[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 21 Mar 2012 12:09:54 +0000 (GMT)
Some textual support that indicates or shows [though it may
not say] that for W in PI the sense of language always depends on something
that can only be shown and cannot be said:
“190. It may now be said: "The way the formula is
meant determines
which steps are to be taken". What is the
criterion for the way the
formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way
we always use it,
the way we are taught to use it.
We say, for instance, to someone who uses a sign
unknown to us:
"If by 'xU' you mean x2, then you get this value for j, if you mean
2X, that one."—Now ask yourself: how does
one mean the one thing or
the other by"x!2"?
That will be how meaning it can determine the steps in
advance.”
In my
suggested view, that concluding “That…”
is pointing us towards what may be shown but which cannot be said here:- W’s
POV here may be summarised as pointing out that even if we say something
like "The way the formula is meant
determines which steps are to be taken" we should not be fooled
that this means that the formula contains within itself “the criterion for the
way the formula is meant”. In
other words, the formula does not say ‘how it is meant’: rather ‘how it is
meant’ can only be shown – shown, for
example, by the kind of things the determine whether one means “the one thing
or the other by” a given formula.
“198. "But how can a rule shew me what I have to
do at this point?
Whatever I do is, on some interpretation, in accord
with the rule."—
That is not what we ought to say, but rather: any
interpretation still
hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and
cannot give it
any support. Interpretations by themselves do not
determine meaning.
"Then can whatever I do be brought into accord
with the rule?"—
Let me ask this: what has the expression of a rule—say
a sign-post—
got to do with my actions? What sort of connexion is
there here?—
Well, perhaps this one: I have been trained to react
to this sign in a
particular way, and now I do so react to it.
But that is only to give a causal connexion; to tell
how it has come
about that we now go by the sign-post; not what this
going-by-thesign
really consists in. On the contrary; I have further
indicated that
a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there
exists a regular use
of sign-posts, a custom.”
(In my
suggested view) what W is saying here is again about the inescapable role of
what can only be shown in determining the application of a ‘rule’ at any given
point. He rejects the idea that the application of the rule can be stated or
‘said’
by way of a stated "interpretation" of the rule, where an interpretation is
something that can be expressed in language. For any such interpretation would
stand in need of its being interpreted: “any
interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets, and cannot
give it
any support. Interpretations by themselves do not
determine meaning.” This means any attempt to say how a ‘rule’ is to be
applied at any given point, by way of some stated interpretation, involves an
infinite regress:- for any stated interpretation would stand in need of a
further stated interpretation, and so on – so it becomes clear that no stated
interpretation can “determine meaning”, as any stated interpretation “hangs in
the air” awaiting something further to show how it is to be interpreted.
What
this tells us is that there is a way of following a ‘rule’ that is not merely a
matter of stated interpretation, but which is shown: “What this shews is that
there
is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but
which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the
rule" and "going against it" in actual cases.”
“201. This was our paradox: no course of action could
be determined
by a rule, because every course of action can be made
out to
accord with the rule. The answer was: if everything
can be made out
to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out
to conflict with it.
And so there would be neither accord nor conflict
here.
It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here
from the mere fact
that in the course of our argument we give one
interpretation after
another; as if each one contented us at least for a
moment, until we
thought of yet another standing behind it. What this
shews is that
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which
is exhibited in what we call "obeying the
rule" and "going against it"
in actual cases.
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action
according to the
rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict
the term "interpretation"
to the substitution of one expression of the rule for
another.”
We
find this way is shown by, for
example, examining how the ‘rule’ is applied.
W's POV is based on what can only be ‘shown’ – about what is involved, for
example, in teaching another,
where something is shown in the teaching that ‘points beyond’ what can be or
is said. It is ‘what can only be shown’ that gets us out of the “logical circle”
that arises if we otherwise try to explain the sense of ‘what can be/is said’ by
something else that can be/is said, where that something else would also stand
in need of a stated interpretation and so on ad infinitum:-
208. Then am I defining "order" and
"rule" by means of
"regularity"?—How do I explain the meaning
of "regular", "uniform",
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS I 83«
"same" to anyone?—I shall explain these
words to someone who, say,
only speaks French by means of the corresponding
French words.
But if a person has not yet got the concepts, I
shall teach him to use the
words by means of examples and by practice.—And
when I do this I
do not communicate less to him than I know myself.
In the course of this teaching I shall shew him the
same colours,
the same lengths, the same shapes, I shall make him
find them and
produce them, and so on. I shall, for instance, get
him to continue an
ornamental pattern uniformly when told to do so.—And
also to
continue progressions. And so, for example, when
given: . . . ... to
go on: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I do it, he does it after me; and I influence him by
expressions of
agreement, rejection, expectation, encouragement. I
let him go his
way, or hold him back; and so on.
Imagine witnessing such teaching. None of the words
would be
explained by means of itself; there would be no
logical circle.
The expressions "and so on", "and so on
ad infinitum" are also
explained in this teaching. A gesture, among other
things, might serve
this purpose. The gesture that means "go on like
this", or "and so
on" has a function comparable to that of pointing
to an object or a
place.
We should distinguish between the "and so
on" which is, and the
"and so on" which is not, an abbreviated
notation. "And so on ad inf."
is not such an abbreviation. The fact that we
cannot write down all the
digits of TT is not a human shortcoming, as
mathematicians sometimes
think.
Teaching which is not meant to apply to anything but
the examples
given is different from that which 'points beyond' them.”
Insofar as 'following a rule' must involve more than applying it once in a
one-off case, rule-following involves understanding what 'points beyond' any
stated "examples given" [by, say, a teacher of the 'rule']. But this
understanding cannot be said but only shown, just as the sense of the 'rule'
cannot be said but only shown. This 'understanding' can be taught because we
are, in our shared form of life, able to grasp what 'points beyond' what is
stated in our language; but what we grasp lies permanently beyond what can
captured by what is said. And what is true of this kind of 'understanding' is
also true of the 'rule' that is 'understood'.
There are many separate points that might be raised even if one accepts this
view of PI, including many as to how W applies this POV. It is separate point,
for example, that W is not suggesting that there is anything very mysterious or
difficult for us in grasping a sense of language that depends on grasping what
can only be shown not said. For W this is no more mysterious or difficult for
us than breathing.
Donal
London
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