[lit-ideas] Re: On the reassessment of Civil War generals, e.g. General Hood
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 8 Jun 2012 06:10:36 -0700
Omar,
Your desire for a “clearer post” isn’t clear. Do you mean clearer posts
(plural) in which case a broader presentation of the American Civil War might
be in order? Or do you mean this particular post isn’t clear?
Assuming the latter, in the post below I am critical of historians who
criticize the various civil war generals for not knowing matters that were in
those days extremely difficult to know. For example, where is the enemy? In
the modern U.S. we went from Gary Powers U2 spy plane which was shot down over
Russia to unmanned drones and satellites which can see almost anything an army
wants to see. But in the American Civil War (1861-1865) they had to get by
with a lot of guessing. Sometimes they got useful information from spies,
civilians and enemy deserters (who were sometimes sent to an opposing army to
supply false information), but the best information came from the cavalry and
the South had better cavalry units than the North until late in the war.
CSA Cavalry General Nathan Bedford Forrest was the very best, and when he was
relied upon the South had an “intelligence” advantage. He would ride out with
2,000 to 3,000 troops and capture the Union’s pickets and take them back to be
interrogated. He would engage in skirmishes with the Union’s cavalry or even
its infantry to test how strong it was and whether the Union army was there in
force. Then he would ride back and report.
But neither the Union nor Confederate forces used cavalry solely for
intelligence purposes. They might beef up a cavalry unit and have it harry the
enemy or alarm him into thinking an attack was happening where it wasn’t. When
a cavalry unit was doing that it wasn’t supplying intelligence. Also, cavalry
reports were sometimes wrong so generals might be forgiven for doubting
information they received. In General Hood’s case he has been faulted for
doubting reports coming from Forrest that turned out to be true. Also, he
sometimes split Forrest’s forces and used them to support infantry rather than
letting Forrest keep his unit in tact to provide intelligence and harry the
enemy.
Interestingly, spy balloons were used by both the North and the South in the
Civil War. They weren’t very successful but the idea intrigued Ferdinand Von
Zeppelin who came over here to see them in action. He was apparently more
impressed with the historians who later wrote about them.
Also, in defense of generals on both sides, President Lincoln in Washington and
President Davis in Richmond issued orders that were not always sound from a
military standpoint. One of the very best generals the North had was General
George Thomas who was almost fired for not moving quickly enough against
General Hoods forces. In retrospect and with the information we have today we
can see that Thomas was planning a nearly perfect attack. His plans couldn’t
be improved upon but Lincoln and not just Lincoln but Grant himself thought
Thomas was moving too slowly and almost replaced him. It was the battle that
Thomas planned and carried out that destroyed General Hood’s army. His army
was routed and Hood himself resigned and never fought again.
Lawrence
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On
Behalf Of Omar Kusturica
Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2012 6:03 PM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: On the reassessment of Civil War generals, e.g.
General Hood
Lawrence,
On behalf of those of us who are not residing in your head, I think that some
clearer post would be appreciated.
All best,
Me
_____
From: Lawrence Helm <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
To: Lit-Ideas <Lit-Ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Sent: Thursday, June 7, 2012 5:55 PM
Subject: [lit-ideas] On the reassessment of Civil War generals, e.g. General
Hood
Someone wrote me privately wanting to argue about Burnside. I’ll probably get
more into him in a couple of weeks. At present I’m more interested in Hood
whose reputation has traditionally been much worse than Burnside’s. After
years of passionate debate about these and other generals some scholars are
making “better” assessments. By “better” I mean that the information about the
various generals has improved cumulatively, but also the task of the historian
is better understood and practiced than in earlier times. It is very difficult
not to impose our present views upon earlier times. Some historians have been
able to put those times into a “better” more objective and accurate context.
An easy criticism is “he should have known”; which is truly an absurd criticism
when we honestly attempt to put ourselves back into those times. Imagine
taking your family into the woods with an inadequate map and no knowledge of
the territory. Imagine getting lost. Then imagine all the authorities saying
“you should have known.” Today that would mean you should have taken better
maps, a GPS, or perhaps have “known better” than to have gone into the woods in
those circumstances, but back in the 1860s there were huge tracts of land where
virtually no one knew what was in them. The enemy was “out there” some place
but you didn’t know exactly where.
Guessing was a big part of generalship. Sherman was a great guesser but on one
occasion he did “a very dangerous thing. He had divided his army and made it
possible for Hood to attack it unit by unit; and that is precisely what he did.
He struck Thomas with the expectation of defeating him and then turning on
Schofield and McPherson, several miles to the east, before they could effect a
junction with Thomas.” Hood called his three corps commanders together and
explained his plan. They agreed it was a good one and went off to get their
troops ready for the attack. But because of the uncertain terrain nothing went
as planned. When the attack did occur it was with an inadequate force and
Thomas held out against it. Should Hood “have known”? I don’t see how he
could have. The Corps commander who “failed” the worst was Hardee who many at
the time rated better at managing an Army than Hood. But Hood took the blame
for this failure.
Sherman realized it had been a near thing. If Hood’s plans had worked
successfully as well it might, Sherman would have suffered a defeat. He called
his own corps commanders together for a “lessons learned” session: “We agreed
that we ought to be unusually cautious and prepared at all times for sallies
and hard fighting, because Hood, though not deemed much of a scholar, or of
great mental capacity, was undoubtedly a brave, determined, and rash man. . .
.”
As we read the correspondence of Jefferson Davis and Braxton Bragg we learn
that Hood’s approach was just what they were looking for. Previous generals
were too defensively minded. Davis & Bragg wanted more aggression and Hood
gave it to them. Unfortunately for Hood’s reputation Davis and Bragg didn’t
give Hood enough men to pull off that ‘brave, determined and rash” sort of
combat. So Hood ran out of troops, and his reputation suffered accordingly.
He was no longer the most highly praised of generals and his fiancé broke off
their engagement – no one says that was why she broke it off but with the
“shine” off of Hood, sitting there, wrinkled and worn with only one leg and one
arm she realized she wasn’t really in love with him. Few people were. One
woman however did love him. They married after the war and had eleven children
– ending speculation that Hood’s injury may have damaged more than his leg.
Lawrence
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