R. Paul wrote: >More on Grice on Wittgenstein on knives and forks, later. For the record, from _//www.freelists.org/post/lit-ideas/In-Philosophical-Investigations,2_ (//www.freelists.org/post/lit-ideas/In-Philosophical-Investigations,2) by courtesy of R. Paul: The translation by P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte [/Philosophical Investigations/. Fourth edn. 2009] of the passage(s) in question. Paul: "Hacker and Schulte have reorganized what was formerly simply called Part II of the /Investigations/, and given it the title /Philosophy of Psychology---a Fragment./ They have retained the division into sections indicated by small roman numerals, but added paragraph numbers. The two paragraphs below are from section xi, as they were in the earlier Part II, as translated by Anscombe." 122. It would have made as little sense for me to say "Now I see it as..." as to say at the sight of a knife and fork "Now I see this as a knife and fork". This utterance would not be understood. Any more than: "Now it is a fork for me" or "It can be a fork too". 123. One doesn't 'take' [/Man 'hält auch nicht...]/ what one knows to be the cutlery at a meal for cutlery, any more than one ordinarily tries to move one's mouth as one eats, or strives to move it. Paul: "Here, 122 is a comment on the earlier discussion, in xi, of 'seeing as,' seeing an aspect of something, interpreting a figure, etc. It's here that the infamous Duck-Rabbit makes its appearance; 123 is just a rhetorical flourish. These paragraphs obviously make no sense on their own---122 clearly refers to something said earlier." ---- Interestingly (or not), when Grice is listing A-philosophers in WoW:I (i.e. the Prolegomena to Logic and Conversation as he rather pretentiously calls it in WoW, Way of Words), he has: Witters Grice. From Witters, Grice quotes from that passage referred to by R. Paul. From Grice, Grice quotes from his own "Causal Theory of Perception". So Grice is implying, or implicating, that Witters's problem is a different one from Grice's problem. This is what he writes about himself: "Another example which occurred to me (as to others before me) is that the old idea that perceiving a material object involves having (sensing) a sense-datum (or sense-data) might be made viable by our REJECTING the supposition [cfr. G. A. Paul, qua 'follower of Witters', and Ayer] that sense-datum statements report the properties of entities of a special class, whose existence needs to be demonstrated by some form of the Argument from Illusion, or the identification which requires a special set of instructions to be provided by a philosopher; and by supposing, instead that 'sense-datum statement' is a class-name for statements of some such form as 'x looks (feels, etc) phi to A' or 'it looks (feels, etc.) to A AS IF" (Grice, Causal Theory of Perception). I hoped by this this means to REHABILITATE a form of the view that the notion of perceiving an object is to be analysed [rather] in CAUSAL terms [alla early Russell?]. But I had to try to meet an objection, which I found to be frequently raised by those SYMPATHETIC TO WITTGENSTEIN, to the effect that for many cases of perceiving the required sense-datum statements are NOT available; for when, for example, I see a plainly red object [pillar box] in ordinary daylight, to say 'it looks red to me,' far from being , as my theory required, the expression of a truth [truism], would rather be [in some sort of Wittgensteinian life-form] an incorrect use of words. According to such an objection, a feature of the MEANING of 'x looks phi to A' is that such a form of words is correctly used ONLY if _either_ it is FALSE that x is phi, OR there is some doubt (or it has been thought or it might be thought that there is some doubt) whether x is phi." Cfr. "It looks like a horse to me." "That horse looks like a horse." ---- etc. Cfr. "Million Dollar Baby" --- "This smells like bleach" --- CLINT EASTWOOD (to boxer): It is bleach. Bleach smells like bleach. --- Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html