I am not sure how it follows from the view that value judgments are contingent / culturally relative that we are entitled to be ethnocentric. One could at least equally logically conclude from this that we should be cautious about making value judgments. No ? O.K. On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 1:46 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote: > Now how could I possibly disagree with a fellow-Canadian? (Ethnocentrism > vindicated.) Thanks for sharing, Chris. > > Preparing for Germany vs USA. > > Opa Walter > > P.S. Ever notice entropy isn't what it used to be? > > > Quoting cblists@xxxxxxxx: > > > > > On 22 Jun 2014, at 19:14, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx> wrote: > > > > > The agreement Rorty seeks on the justifiability of his ethnocentrism > must > > be intended as agreement by a universal audience. ... Rorty's espousal of > > ethnocentrism displays performative self-contradiction, for what it > > explicitly says is contradicted by what it shows in the saying (and > *must* > > show in the saying for the saying to say what it's saying). Any position > that > > cannot be expressed without contradicting itself, performatively or > > logically, is not a rational position to maintain ... > > > > Did Rorty seek a universal audience, or was he merely wishing to convince > > believers in (what I will, I hope unproblematically, call) the > Enlightenment > > Project that their faith is not grounded in rational argument, but merely > > intellectual 'hand-waving' which in the end says nothing more than > 'that's > > the way we do things around here'? > > > > If Rorty imagined that he accomplished this by rational argument, then > he was > > indeed guilty of the contradiction which Walter points out above. By his > own > > account, he should only have been able to indulge in that same > 'intellectual > > handwaving'. And that begs the question. > > > > Will Kymlicka, in his "Liberalism and Communitarianism", argues that > Rorty's > > position was dogmatic. Rorty was not predicting that we will be unable > to > > find universal, rational grounds and means of persuasion for our moral > > positions, he was claiming from the outset that he knew 'in advance of > the > > arguments' that such 'universal' rational grounds and means of persuasion > > will only be compelling to particular historical communities. In > Kymlicka's > > words, "Rorty ... simply presuppose[s] ... that Kantian liberal theories > > won't work. ... Rorty has decided he doesn't even have to examine the > > theories - and that is just dogmatism." > > > > Chris Bruce > > Kiel, Germany > > > > Will Kymlicka, "Liberalism and Communitarianism", in the Canadian > Journal of > > Philosophy, Vol. 18, No. 2 (June 1988), pp. 181-204; reprinted in several > > philosophical collections, including Andrew Bailey, ed., FIRST > PHILOSOPHY: > > FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS AND READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY, Broadview Press > > (Peterborough, Canada), 2004; Vol 1: VALUES AND SOCIETY, pp. 324-338. > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- > > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html > > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html >