[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations - text and comments II A
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2012 20:32:13 +0100 (BST)
As this post seems too large to get through in one, it is being
split into an II A and II B:-
Though I am indebted to Robert Paul for access to an on-line
copy for excerpts from PI, there are errors – sometimes quite serious errors –
in this on-line edition, which I have sought to correct in what is set out
below. (Btw, ‘x2’ means ‘x squared’, and ‘2x’ means ‘x plus x’). For the fourth
time today may I also wish that Robert’s hand
gets better.
In
the first offering in this thread, we looked at the beginning of PI and the
Augustinian account of language in terms of the items of language being names
of objects. It was indicated that W accepts this account is appropriate where
words are being used in the sense of ‘name-object’ [3: “Augustine, we might
say, does describe a system of communication; only
not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to say this in
many cases where the question
arises "Is this an appropriate description or not?" The answer is:
"Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region,
not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe”]. But thefundamental
point, or ‘key tenet’, that continually underlies W’s discussion is that the
sense of any such language is not said in ‘what is said’ in that language.
This
‘key tenet’ is, I suggest, illustrated through-out the text and is one of its
two most central points.* It is implicit in what W ‘shows’. By showing how this
‘key tenet’ is implicit in what W writes, we may help those who do not
recognise this ‘key tenet’ in PI to recognise it.
[*The
other aspect of PI that might be described as similarly fundamental is that W
seeks to show that this ‘key tenet’ gives rise to a way to ‘dissolve’
philosophical problems by showing how they ‘disappear’ when we have an utterly
clear grasp of the sense of language. But it may be noted that we might accept
W’s view, that the sense of ‘what is said’ is not said in ‘what is said’,
without accepting his views as to how achieving complete clarity in
understanding the sense of language leads to philosophical problems being
dissolved. It might, for example, lead to the dissolution of those problems of
philosophy that arise only because of some conceptual confusion or lack of
clarity in understanding the sense of certain propositions or claims. But it
may be thought that, even if those such problems may be dissolved, there are
substantive problems or issues in philosophy that cannot be dissolved simply by
achieving clarity in the sense of language (this was the issue Popper tried to
raise with W when they met at the ‘Moral Sciences Club’)].
In a
related thread we have discussed whether a “rule” can be stated so its sense is
given in that statement. This cannot be done, according to W, because the sense
of ‘what is said’ [be it a “rule” or a command or an exclamation or a joke] is
never said in ‘what is said’. And
this is true, for W, ‘whatever is
said’.
Against
W’s POV, a tempting thought is that, while perhaps the sense of certain
statements is not said in their statement, there are certain statements whose
sense is said in their statement. We might intuit that the sense of a joke may
depend on much more than ‘what is said’. But other kinds of statement might
seem to state their sense in ‘what is said’. For example, a “rule” of
calculation
[or formula] might seem to contain within its statement the sense of how it is
applied – even onto infinity [“189. "But are the steps then not determined by
the algebraic formula?"—The
question contains a mistake.”]. Richard suggested an example of such a
“rule”, whose sense is said in its statement:- a “rule” such as ‘Take a number
n, add 2, then take that ‘(n + 2)’ as n and add 2, and so on’. But it is W’s
POV that it is simply a kind
of ‘optical illusion’ to think that the sense of such a “rule” [or of any kind
of statement] is stated [or said] in
its statement. And he tries to show this in relation to giving a mathematical
instruction of Richard’s type, in passages considered below.
“143. Let us now examine the following kind of
language-game:
when A gives an order B has to write down series of
signs according
to a certain formation rule.
The first of these series is meant to be that of the
natural numbers in
decimal notation.—How does he get to understand this
notation?—
First of all series of numbers will be written down
for him and he will
be required to copy them. (Do not balk at the
expression "series of
numbers"; it is not being used wrongly here.) And
here already there
is a normal and an abnormal learner's reaction.—At
first perhaps we
guide his hand in writing out the series 0 to 9; but
then the possibility
of getting him to understand will depend on his going on to write
it down independently.—And here we can imagine, e.g.,
that he
does copy the figures independently, but not in the
right order:
he writes sometimes one sometimes another at random.
