[lit-ideas] Re: Pass it on ...
- From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 16:49:01 -0800 (PST)
I think that would be mostly correct. Thanks Donal for the recent interesting
and helpful comments. I am sorry that I cannot in a similar way thank some
others who appear not to have followed the discussion at all carefully, yet
found it suitable to evaluate the participants.
O.K.
On Friday, January 17, 2014 1:36 PM, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
Have used this 'pass it on' thread to pass on post that belongs on another
thread where (yet again) have been unable to post it.
Dnl
On Friday, 17 January 2014, 12:34, Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
>Generally though, we can hardly speak
of historical claims as being empirically testable.>
This might be re-formulated as the issue of which “historical
claims” are also claims that are falsifiable/testable in a scientific sense –
and which are not?
Clearly some “historical claims” may be scientific claims – for
example, if we establish that a discovered body is Richard III’s by scientific
means [via DNA] then the “historical claim” as to a certain discovered body
being Richard III’s may be simultaneously “empirically testable” i.e. a
“scientific claim”. (The death of Emily Bronte might provide another example).
But it seems clear that many, if not most, “historical claims” are not
“scientific
claims” in this way.
This leaves the large question of whether (and how) those
non-scientific “historical claims” may be critically checked? A large question,
too large for this post: but it may be emphasised that investigation of
“historical claims” may still
be pursued in terms of their critical checking even if that critical checking
cannot be performed by way of a reproducible experiment as in the case of
“scientific claims”. So even non-scientific “historical claims” may be
rationally investigated
despite the fact that empirical tests cannot play the same vital role in
checking them as they play in checking “scientific claims”.
>I am not sure if historical
explanations as to why something happened, whether in intentionalist or
non-intentionalist
terms, would be considered 'knowledge' in the hard sense.>
Popper has written important
things on the character of historical explanation – including a very important,
though controversial, paper on the so-called ‘rationality principle’ in
historical
explanation i.e. the principle that
people generally act
‘rationally’ given what they think is their situation. This ‘rationality
principle’ bears on the issue of whether
history is to be understood in intentionalist or non-intentionalist terms, and
it may help clarify how it may be understood in both kinds of terms in
combination. There is of course much more to full examination of “historical
claims” and historical explanation than can be contained in Popper’s work, just
as there is much more to full examination of “scientific claims” and scientific
explanation than can be contained in Popper’s work. And understanding Popper’s
view is complicated by the fact that Popper’s major works on historical
explanation were completed long before he published anything on his theory of
“World 3” and do not take direct account of “World 3”: yet it seems clear that
Popper’s view of historical explanation would be that it must involve
explanation
in terms of an interacting W1, W2 and W3 (as indeed the best history does, even
if not couched consciously in W1-W2-W3 terms).
However, all of this is very
separate from “historicism”, as explained and criticised in Popper’s works The
Open Society and The
Poverty of Historicism. So I do not agree the following:-
>Here Popper's critique of
historicism comes into play;>
In Popper’s critique,
“historicism” is the view that history may be explained in terms of
"historical laws of development". If we follow Popper in rejecting
“historicism”, we are left with the large question of how we may (perhaps
rationally or critically) pursue historical claims and historical explanation –
for example, explanation as to how the First World War began. Conversely, this
large question can be addressed without bringing “historicism” into play
(except as an approach to be side-lined as mistaken).
>such explanatory
frameworks seem to be capable of interpreting almost any emerging evidence so as
to fit the theory, and it is difficult to see how they could ever be tested or
conclusively disproven.>
Popper’s view is that any explanatory framework – whether historicist or
Newtonian or Einsteinian – is
“capable of interpreting almost any emerging evidence so as to fit the theory”:
that is, it is always possible to evade a falsification. But it is bad method
to investigate reality with a method that seeks merely to evade falsification
for our explanatory framework – the more critical method (on which science is
based) is to adopt a method that exposes our explanatory framework to as much
possible falsification as possible i.e. to seek greater rather than lesser
falsifiability/criticisability in our
explanatory framework.
Now if we look at Marxism in its
“historicist” form, Popper would say roughly this: the initial “historicist”
form of Marxism was stated by Marx to be “scientific” and (putting aside its
mistaken conflation of scientific-historical explanation and “historicist”
explanation in terms of historical laws) it did make predictions that were
falsifiable – for example (1) that unrestrained “capitalism” could not and
would not be reformed by Parliamentary intervention (2) that inevitable
revolution against unrestrained “capitalism” would occur first in advanced
“capitalist” states. These predictions may be considered falsified: (1)
Parliamentary intervention did alter the unrestrained “capitalism” of Das
Kapital and (2) revolution did not
occur in advanced “capitalist” states like England, Germany and France but in
comparatively backward states like Russia and China – moreover, the revolution
was not spearheaded by the “proletariat” as per Marxist theory but by a largely
peasant class mobilised by leaders fired by
Marxist theory (again a falsification: in Marx’s theory his own theory should
play no or little role in bringing about the revolution it predicted).
So there was much that indicated that Marxist theory as put forward by Marx,
and as falsifiable, was falsified by events.
But, as indicated, any
falsification can be evaded – by “cooking up” a “fix-up” (as Feynman expresses
it). This is what happened with Marxist theory. The theory was amended and
varied so as to rebut any falsification. But in the process of amendment and
variation, the Marxist theory went from being a falsifiable (indeed falsified)
theory to being an unfalsifiable theory that well fits the description O.K.
gives of “explanatory frameworks [that] seem to be capable of interpreting
almost any emerging evidence so as to fit the theory”.
But it is not an entirely
straightforward or inevitable story: just as explanatory frameworks can be
taken in an uncritical direction they may be taken in a more critical direction
– even if this direction means largely rejecting them for a better explanatory
framework. But the history of humankind shows how when an explanatory framework
takes hold both individuals and institutions may find it very hard to give it
up (‘JTB-theory’ may be a recently discussed example) and may evade possible
falsification at every turn (e.g. in
the case of JTB-theory, evading ‘the fact’ that Newton’s physics is “false
knowledge”). As many people were killed in the name of Marxism it is a story
much more tragic than that of JTB-theory - the old and oft-repeated story of a
theory that might at some point appear to be held critically then being
defended dogmatically against possible ‘falsification’/criticism until is held
uncritically, but which becomes even more entrenched and deadly when it becomes
allied to maintaining political control.
DnlLdn
On Friday, 17 January 2014, 7:02, "cblists@xxxxxxxx" <cblists@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Back in June I wrote (under the rubric 'Not very neighbourly') to this list:
> So Obama has been reading my e-mail and listening to my telephone calls all
> these years ... Nevertheless ... [I've] not even [received] notes of
> condolence when I have lost loved ones, or a postcard of congratulation for
> my 60th
birthday.
>
> I call that downright rude.
Or (principle of charity kicking in here) maybe he's just too busy.
I, on the other hand,
have a bit of time on my hands, and knowing that this message, along with
billions of SMSs and telephone calls, is being monitored by the NSA, ask them
to pass on the following:
Happy 50th birthday, Michelle!
Chris Bruce,
always ready to celebrate
with a neighbour, in
Kiel, Germany
--
------------------------------------------------------------------
To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off,
digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html
Other related posts:
