[lit-ideas] Re: Persuasion Redux
- From: wokshevs@xxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 25 Dec 2007 16:57:49 -0330
Note how our sly and mischievous gnomic/gnosic philosopher in residence returns
from the arduous labours of malt tasting in the wilds of Cape Breton to address
orthogonally the issue the rest of us have been painstakingly considering. He
deftly feigns primary attention to the quotation about logic and language, then
feints to his left while delivering a brilliant riposte on the left side.
Fine
table tennis strategy to be sure. And Guy Lafleur would as well be suitably
impressed. Observe:
Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>:
> John McCreery is not persuaded that the assumption 'if the English
> language employs a distinction there must be a logic to it' is 'valid.
> I'm not convinced that as worded the assumption makes much sense.
snip
Of course, conceptual requirements obligate RP to say that JM is not
*convinced*
of the truth or correctness of the assumption identified. The subsequent claim,
made in the first person is correct. RP would not become convinced of the truth
or correctness of that assumption by means of an offer of $3,000. Not even in
*Canadian* currency, I trust. (Eat your hearts out!) Though I'm sure he'd grant
that one can be persuaded to agree to the truth or correctness of an
assumption, claim, implication or inference, from an appreciation of cold,
hard, Canadian currency.
Returning to a now very dark duck honey and garlic glaze,
Walter O.
> And
> that's because I don't understand what it is for a distinction to have a
> logic to it. We sometimes use the expression,'well, that's logical,' to
> convey that it 'makes sense,' or simply that we agree with it. I suspect
> that Grice and Warnock only meant that there was a reason for the
> distinction, which is sometimes the case and sometimes not.
>
> John uses the word 'valid.' In logic 101 this would be a mistake, for in
> logic, formal, there's a distinction between validity, truth (and
> soundness), so that validity refers to entire arguments, as in 'invalid
> argument,' and truth is something posited of certain propositions for
> experimental purposes, such that a valid argument cannot have true
> premises and a false conclusion. If a certain argument's form allows
> this the argument is invalid. This is the formalization of 'What you say
> may be true, but so what?'
>
> I mention this because in one context, formal logic, the distinction
> between truth and validity is strict: arguments are neither true nor
> false, and propositions are neither valid nor invalid. Yet here's John,
> assigning a lack of validity to an assumption. But of course we
> understand him. Context is all, as someone said earlier (Phil? Eric?),
> and in this context (class dismissed) we might even let someone get away
> with saying that an argument was true.
>
> So, here's a distinction, validity vs. truth, that's employed in one
> specialized branch of English, where it's useful and strict, and a wider
> setting (newspapers, politicians, plain folks) where it's often ignored.
>
> I'm not sure if Grice and Warnock believe that the distinction is
> important and should be maintained always and everywhere. If so, they
> would seem to be strict constructionists à la Antonin Scalia, and John,
> a more permissive Justice.
>
> John quotes a noted historical linguist who once said that historical
> linguists know (know! isn't the jury still out on that word?) that
> natural language is like a discarded Erector set, many of whose original
> parts are missing, and have been replaced by various makeshift items and
> substances, from hardened bubble gum to miscellaneous screws and 'odd
> bits of hardware.' The instructions for it have been lost, and what
> remains is there because of historical accident.
>
> I don't see how this really engages with what Grice and Warnock are said
> to have said, for the analogues of distinctions drawn in English, don't
> seem to be there. And if the simile is meant to suggest that many
> distinctions in English have been lost, that is certainly true. But it
> doesn't tell us why they were lost (can it be as simple as a child's
> mislaying one of the pieces of his Erector set?) or whether they were
> important but lost anyway. 'Metaphors are no argument, my pretty
> maiden,' as whoever wrote The Fortunes of Nigel, is supposed to have said.
>
> Here's a distinction: 'rear' vs. 'raise.' When I was growing up, we were
> cautioned that cattle and turkeys were raised, while human children were
> reared. Only the Lower Classes said that they had raised their children.
> That distinction is, I think, almost entirely gone. Good riddance. It
> never seemed to do any work. Even so, I try to go round it by saying
> that I was brought up (by logicians). Would G & W insist that this
> distinction was important and should have been preserved. I hope not.
> The linguistic distinction doesn't seem to be anything more than a
> manner of speaking. If someone says that he raised his son to be a
> Marine, it would be silly to say to him that he should have reared him
> instead, because that way he'd have had better results.
>
> Here's another: 'imply,' vs. 'infer.' This distinction seems to be
> disappearing. It should be saved. If I imply that someone is nuts, I'm
> saying, indirectly, that she is. If I infer that someone is nuts, I'm
> drawing a conclusion about him based on what he says and does. A
> psychiatrist might imply that one of his clients was nuts, after having
> inferred it from the evidence. There are two different notions being
> distinguished here. Grice and Warnock, thou should'st be living at this
> hour.
>
> Then there's 'uninterested' vs. 'disinterested.' There's a real
> distinction here for those who'd see it. Yet the use of the former to
> mean the latter goes far back. However, I'd like the judge who tries my
> case to be both interested and disinterested.
>
> Wittgenstein said
>
> Ask yourself whether our language is complete?whether it was so before
> the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal
> calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of
> our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town
> begins to be a town?) Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a
> maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses
> with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude
> of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.
>
> Do I agree with this? Maybe, maybe not. But I like the sound of it.
>
> Robert Paul
> reed.edu
>
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