[lit-ideas] Re: Motive, and the quality of foreign policy
- From: "Lawrence Helm" <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 16 May 2006 10:46:00 -0700
Omar,
You have written, "SInce you do not indicate being supportive or even
tolerant of any of these [i.e. your idea of what would be diplomatic in this
case] ideas, I think that I will continue to view you as being pro-war."
What I say in response to that is that any approach that achieves U.S.
objectives short of actual war or punitive strike, even if involves the
threat of war, must be considered diplomacy.
You also wrote, "I also think that some (though by no means all) of the US
policy in the past has been wiser than that. After all, the US did not
launch pre-eventive nuclear attacks on the USSR or PR China to prevent them
from developing nuclear weapons."
Don't forget that while Political Realism may not have been the official
posture in any administration other than Nixon's, Realistic considerations
are difficult to avoid when considering such courses of action as you
describe. What you say would be decisive if we placed some form of legalism
(e.g., enforcing the NPT unilaterally) above National Interest, but that has
not been the case. Our main contention with China had to do with Taiwan
with which we had a treaty. If China attacked Taiwan militarily, we would
come to its defense. China's having the bomb or using it could threaten our
allies (South Korea and Japan) but practically speaking China seemed to be
doing their best to mount a creditable threat in case we came to blows over
Taiwan. And as much or more than their worry about Taiwan was their border
concerns with India and Russia.
As to North Korea, the Clinton Administration agreed to South Korea's
"Sunshine Policy," in which they (primarily South Korea and the U.S.) would
give NK all sorts of things, sort like your item two recommendation for
diplomacy, in return for NK giving up their nuclear ambitions. It was in
the nature of the Sunshine that no one would check to see if NK was really
doing what they promised to do. All of that Sunshine baggage was in the way
of the Bush Administration's trying something else, even if it wanted to.
China, Japan and South Korea have more of an interest in the activities of
North Korea than we do. That is, more of a National Interest in the
Morgenthau sense of the term. Only if you apply a non-Realistic criteria
does it seem as though America is being inconsistent.
In regard to Iran, our National Interests have been threatened by
Iran-inspired and financed terrorist activities, direct threats to America's
allies (Britain and Israel), an avowed desire to destroy the U.S.
(Khomeini's "Great Satan" speeches the effect of which are included to a
certain extent, as I understand from reading Robin Wright, in the Iranian
constitution), and Iran's potential, given their belligerence, for
preventing the free flow of shipping through the Straits of Hormuz should
that suit what they conceive to be their national interests. Our
inclination to tolerate Iran's threats seems to have lessened since evidence
has been discovered indicating their pursuit of nuclear weapons.
You seem to be hoping that by applying moral pressure to the U.S., that the
U.S. can be induced to give in to Iran's National Interests and give up its
own. I don't really believe it works that way. The Reality is that both
Iran and the U.S. will advance what they, respectively, believe to be their
National Interests with as much power as they possess, and the U.S. has
quite a bit more power than Iran does.
Lawrence
-----Original Message-----
From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of Omar Kusturica
Sent: Tuesday, May 16, 2006 8:56 AM
To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Motive, and the quality of foreign policy
--- Lawrence Helm <lawrencehelm@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Furthermore I have said any
> number of times that I am
> supportive of the diplomatic attempts by several
> nations to 1) stop Iran
> from developing nuclear weapons
*I was thinking that 1) the "diplomatic attempts"
might include direct and high-level talks with the US
as well. 2) They might include some substantial offers
in the area of diplomatic relations, economic
co-operation etc. 3) The option of allowing Iran to
develop nuclear weapons, if it wishes and has an
ability to do so, does not have to be rejected a
priori and at all costs.
SInce you do not indicate being supportive or even
tolerant of any of these ideas, I think that I will
continue to view you as being pro-war. I also think
that some (though by no means all) of the US policy in
the past has been wiser than that. After all, the US
did not launch pre-eventive nuclear attacks on the
USSR or PR China to prevent them from developing
nuclear weapons.
In drawing
> attention to the proximity of
> the normalization of relations with Libya to the
> Ahmadinejad letter, I
> argued that this could plausibly be shown to be a
> Realistic (as in
> Morgenthau's definition of Political Realism)
> approach to the Iranian
> problem. I believe it can be seen from my language
> that I approved of this
> approach (assuming an association between Libyan
> normalization and diplomacy
> with Iran).
*So if Iran would agree to suspend uranium enrichment,
and to stay away from Israel, we wouldn't be hearing
about its human rights violations etc. ? I approciate
the honesty but I think that we need an approach that
is more comprehensive and imaginative, not just
realistic. You are right though that your approach is
probably in line with much (but not all)of the US Cold
War policy.
O.K.
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