I really should be off hunting for a christmas tree, but Eric's remark
below is
arrestingly interesting. Just a comment or two - realizing this is my 3rd
posting of the day and wishing to abide by all of Andreas's
universalizable
maxims.
Quoting Eric Yost <mr.eric.yost@xxxxxxxxx>:
For a philosophical mind, being convinced by argument is being
persuaded.
This is clearly false, but it's not easy to express precisely what's wrong
with
the claim. It's similar to "I prefer to fulfill my obligations rather than
promote my self-interests." Or: "I feel that men have no right to pass
moral
judgement on the issue of abortion because they cannot give birth." In the
former case, one misunderstands the meaning of an obligation; in the
latter
case, the possibilities and limits of feeling.
I want to say that being convinced by argument is not at all equivalent
to, or
an instance of, being persuaded. One can be convinced only through the
provision and assessment of reasons, while one can be persuaded by any of
a
multitude of factors influencing belief and/or judgement: political
ideology,
erotic seducation (that typo is just too good to fix:), appeal to the
maintenance of one's SES or to a desire to become Prime Minister of
Quebec.
Imagine believing that there could not possibly have been a conspiracy to
murder Kennedy because one could not possibly live in a world where such
terrible events could happen. Here one is persuaded to believe, but not on
the
grounds of epistemically relevant reasons. Hence, one cannot be said to be
"convinced of" the truth or rightness of one's belief.
If I am convinced of the truth or rightness of a belief or judgement, then
I
possess a conviction. That's a kind of achievement which nobody else can
procure for me in my stead. A fortiori, nobody can force me to have a
conviction, though others may indeed succeed in persuading me to do
something I
am not convinced is true or right. (This is a fundamental feature of
Kantian
"autonomy," a character disposition displaying its own distinct form of
discipline. The autonomous agent is motivated to believe and act only on
reasons. No other factor is motivationally ert for such a disposition.
"The
good will.")
- Aristotle on knowing when (in which disciplinary contexts) to stop
trying to
convince somebody and start trying simply to persuade them. Because, after
all,
life is short and one should not spend too much time attempting the
impossible.
The disciplined man (the "phronimos")is the one who understands the
possibilities and limits of the various disciplines of inquiry and has
appropriated this understanding as a character disposition. Anybody know
anything about that?
Walter O
MUN
===============================================================================
An artistic mind could be persuaded by beauty. A cabinetmaker
by the quality of the work or the fine grain of the wood.
I'll hang onto the "style of mind" notion for the time being, and reject
the "style of self." The same style of mind could lead to many styles of
self ... compare Mark Helprin to John Gardner, Richard Powers to Alice
Munro, and so on.
In self-styled ignorance,
Eric
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