Looking back at the original post, which I finally did, I see a different question is posed. Is it the intent of the original question to ask whether there is a difference between believing that x is not true and not believing that x is true? Julie Campbell Julie's Music & Language Studio 1215 W. Worley Columbia, MO 65203 573-881-6889 https://juliesmusicandlanguagestudio.musicteachershelper.com/ http://www.facebook.com/JuliesMusicLanguageStudio On Wed, Dec 4, 2013 at 9:54 AM, Julie Krueger <juliereneb@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > I want a definition of "believe" for the sake of this conversation. Or is > the goal of the above conversation to define "believe" by equating it (or > not) with cognitive knowing? > > "Belief" in common terms, at least, involves some psychological attitude > that is typically distinguished from cognitive "knowing" by very virtue of > subjective or psychological/psychiatric factors that are not purely > cognitive. > > Perhaps the above dialogue is an argument about whether or not that is an > accurate definition of "believe" or is, in fact, the way one will choose to > use the word "believe". > > If the question then is that cognitive knowledge = > psychologically/psychiatrically/emotionally impacted "belief" then it's not > a matter of logic, it's a matter of definition, or behavioral science, or > what have you. > > What am I missing here? I suspect that there's something about the nature > of the original question that I don't understand. > > The phrase "choose to believe" has always troubled me, but largely because > "believe" is a such freighted word. > > Julie Campbell > Julie's Music & Language Studio > 1215 W. Worley > Columbia, MO 65203 > 573-881-6889 > https://juliesmusicandlanguagestudio.musicteachershelper.com/ > http://www.facebook.com/JuliesMusicLanguageStudio > > > > On Wed, Dec 4, 2013 at 7:53 AM, <Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx> wrote: > >> Some Notes on Noting, etc. >> >> I agree with McEvoy below. >> >> I would distinguish more than the scenarios provided by Phatic. >> >> i. Pierre notes that it is raining, and yet Pierre does not BELIEVE that >> it is raining. >> ii. Pierre notes that it is raining, and yet Pierre BELIEVES that it is >> not raining. >> iii. Since Pierre notes that it is raining, he should BELIEVE that it is >> raining. >> >> Etc. >> >> It may be noted that 'note' is 'factive' (as the Kiparskys would put it): >> >> "I noted he was being sarcastic" seems to entail that "he was being >> sarcastic". >> >> Etymology Online indeed notes that, 'probably', to "note" is cognate with >> to 'know'. >> >> This would yield: >> >> iv. Pierre knows that it is raining yet he does not care to believe it. >> >> ---- >> >> McEvoy seems right (and possibly is) about the non-equivalence of ~BEL >> and >> BEL~. Or not. >> >> One problem with Pierre is pointed out by Kripke. His example: >> >> v. Pierre believes that Londres is ugly. >> vi. Pierre believes that London is pretty (i.e. not ugly). >> >> Pierre, in Kripke's convoluted example, fails to realise that London IS >> Londres. >> >> Or not. >> >> The topic, more than Griceian (after Grice, who revelled in the nice >> distinction of 'not-believe' and 'believe-not' in terms of implicature) >> seems >> Popperian. If we take 'note' as 'observe' (as we shouldn't), then Pierre, >> upon >> noting that it is raining should almost automatically form the belief >> that >> it is raining. >> >> (Pierre's noting (or observing) that p seems to refute -- or falsify -- >> his disbelief in p, or absence of belief in p. Or not). >> >> Thus, I agree with McEvoy that he (Pierre, not McEvoy) should "get out >> more". >> >> In this connection, Pierre's Puzzle resembles Moore's: >> >> "I know it is raining, yet I won't believe it". >> >> --- If 'note' is used weakly to mean 'to have the hallucination', then, as >> Geary notes, what Pierre notes is not a belief, but what Geary calls, >> etymologically, an 'annotation'. >> >> ---- >> >> Cheers, >> >> Speranza >> >> ---- >> >> McEvoy: >> >> "Would it help to say this question is the same (given "Pierre notes >> that >> it is raining" is the same in both formulations and may be 'cancelled >> out') >> as asking whether "Pierre doesn't believe it's raining" is the same as >> "Pierre believes that it's not raining"? And this is to ask whether "X >> doesn't >> believe p" is equivalent to "X believes non-p". And might it help to add >> that, while in many cases these expressions may be interchangeable, we >> might >> draw a subtle distinction viz. when "X doesn't believe p" that doesn't >> necessarily mean "X believes non-p" - for it may be "X doesn't believe p >> or >> non-p" i.e. even if X believes "p or non-p" must be true, X may not have >> belief that p is actually true or that non-p is actually true. He may >> believe >> one of them must be true but have no belief as to which one is true. In >> this >> way "X doesn't believe p" is not equivalent to "X believes non-p" and nor >> does it entail it. However, in many cases when "X doesn't believe p" that >> is because "X believes non-p", and this may explain why the terms are >> often >> interchangeable. Btw, Pierre should get out more. >> >> Phatic: >> >> "Is there a (relevant) difference between "Pierre notes that it is >> raining >> and Pierre doesn't believe it's raining" >> and "Pierre notes that it is raining and Pierre believes that it's not >> raining." >> >> ------------------------------------------------------------------ >> To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, >> digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html >> > >