[lit-ideas] Re: On linguistic and genetic uncertainty
- From: Phil Enns <phil.enns@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 8 May 2014 17:00:18 +0600
Walter writes:
"I would submit that Witters had a tad too many wee drams of the good stuff
before saying his saying/showing distinction."
"Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the
ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be
no science." - Wittgenstein 'A Lecture on Ethics'
If I may differ from my colleague from the Rock, the say/show distinction
strikes me as being quite useful, particularly when it comes to ethics and
aesthetics. In order for ethics to get off the ground, even for the Master
of Koenigsberg, we require ethical intuitions. These ethical intuitions
both identify what might be considered as a matter of ethical concern, and
provide the stuff for ethical deliberation. Some people see the eating of
animal flesh as a matter of ethical concern, while others are indifferent.
One can, of course, give arguments for and against the eating of animal
flesh, but eventually the debate will come down to the shrug of one's
shoulders and the statement that, well, that is just how one sees things.
At a certain point, the best we can do is show our ethical commitments and
judgments, because these commitments and judgments reflect our attitudes or
orientations towards life, the Good, everything that matters to us, We can
talk about how these attitudes or orientations manifest themselves in
particular ways in our lives, but since they address, as it were, the
whole, they cannot themselves, be things beside other things in the world.
It seems to me that the same is true of the beautiful.
Sincerely,
Phil
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