[lit-ideas] Re: Ontilogical vs. Onticological
- From: "Phil Enns" <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2004 11:11:49 -0400
In response to my claiming that Heidegger goes to great lengths to
maintain the distinction between the ontic and ontological, John
McCreery wrote:
"How would Heidegger answer the quesiton, 'So what?'"
One answer would be that it is a use-less distinction in that it doesn't
bring about any specific results. It only has a role for a particular
kind of thinking, a kind that is not subject to instrumental reason and
therefore is not subject to the demands of being productive or use-full.
Another answer would be that the ontological difference, the difference
between Being and beings, is critical in two related ways. First, it is
crucial for any account of truth that moves beyond truth as correctness.
Very little of what matters in the world can be accounted for in
propositions and their relations. '2+2=4' is correct and therefore true
but it also matters very little to us. However, as we reflect on
ourselves, on our relations to other people, and our relations to the
world, it no longer is possible to talk in terms of correctness and yet
it is precisely at these times that truth matters the most. A river can
be described according to volume of water and flow rate, but more
importantly it can be described according to its beauty and how it
nurtures human community. People can be described according to their
roles and occupations, but more importantly they can be described
according to their character and being a self in the world. This truth
shows itself when we look past what is merely for the moment, to what is
enduring and what makes possible that which is momentary and useful. To
get at the truth of something is to not only account for what is correct
but also what makes that thing what it is. This is not possible unless
one distinguishes between beings and Being, between the ontic and the
ontological.
Second, the distinction between ontic and ontological is fundamental for
thinking.
"Nobody will deny that there is an interest in philosophy today. But -
is there anything at all left today in which man does not take an
interest, in the sense in which he understands 'interest'? Interest,
_interesse_, means to be among and in the midst of things, or to be at
the center of a thing and to stay with it. But today's interest accepts
as valid only what is interesting. And interesting is the sort of thing
that can freely be regarded as indifferent the next moment, and be
displaced by something else, which then concerns us just as little as
what went before. Many people today take the view that they are doing
great honor to something by finding it interesting. The truth is that
such an opinion has already relegated the interesting thing to the ranks
of what is indifferent and soon boring. It is no evidence of any
readiness to think that people show an interest in philosophy. ... But
even if we have devoted many years to the intensive study of the
treatises and writings of the great thinkers, that fact is still no
guarantee that we ourselves are thinking, or even are ready to learn
thinking. On the contrary - preoccupation with philosophy more than
anything else may give us the stubborn illusion that we are thinking
just because we are incessantly 'philosophizing'. (Heidegger, _What Is
Called Thinking?_)
Thinking begins when one takes seriously the duality of individual
beings and Being, the participation of individual beings in Being and
the Being of individual things.
"Western-European thinking, in keeping with the guiding question ...
what is the particular being in its Being?, proceeds from beings to
Being. Thinking ascends from the former to the latter. In keeping with
the guiding question, thinking transcends the particular being, in the
direction of Being, not in order to leave behind and abandon the
particular being, but so that by this ascent, this transcendence, it may
represent the particular being in that which it, as a being, is.
(Heidegger, _What Is Called Thinking?_)
By reflecting on the thingness of things, one moves beyond use-fullness
to an openness to things as they are. This is not a rejection of
use-fullness but rather a move to engage the world as something more
than what we as human beings do with it. In this sense, the distinction
between ontic and ontological serves as an argument against humanism.
To think, to distinguish between particular things and their thingness,
is to be open to the fact of our situatedness in the world.
That thinking matters, that the distinction between ontic and
ontological matters, is not something that can be argued for or proven.
Either one cares or one doesn't. So, while the above have the
appearance of being answers, they can't be. If one asks 'So what?', the
above can only be a response but they can't be an answer that would
satisfy the person asking the question. If the above would be an
answer, the question could only be rhetorical and therefore without need
of an answer. I therefore suggest that the above is how Heidegger might
answer but that it isn't an answer at all.
Sincerely,
Phil Enns
Toronto, ON
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