[lit-ideas] One more re. the Nuke Document
- From: JimKandJulieB@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 11 Sep 2005 13:10:19 EDT
I've only skimmed the first half of the document -- when it got to
"Consequence [of a nuclear strike] Management", I quit. Anyone who thinks you
can
manage the consequences of a nuke.... The govt couldn't even coordinate an
evacuation from NO -- and they're going to implement all the nice tidy little
diagrams and procedures in this document?
(4) New Thinking for a New Era. In a major break from Cold War thinking,
the results of the 2001 NPR reflect the capabilities required of nuclear
forces in the new 23
strategic environment. This approach allows the United States to take the
lead in 24
reducing nuclear stockpiles rather than rely on protracted arms control
negotiations. The 25
NPR outlines implications for various arms control treaty regimes,
underscores the need 26
for a new cooperative approach to Russia, and establishes a new strategic
framework 27
more consistent with the post-Cold War relationship between the two
countries. 28
Terrorists or rogue regional states armed with WMD will likely test US
security 29
commitments to its allies and friends. In response, the US needs a range of
capabilities to 30
assure friend and foe alike of its resolve. A broader array of capability is
needed to 31
dissuade states from undertaking diplomatic, political, military, or
technical courses of 32
action (COAs) that would threaten US and allied security. US forces must
pose a 33
credible deterrent to potential adversaries who have access to modern
military 34
technology, including WMD and the means to deliver them. 35
~~~~~~
Nuclear Force Fundamentals
miscalculation or by deliberate choice, use those weapons. In such cases,
deterrence, 1
even based on the threat of massive destruction, may fail and the United
States must be 2
prepared to use nuclear weapons if necessary. A major challenge of
deterrence is 3
therefore to convincingly convey both will and capability to the opposing
actor. 4
(5) Figure I-2 lists the most prominent deterrence challenges in a 2003
strategic 6
deterrence requirements study commissioned by the Joint Requirements
Oversight 7
(1) The US does not make positive statements defining the circumstances
under 12
which it would use nuclear weapons. Maintaining US ambiguity about when it
would 13
use nuclear weapons helps create doubt in the minds of potential
adversaries, deterring 14
them from taking hostile action. This calculated ambiguity helps reinforce
deterrence. If 15
the US clearly defined conditions under which it would use nuclear weapons,
others 16
might infer another set of circumstances in which the US would not use
nuclear weapons. 17
This perception would increase the chances that hostile leaders might not be
deterred 18
from taking actions they perceive as falling below that threshold.
25
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