[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2012 15:10:38 -0700 (PDT)
A. 1
B. b2
C. C 3.1
C.f.15
This most of all reminds me of boring translations of vehicle documentation.
________________________________
From: Mike Geary <jejunejesuit.geary2@xxxxxxxxx>
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Sent: Friday, March 30, 2012 11:29 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online
Damn it all, all this our culture stinks philosophy. Come, Papiols, let's to
music! I have no life save when I dance with damsels both fair and brown, her
whom wealth melts and her whom want betrays. Let us go then, you and I,
and throw roses riotously to the throng, singing songs of mackerel crowded
seas, the young in one another's arms, let us not succumb to the self-pitying
throes of old age, questioning the primrose path of dalliance we once tread
because all existence called us to it. What Whitman said: I'd prefer to turn
and live with animal.-- they know they are there, what's to question? I pray
to all the gods that I not become an old man in a dried month being lectured to
by my family and friends. Popeye had it right -- "I am what I am." Sounds
pretty damn god-claiming to me. And if Popeye can do it, so the hell can I.
This universe is mine.
On Fri, Mar 30, 2012 at 1:26 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>no
>
>
>________________________________
> From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
>To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Sent: Thursday, 22 March 2012, 22:29
>Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online
>
>
>Donal wrote
>
>
>
>
>>________________________________
>>
>>>I have already outlined what might be a
counter-example to the view that the 'said/shown'
distinction is central to PI: (i) an example of a 'rule'
whose sense can be stated without anything further needing
to be shown for it to have that sense. I will here give
other possible counter-examples: (ii) W saying that the
said/shown distinction does not feature in PI (iii) W
saying something like 'Everything involved in the sense of
language can be said'.
>>
>>I suggest that it is the search for such counter-examples
that will prove that they are the real 'will-o-the-wisp'
here. So far none have been produced; and dismissing the
idea that the 'shown/said' distinction features in PI as
looking for a 'will-o-the-wisp' is itself just a kind of
will-o-the-wisp as far as serious argument or explanation
goes.>
>>
>>Well, this comes close to argument by bluster.
>
>We'll perhaps see how close...
>
>
>> It's claimed that
there is a clear (if hard to find) distinction between saying and
showing in the Investigations, a distinction
>identical or quite similar—or at least analogous—to that in the Tractatus.>
>
>These are not quite my claims.
>
>So, for example, the apparent contradiction of my claiming that there is a
>"clear (if hard to find) distinction" does not attach to my claims.
>
>To be clear, my claims are as follows:-
>
>1. A. There is a distinction between saying and showing that is 'shown' in the
>TLP.
> B. This is clear - or clear enough.
> C. If one is tempted to say the distinction is 'drawn' in the TLP, it
>should be noted that it is part of W's POV that such a distinction cannot be
>'drawn' in the very fundamental sense that to 'draw' the distinction would be
>to try to express what cannot be expressed, or to 'say' what cannot be 'said'
>but which can only be shown. Hence it would be potentially misleading to say
>to the distinction is 'drawn' in the TLP; and so it is better to express the
>position
as at 1.A.
> D. This distinction is absolutely central to the TLP - without it we miss
>what is most fundamental and important in W's POV in TLP.
>
>2. A.There is a distinction between saying and showing that is 'shown' in PI.
> B. This is perhaps less clear than in the case of such a distinction
>'shown' in TLP. How much less clear we might leave open, but it is a much
>lesser matter than whether or not the distinction is there 'shown' and used.
> C. If one is tempted to ask where the distinction is 'drawn' in the PI, it
should be noted that it is part of W's POV that such a distinction
cannot be 'drawn' in the very fundamental sense that to 'draw' the
distinction would be to try to express what cannot be expressed, or to
'say' what cannot be 'said' but which can only be shown. Hence it would
be potentially misleading to infer that there is no such distinction in PI
because it is not explicitly 'drawn' in PI; and so it is better to express the
position as at 2.A.
> D. This distinction is absolutely central to PI - without it we
miss what is most fundamental and important in W's POV in PI.
>
>3. There are clear differences between the distinction 'shown' in the TLP and
>that in the PI:-
> A. In the TLP the distinction between saying and showing is inextricably
>linked with a 'doctrine of sense and nonsense' according to which only the
>propositions of "natural science" say anything with sense, whereas PI abandons
>any such doctrine.
> B. This doctrine in the TLP means that 'what is shown' there is nonsense:
>a consequence W explicitly recognises at the end of TLP; but because PI
>abandons this 'doctrine of sense and nonsense' PI does not have to treat 'what
>can only be shown' as nonsense.
>
>4. There is a key piece of thinking that links W of the TLP and the PI and his
>two different views of 'what can be said and what can only be shown':-
> what gives 'what is said' its sense is never 'said' in 'what is said' -
>what gives 'what is said' its sense cannot be said but can only be shown.
>
>These are my claims.
>
>I have also offered textual support from PI to show how there W conveys that
>what gives 'what is said' its sense is never 'said' in 'what is said' - what
>gives 'what is said' its sense cannot be said but can only be
shown. For example, in text given, W points out that the sense of a 'rule'
cannot be 'said' because to try to give the sense of a rule by a stated
'interpretation' would only give rise to a need for a further stated
'interpretation' to give the sense of that stated 'interpretation', and so on -
and that the way out of this kind of "logical circle" (or infinite regress) is
to see that there is a way of grasping a rule "that is not an interpretation"
but which is "exhibited" [or shown] in what we call 'obeying the rule' and
'going against it' in actual cases.
>
>Robert seems to think the following tells against the claims above:
>
>
>>The difficulty is that there's very little agreement as to what this
distinction amounts to there;
>e.g. does what can only be shown include logical form, the mystical,
and the aesthetic—none of them, all of them, only one or two, and
which one or two? And so on. There's no agreement about the nature and
scope of the distinction in the Tractatus; therefore, to try to match the
Tractatus account of saying and showing to something in the Investigations is
indeed to follow a will-o'-the-wisp. What is it in the former that's also found
in the Investigations?>
>
>But this does not, in my view, tell against my claims above. First, there is
>agreement that the distinction features, indeed centrally, in the TLP:
>therefore, that there may be dispute or "very little agreement as to what this
>distinction amounts to there" is no argument that the distinction does not in
>fact feature there, indeed centrally.
>
>As this "little agreement as to what this
distinction amounts to there" is therefore no argument that the distinction
does not in fact feature in the TLP, indeed centrally, it is obvious that it
provides even less of an argument that the distinction is not in fact in PI.
>
>Dare I suggest that thinking the question "What is it in the former that's
>also found in the Investigations?" (reasonable as it might seem) therefore in
>fact comes very close to argument by bluster? It certainly passes over, in
>silence as it were, many of the points made in my recent posts.
>
>Donal
>Plymouth
>
>
>
>
>
>
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