that" to someone who doesn't have the right
> > kind
> > of evidence or reasons for her belief, or who simply eschews the
> requirement
> > of
> > having any evidence or reasons for her knowledge-claims, so I'm not clear
> > why
> > we
> > don't demur from attributing beliefs to persons who think they don't need
> to
> > have reasons or evidence for their beliefs. "Believing-that" seems to me
> to
> > be
> > a particular kind of language game in which no individual has any kind of
> > privileged authority over determining the truth of whether she actually
> > believes-that. The claim that "I know what I believe" seems to me to be a
> > fallible one. And the view expressed in "Who are you to tell me what I
> > believe?" seems innocent of the "space of reasons" we expect moral agents
> > and
> > citizens of a deliberative democracy to come to feel at home in.
> > 
> > Walter O
> > MUN
> > 
> > P.S. "Always a steppe behind."  -- brilliant! Of course I myself am "The
> Rock
> > of
> > Reason"
> > 
> > 
> > Quoting Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>:
> > 
> > > Walter O. wrote:
> > > 
> > > "Could a rational person really believe that P while also believing she
> > has
> > > no good reason for believing that P? ... 'Well then you clearly don't
> > > believe that P.' Is that a cogent reply?"
> > > 
> > > I can imagine offering this reply as part of an argument, that is,
> trying
> > > to persuade someone to change their beliefs. Someone makes some sort of
> > > statement about what they believe and I respond by pointing out an
> action
> > > or different statement of theirs which seems to suggest a different
> belief
> > > or different beliefs, and then add, 'So, clearly you don't believe that
> > P'.
> > > It seems to me that, here, I am trying to persuade the person to change
> > > their mind. The argument is that the person's belief is, in some way,
> > > inconsistent with either their actions or other beliefs, and that they
> > > should alter their professed belief.
> > > 
> > > I can also imagine offering a reply like, 'He clearly doesn't believe
> that
> > > P', accompanied by a list of actions and statements made by the person
> > > which in some way run counter to believing that P. Again, in this case I
> > am
> > > not describing what the person does or does not actually believe but
> > rather
> > > making an argument about what they probably should believe given the
> other
> > > things they say and do.
> > > 
> > > Additionally, I can also imagine someone saying, 'Given your lack of
> > > supporting evidence, you should not believe that P'. Here, one would be
> > > expressing the conviction that there is an ethics of belief that
> requires
> > > one to have evidence for beliefs, and, again, arguing that some kind of
> > > change should be made.
> > > 
> > > What I can't make sense of is telling a person that they don't actually
> > > hold a particular belief where this means that the belief is not
> present.
> > > In part, this doesn't make sense to me because I can't imagine a person
> > > saying something like, 'Oh, you are right, I thought I believed that P
> but
> > > I now realize that I can't find any evidence of my believing that P'. In
> > > short, I can't make sense of how a person could be mistaken about their
> > > holding a belief.
> > > 
> > > Also, it seems to me that there is a difference between a person being
> > able
> > > to offer good reasons for holding a belief and having confidence that
> > there
> > > are good reasons for holding a belief. Politics is an excellent example.
> > > One of the reasons why people identify with political parties is that no
> > > person has the time or ability to be knowledgeable about the wide range
> of
> > > political issues that must be addressed by governments. We may have some
> > > knowledge about education issues, or healthcare, but who can be
> > > sufficiently knowledgeable about all political issues? Identifying with
> a
> > > party allows people to have a degree of confidence that there are good
> > > reasons for holding a particular political belief without having to
> > > actually be aware of those reasons.
> > > 
> > > I realize that Walter is dealing with the issue of the possibility of a
> > > belief that is understood as having no supporting good reasons, but it
> > > seems to me that the question of whether someone does or does not hold a
> > > belief is something different.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Phil Enns
> > > Always a steppe behind
> > > 
> > 
> 

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