And then
communication stops at that point.—Or again, he
makes 'mistakes"
in the order.—The difference between this and the
first case will of
course be one of frequency.—Or he makes a systematic mistake; for
example, he copies every other number, or he copies
the series 0, 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, .... like this: 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4, . . . . .
Here we shall almost be
tempted to say that he has understood wrong.
Notice, however, that there is no sharp distinction
between a random
mistake and a systematic one. That is, between what
you are inclined
to call "random" and what
"systematic".
Perhaps it is possible to wean him from the systematic
mistake (as
from a bad habit). Or perhaps one accepts his way of
copying and
tries to teach him ours as an offshoot, a variant of
his.—And here too
our pupil's capacity to learn
may come to an end.”
Though it is not said by W, what is important here is the essential role of
showing in understanding
the sense of ‘what is said’. W is ‘pointing out’ that, where a person is being
instructed in a “series of numbers”, that
person may conceivably make what we regard as ‘mistakes’, and their ‘mistakes’
may even have a systematic character
so that we are “tempted to say that he has
understood wrong”.
While W does not here say it, it is
implicit that a person could not make such mistakes if the sense of the
“series” was said in ‘what is said’
here. Of course, we could try to explain their mistakes as arising because they
do not understand the sense of ‘what is said’ here [to instruct them in the
“series”]:- but if the sense is said in ‘what is said’ how can they not
understand it? How can they understand ‘what
is said’ at all [which they may do,
as their response may show some understanding that ‘what is said’ concerns what
we understand as a mathematical
series], and yet still be mistaken as to the sense of ‘what is said’ – if that
sense is said in ‘what is said’? The implicit
answer is that, for W, they can have some understanding of ‘what is said’, yet
also fail to understand its sense as we do, because the sense of ‘what is said’
is not said in ‘what is said’. Also
‘what is said’ may be understood in more than one sense, so a person may
understand the sense of ‘what is said’ correctly in certain respects but not in
others.
The ‘key tenet’ holds
that the sense of ‘what is said’ can only be shown. So when they make ‘mistakes’
in writing out the series, so that it is clear they do not understand the sense
of the series, we try to teach them by showing
them various things [not simply repeating ‘what is said’ as if this conveys
its own sense] – we try to show them the
sense so that they may understand it: and we can imagine various ways we
might try to show them. If they write
‘1,0,2,3,4,5’ etc. we might begin by repeating the correct order
‘0,1,2,3,4,5,’; but if this does not show them the correct sense of the
“series”, we might try to show them by shaking
our head at their series and then writing out other ‘wrong series’ [e.g.
‘0,2,1,3,5,4’, ‘0,5,2,4,3,1’ etc.] and shaking our head so as to show them
‘what is a wrong series’; and
then perhaps writing the correct series and nodding so as to show them ‘what is
the correct series’. Or we might link the writing of each number in the correct
series with a number of objects we consecutively place in a box: so after ‘0’
we point to an empty box, after ‘1’ we place one object in the box (and point
to show the link between the number in the series and the number of objects in
the box), and after ‘2’ we place another object in the box (and point to show
the link) etc. Or, if what this seeks
to show is not understood, we begin with the empty box then move to the number
‘0’ in the series, then put one object in the box and move to the number ‘1’ in
the series etc. And so on.
We
might exhaust all the ways we can think to show them the sense of the “series”.
But if all these ways fail to convey to them ‘what is a wrong series’ from
‘what is the correct series’ – if what can only be shown here is not understood
– there is nothing to be said so that
they may understand what they do not understand by what is shown (unless, of
course, something is ‘said’ that inspires understanding because the pupil
understands _‘what is shown’_ by ‘what is said’).
If ‘showing’ fails to convey the sense of ‘what is said’, there is no further
recourse to ‘what is said’ for explanation of its sense, for ‘what is said’
does not say its own sense (185: “Or suppose
he pointed to the series and said: "But I went on in the same way." —
It would now be no use to say: "But can't you see . . . . ?" — and
repeat the old examples and explanations.”). As grasping the sense
depends on the pupil grasping what can only be shown, if we exhaust our ways of
showing them the sense and still they
do not understand then, in this way, “our
pupil's capacity to learn may come to an end.”Why? Because we have nothing left
to show them and there is nothing to be said that can convey the sense
by ‘saying’ the sense.
D
Salop
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