________________________________ From: Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx> >> Wittgenstein told Ogden 'For although TLP isn't _ideal_ still it has something like the right meaning, wheras 'Philosophical logic' is wrong. In fact I don't know what it means! There is no such thing as philosophical logic. (Unless one says that as a whole the book is nonsense the title might as well be nonsense to).' [Monk's biography, p 206]>> But repeatining this quotation does not explain the difference between "Philosophical logic" [which "is wrong", according to W] and "TLP" [which "has something like the right meaning"]. We can play on this merry-go-round of terminology and get nowhere - what we need is an explanation of the difference. Likewise, JLS offers this: >And the question then concerns what "logico-philosophical" may mean. One possibility would be: logical-cum-philosophical (treatise) i.e. NOT as having 'logical' qualifying 'philosophy', but as a treatise which deals with LOGIC _and_ philosophy.> To which again the question arises: what is the difference between a work that concerns "logic and philosophy" and a work in "philosophical logic"? Etc. Here is a suggestion about the W quotation: what W is getting at is not that there is a difference between "philosophical logic" and the field denoted by a "logico-philosophicus" but that there is difference between these terms simpliciter and a title that is a "Treatise" or Tractatus on them. For his "Treatise" suggests we cannot say anything about these fields, though we can show or exhibit what is "the truth" as to them: and so to refer to "Philosophical Logic" simpliciter "is wrong" as it wrongly suggests we can say something about "Philosophical logic" - whereas, because of the "limits of language", we can only offer a treatise on that subject-matter that shows the character of that subject-matter but without saying anything about it. (And this suggestion may be corroborated by the parenthetical remark that ends the quotation re "nonsense" - for this question of "nonsense" is to be understood in terms of the distinction between showing and saying.) Just a suggestion mind, but one that takes W's point as being in a different direction to distinguishing "philosophical logic" from whatever is denoted by a "logico-philosophicus" etc. If this direction is right, some here are barking up the wrong tree. For those who want to take W in that other direction, the question remains for them to explain the distinction - repeating the quotation from W amounts to no explanation at all. Donal Sometimes fond of explanations London