[lit-ideas] Re: Nothing is Shown

  • From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 7 Jul 2012 23:36:42 -0400 (EDT)

R. Read and B. Deans, from link as per previous post. Some excerpts  below.


Read and Deans write:
 
"the say-show distinction continues to figure in Wittgenstein’s  
post-Tractatus writings."

"Proponents of the Diamond-Conant  interpretation are concerned to record 
the fact that, within the Tractatus, the  notion of showing [zeigen] is never 
used in reference to nonsense [Unsinn] but  only in reference to 
legitimate, well-formed propositions."

"Here we  might recall two central Tractarian remarks on  showing"

Wittgenstein:
 
"Propositions cannot represent logical form."
 
"Logical form is mirrored in propositions."
 
"What mirrors itself in language, language cannot represent."
 
"What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by language."
 
"Propositions SHOW the logical form of reality. They display it  (4.121)."
 
"What can be shown cannot be said" (4.1212).

"the ‘say–show’ distinction
calls into question both the ineffability of  nonsense and the effability
of sense." 
 
A re-reading of the concluding sections of Read's and Deans' essay may be  
in order!
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
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