[lit-ideas] Re: Philosophical Investigations online
- From: Julie Krueger <juliereneb@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 18 Mar 2012 18:58:27 -0500
Can some kind-hearted, patient soul on the list do a nutshell compare &
contrast for me of Derrida (I'm thinking particularly of Diference and
Margins of Philo) and W? Philosophy of language was in a former lifetime...
Julie Krueger
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 6:18 AM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>wrote:
> Thank you very much Robert. (And may I recommend everyone reads it).
> Whatever we may make of the contents, Wittgenstein's prose itself is
> compelling, and even has its own beauty. Wittgenstein is arguably one of
> the great writers of philosophy [and perhaps even better in the German].
>
> I have read that a common reaction to TLP is what does he mean by that
> e.g. "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the
> mystical." Or take even the very concluding propositions: "6.54 My
> propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally
> recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on
> them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has
> climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the
> world rightly. 7 Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."
> [In recent posts I have indicated what these mean: they mean to encapsulate
> aspects of the doctrine of "what can be shown and not said" that underpins
> the whole work:- so that, according to the TLP, only the propositions of
> natural science have sense in what they say, and so the propositions of the
> TLP are accordingly "senseless" (as they are not propositions of "natural
> science"), but are nevertheless an attempt to show what cannot be said.]
>
> Whereas a common reaction to PI is 'I understand the words used and
> seemingly what is said, but what is the point of saying that?'
>
> My suggestion (especially to prospective readers) is that the point of W
> saying much of what he says in PI is likewise to show what cannot be saidbut
> also to show
> why it can only be shown not said. Insofar as W seeks to show why it can
> only be shown not said he is not giving an express or stated reason (for
> this would be inconsistent with his POV that here we can show but not say)
> but to seeking to convey his POV that fundamentally what we are dealing
> with here cannot be expressed [or stated, or said] by instead 'showing'
> various things. He seeks to demonstrate, rather than argue for, his POV
> [though certain arguments can be identified, his position cannot be
> established by stated argument if that position is true].
>
> At the core of PI are the so-called 'rule-following considerations'
> ['RFC']. These RFC reflect Wittgenstein's view of the fundamental 'rules'
> that govern language and whether language has "sense":- for Wittgenstein,
> no 'rule' states or expresses [the grounds for] its own application, and so
> only by looking at how it is applied is it 'shown' what the sense of the
> rule is (for a 'rule' has no clear sense outside of its application); and
> when we pursue this POV we find that, while it might appear that we could
> state a rule and its application, any such statement would be just
> another 'rule' that stands in need of an application in order for it to be
> shown what that rule is. So we find that, inescapably, the 'rules' which
> distinguish sense from nonsense are something that cannot be stated but
> only 'shown', and they can only be 'shown' by examining how they apply in
> particular cases. By this kind of examination we may learn how to
> distinguish sense from "patent nonsense" and even "disguised nonsense".
> Demonstrating this POV, by applying it in various ways, is what the core of
> the book is taken up with.
>
> What we have in TLP and PI are two distinct accounts of "what can be
> shown and what can be said". What they also have in common is
> Wittgenstein's underlying view of much traditional philosophy - both the
> 'early' and 'later' Wittgenstein would say that much of traditional
> philosophy rests on the error of trying to say what can only be shown, and
> indeed propounding nonsense as a result.
>
> Thanks again to Robert for providing us, via his own investigations, with
> this valuable resource.
>
> Donal
> London
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 14 March 2012, 20:16
> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Philosophical Investigations online
>
> Donal asked
>
> Is there an on-line copy of 'Philosophical Investigations' someone
> would recommend? (My copy is not in London).
>
>
> I was surprised to find that there is.
>
>
> http://gormendizer.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Ludwig.Wittgenstein.-.Philosophical.Investigations.pdf
>
> (My copy is not in London either. Coincidence?)
>
> Robert Paul
>
>
>
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