[lit-ideas] Re: 'Philosophical Logic'

  • From: "Walter C. Okshevsky" <wokshevs@xxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 19 Feb 2013 08:23:03 -0330

But at least now we may have a better idea of what W thought didn't exist and
didn't wish to create.

Walter O


Quoting Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>:

> But surely Wittgenstein would not agree with this account, since he denied
> that philosophical logic even exists ? Or would he accept the account and
> then argue that this is not what philosophy is in fact about ?
> 
> 
> O.K.
> 
> 
> 
> ________________________________
>  From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
> To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
> Sent: Monday, February 18, 2013 9:07 PM
> Subject: [lit-ideas] 'Philosophical Logic'
>  
> Despite its name, philosophical logic is neither a kind of logic nor simply
> to be identified with the philosophy of logic(s)—the latter being the
> philosophical examination of systems of logic and their applications. Though
> the subject of philosophical logic is hard to define precisely, it may
> loosely be described as the philosophical elucidation of those notions that
> are indispensable for the proper characterization of rational thought and its
> contents—notions like those of reference, predication, truth, negation,
> necessity, definition, and entailment. These and related notions are needed
> in order to give adequate accounts of the structure of
> thoughts—particularly as expressed in language—and of the relationships
> in which thoughts stand both to one another and to objects and states of
> affairs in the world. But it must be emphasized that philosophical logic is
> not concerned with thought inasmuch as the latter is a psychological process,
> but only
>  in so far as thoughts have contents which are assessable as true or false.
> To conflate these concerns is to fall into the error of psychologism, much
> decried by Frege.
> 
> No single way of dividing up the subject-matter of philosophical logic would
> be agreed upon by all of its practitioners, but one convenient division would
> be this: theories of reference, theories of truth, the analysis of complex
> propositions, theories of modality (that is, of necessity, possibility, and
> related notions), and theories of argument or rational inference. These
> topics inevitably overlap, but it is roughly true to say that later topics in
> the list presuppose earlier ones to a greater degree than earlier ones
> presuppose later ones. The order of topics in the list reflects a general
> progression from the study of parts of propositions, through the study of
> whole and compound propositions, to the study of relations between
> propositions. (Here we use the term ‘proposition’ to denote a thought
> content assessable as true or false—something expressible by a complete
> sentence.)
>
———————————————————————————————————————————————————————————-
> 
> This is PART of the entry on philosophical logic in a well-known reference
> work. It continues for several more pages.
> 
> Robert Paul
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