[lit-ideas] "Objects Are Colourless" (TLP): the 'internal/external' property distinction

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 27 May 2004 10:24:08 EDT

In a message dated 5/26/2004 9:56:46 PM Eastern Standard Time,  
Henninge@xxxxxxxxxxx writes:
One is  the distinction between internal and external
properties of the objects.  The internal properties are logical, are in his
logical space. Basically,  color is an external property. 
I'm not sure I understand this.
I understand Wittgenstein was familiar with both propositional and  predicate 
In predicate logic, something like "There is a blue book (Wittgenstein's)  on 
the table" would come out as
Ex.Fx & Gx & Hx
where "F" refers to the property, "being a book"
"G"  "                  "            "being  blue"
"H"   "                 "            "being  on the table.
Ditto, "all crows are black" comes out as
(x) Fx -> Gx
For every x, if x is a black, x is black.
The point being that 'colour' looks like a pretty _logical_ (internal)  
property in that it gets a representation in the logical form of what you are  
trying to say.
As opposed to 'beautiful':
That blue Picasso is beautiful.
would come out as
(!)(ix) Fx & Gx
The x is blue and the x is Picasso, and BUY IT (or admire it)! ('beautiful'  
can have just an 'emotive' meaning -- does not represented in the logical 
Some colour words do tend to have 'connotative associations' -- 'Red!' --  
but that's surely implicatural.
If Wittgenstein meant to say that 'external' properties are _perceiving  
subject_-relative, then most in life generally is.


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  • » [lit-ideas] "Objects Are Colourless" (TLP): the 'internal/external' property distinction