I wrote: ... if there is a right to life, then there must also be a right to the preservation and maintenance of life, for a right to something that one has no right to preserve is no right at all: It is like having 'the right' to Alpha Centauri, or the wind. Phil replied: The analogy doesn't seem quite right. As Robert himself notes, the right to life can't be one of possessing life since it presupposes life, so the analogy can't be to a right to Alpha Centauri or the wind. RP: The analogy was unintended. The fanciful supposition that one might have a right to such things was meant to illustrate something about rights, viz., that if they are never enforceable they are not rights at all. Phil: The reference to 'maintenance of life' strikes me as being an interpretation that moves beyond mere preservation. RP: Indeed it does. When I’m drowning, it’s mere life I want; when I want an operation that would prevent me from losing my sight and hearing, it’s something more. Of course, sight and hearing may not be that big a deal for non-Alphas. Phil: Why couldn't the right to life be nothing more than security from having one's life and property taken by another? RP; It could be, but the Founders were, I believe, thinking beyond Hobbes. There ‘s no reason one must positively leap to such an interpretation, especially as the other two rights mentioned in the Preamble are so closely allied to a richer notion of how ‘life’ should be understood. Phil: I am also wary of positive rights. If there is the right to maintenance of life, how does one decide that a government has satisfied this condition? RP: Through arbitration, negotiation, precedent, and looking at clear cases, e.g. the care of premature babies. That you don’t know a priori what some endeavour’s limits are doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t be undertaken (or that it has no limits). Phil: I see two obvious problems. First, one of extension. If the maintenance of life involves health and welfare, does every or any sickness or death represent a failing of the government? RP: Do you really want to ask this? First of all, how could the maintenance of life not involve health and welfare? Often being restored to health and being restored to life are the same thing. The answer to the last part of the question is, of course not. This is a world of contingency, not the world of Forms. Phil: There seems to be no boundary to what could be understood as maintaining life. RP: No a priori boundary, perhaps. But at the margins we try to make our negotiations as fine-grained as we can, and sometimes we are forced either stipulate, or to give up trying. The problem of when and where an activity stops is no more a problem in this case than it is elsewhere. There is no special problem here. (I’ll bet Phil knows this.) Phil: …Does the government fail in its duty if it allows people to smoke? Does the duty of government to maintain life supersede the wishes and responsibility of individuals? RP: If one seriously believes the right to life is inalienable, yes. And if it is known that ‘secondhand smoke’ harms children who must live with parents who smoke, again, yes. J. S. Mill, that hero of liberty, would, I think, agree. One’s freedom to act ends when one’s acts palpably harm others. Phil: These, however, are practical issues. RP: Sorry, I saw them as philosophical issues. Phil: It seems to me that the more fundamental question is whether people have a right to demand of government positive goods. I don't see how such a right can be given (if individuals do not have a right to maintenance of life, how can the government grant such a right?)… RP: My argument, which seems to have failed, is that such a right derives immediately from the right to life, which is said to be (as are liberty and the pursuit of happiness) inalienable. If I have a right to life, but no right to be treated for a life-threatening illness, the claim that I have a right to life—even to ‘mere life’—is a joke. Phil: [Nor do I see] how such a right can be satisfied (maintenance of life can't be articulated except against a background of particular goods, which would conflict with the notion of an inalienable right). RP: I don’t follow this. Sorry. I thank Phil for having replied so thoughtfully. Robert Paul Reed College ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html