[lit-ideas] Re: On the reassessment of Civil War generals, e.g. General Hood
- From: "Richard Henninge" <RichardHenninge@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 9 Jun 2012 03:34:00 +0200
Lawrence writes:
Guessing was a big part of generalship. Sherman was a great guesser but on
one occasion he did "a very dangerous thing. He had divided his army and made
it possible for Hood to attack it unit by unit; and that is precisely what he
did. He struck Thomas with the expectation of defeating him and then turning
on Schofield and McPherson, several miles to the east, before they could effect
a junction with Thomas." Hood called his three corps commanders together and
explained his plan. They agreed it was a good one and went off to get their
troops ready for the attack. But because of the uncertain terrain nothing went
as planned. When the attack did occur it was with an inadequate force and
Thomas held out against it. Should Hood "have known"? I don't see how he
could have. The Corps commander who "failed" the worst was Hardee who many at
the time rated better at managing an Army than Hood. But Hood took the blame
for this failure.
Sherman realized it had been a near thing. If Hood's plans had worked
successfully as well it might, Sherman would have suffered a defeat. He called
his own corps commanders together for a "lessons learned" session: "We agreed
that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies
and hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of
great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man. . .
."
As we read the correspondence of Jefferson Davis and Braxton Bragg we learn
that Hood's approach was just what they were looking for. Previous generals
were too defensively minded. Davis & Bragg wanted more aggression and Hood
gave it to them. Unfortunately for Hood's reputation Davis and Bragg didn't
give Hood enough men to pull off that 'brave, determined and rash" sort of
combat. So Hood ran out of troops, and his reputation suffered accordingly.
1.. "Guessing was a big part of generalship. Sherman was a great guesser but
[my emphasis] on one occasion he did 'a very dangerous thing. He had divided
his army and made it possible for Hood to attack it unit by unit; and that is
precisely what he did. He struck Thomas with the expectation of defeating him
and then turning on Schofield and McPherson, several miles to the east, before
they could effect a junction with Thomas.'" Rhetorically speaking, from the but
on Lawrence's tendentiousness, following his improved historians who, equally
tendentiously, propose strikingly new re-readings of history that would lead
wishful thinkers to think that it all could have easily turned out the other
way around--but for a handful of unfortunate circumstances. Read out the but
rhetoric, however, and Hood supporters don't have a leg to stand on. Sherman
was a great guesser--forget but--and he "guessed" right here too and carried
off the victory against a "brave, determined, and rash [Hood]."
2.. The historian that Lawrence is quoting wants to have a point, but all the
good points are taken: he can't very well claim that Sherman "made a mistake,"
since what Sherman did turned out to be the perfect defensive strategy. Without
even knowing the details of the encounter, one can assume that Sherman's
normally "very dangerous" dividing of his army was dictated by the very terrain
that Lawrence's author claims Hood could not "have known." Perhaps it was three
ridges, each several miles apart, in a line from west to east with deep ravines
between them: "He had divided his army and made it possible for Hood to attack
it unit by unit; and that is precisely what he did." "[Rash] fools rush in
where angels fear to tread," which defines not so much angels as
fools--"angels" could be replaced by "others."
3.. "'He struck Thomas with the expectation of defeating him and then turning
on Schofield and McPherson, several miles to the east, before they could effect
a junction with Thomas.' Hood called his three corps commanders together and
explained his plan. They agreed it was a good one and went off to get their
troops ready for the attack. But because of the uncertain terrain nothing went
as planned." We can be sure that Sherman did not leave his isolated west flank
vulnerable to attack. It also cannot have been the case that Hood could not see
the terrain his troops were attacking; he had it in his sights--Thomas's,
Schofield's and McPherson's units on their respective ridges. The very ridges
that, in their isolation one from another, prevented Sherman from presenting a
common front to the enemy army at the same time effectively defended them from
sudden, massive attack. These are the kinds of things you learn at West Point
by studying military history from the Greeks down to modern times: things for
which rashness can seldom compensate.
4.. "When the attack did occur it was with an inadequate force and Thomas
held out against it." The tendentiousness! This kind of military history would
rewrite the history of the world by pumping in more special FX firepower and
manpower in a sort of "other worlds" scenario. The force they had was the force
they had. Period.
5.. "Sherman realized it had been a near thing." Read by the tendentious,
this tendentious statement sways by innuendo--do you feel the sweat, the close
call; hear the "whew"; notice how close the Union had come to losing the whole
war? If only Hood had been able to send in a couple thousand 14-year-olds to
run up the hill and tackle the Northerners around the knees, three at a time.
What is this, Harry Potter, Lord of the Rings? "If Hood's plans had worked
successfully as well it might [...and how well that might be depends on how
tendentious you're feeling today], Sherman would have suffered a defeat." Yes,
indeed: "If wishes were horses, beggars would ride."
6.. "[Sherman] called his own corps commanders together for a 'lessons
learned' session:...."i.e. the tendentious take-away for us is that Sherman and
his men had in some way been caught off-guard or strategically topped by the
cleverer, better, braver, more daring Southern army, which was unfortunately
hopelessly outmanned and would have otherwise prevailed, actually should have
prevailed, if they hadn't done this, that or another thing wrong, such as not
throwing enough people into the breach.
7.. Then comes the most intelligent, non-tendentious, statement in Lawrence's
e-mail, a direct quote from Sherman: "We agreed that we ought to be unusually
cautious and prepared at all times for sallies and hard fighting, because Hood,
though not deemed much of a scholar, or of great mental capacity, was
undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man....." That says it all. The rest
is merely tendentious special pleading, whereof one would be well advised not
to speak.
Richard Henninge
University of Mainz
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