[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online
- From: Julie Krueger <juliereneb@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2012 20:21:05 -0500
Very helpful. Thank you!
Julie Krueger
On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 8:14 PM, Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> Julie K. wrote:
>
> "Can some kind-hearted, patient soul on the list do a nutshell compare
> & contrast for me of Derrida (I'm thinking particularly of Difference
> and Margins of Philo) and W?"
>
> Here is a summary from Samuel Wheeler's book, 'Deconstruction as
> Analytic Philosophy'.
>
> "First, both Derrida and Wittgenstein deny the possibility of the
> perfectly transparent, magic words of thought so widely credited by
> philosophers. These 'magic words' are the alleged meanings that
> underlie the words of natural languages and that, unlike the words of
> natural languages, cannot be misinterpreted. The correct
> interpretation of such meanings is supposed to be built into their
> very nature. The incoherence of the notion that there are such magic
> words of thought is the core realization that drives the
> deconstructions of Derrida and Wittgenstein, as well as those of
> W.V.O. Quine, Nelson Goodman, and Donald Davidson, among others.
>
> Second, Derrida and Wittgenstein both deny the existence of a given
> that the terms of the magic language could designate. Such a given
> could be the senses of the terms of the magic language, or a realm of
> entities designated by terms, magic or not. In principle, one could
> deny the magic language and yet believe in an ontological given. ...
> On my understanding of Wittgenstein as a deconstructor, he is a
> conservative deconstructor in something like Davidson's fashion. That
> is, the fact that truth, necessity, meaning, and the like have no
> foundation of the traditional kinds shows that foundationalism is
> defective, not that truth, necessity, and meaning are nonexistent.
> Philosophy will leave everything intact, for Wittgenstein."
>
> In short, first, both agree that there are no words that belong to a
> particular language, for example English or German, and make clear the
> relationship between words in that language and something more true.
> Second, both agree that there isn't a something else that determines
> how language is true, necessary or meaningful.
>
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Phil Enns
> ------------------------------------------------------------------
> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
>
Other related posts:
