"Motivated irrationality" is the title of Pears's book.
Thanks to McEvoy for expanding on what he sees as 'the point' at stake,
figuratively.
In a message dated 2/24/2016 2:15:00 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes in "Re: Popperians and Griceians": "We may
agree
but perhaps for very different reasons. My side of the agreement is not based
on applying a version of the Razor: it is not clear how "beyond necessity"
should be judged here (the central weakness in Razor arguments), and
clearly there are many different W2 psychologies that could be distinguished.
So
why not here? My assumption is only a provisional one and to be abandoned
if evidence, like tests, went against it: nevertheless my provisional
assumption is based on looking at the four card example - an 'A', 'D', '4' and
'7' (where each card has a number on one side and a letter on the other) and
the rule to be tested (by turning over cards) is "If a vowel on one side
then an even number on the other". This example was used in my earlier post
but perhaps I should amplify the point. What are we to say about the
psychology of the v. many people who correctly say we should turn over 'A' and
then incorrectly say the other card we need to turn over is '4' [when the
correct other card is actually the '7']? It is not plausible that
(psychologically) they went from 'logical' re 'A' to illogical as they scanned
across to
'4', and also illogical as they scanned on '7' and failed to see its
logical relevance: it seems to me much more plausible that it is all the same
individual psychology in relation to the whole set of cards. It is therefore
more plausible to think that just as they are wrongly choosing '4' on the
basis that a vowel on the other side would confirm the rule (which it would,
it's just that a consonant would not disconfirm the rule, and so '4' is
logically irrelevant and its confirmatory potential is logically irrelevant)
so they are choosing 'A' for the wrong reason - they are likewise choosing
'A' because an even number on the other side would confirm the rule (which
it would, its just that an odd number would disconfirm the rule, and it's
only this potential disconfirmation that makes 'A' logically relevant, and
its confirmatory potential is logically irrelevant). I don't think [Speranza]
really understands this - particularly the ... point that "confirmatory
potential is logically irrelevant". For this point is at the logical heart of
the matter. Yet JLS goes on to make a whole series of claims that could
hardly be made by anyone who properly understands the logic here:- ... It
really does tend to happen [that scientists falsify hypotheses]: and you will
see scientists quite explicitly state what it is that would falsify a
theory, as well as criticise theories because they are not in a falsifiable
form
as against competitors, as well as improve on investigations into a theory
by specifying new tests which could falsify the theory. Etc. All this is
the very lifeblood of scientific investigation and its method. It happens, a
lot - and it is characteristic of valuable science. Do not believe
philosophers in armchairs who suggest otherwise. They are outnumbered and
logically outclassed by the many scientists who understand scientific method
and
the "Logic of Research" in the terms Popper explained. By comparison to the
valuable role of "falsifiability", "confirmability" is not valuable at all
except insofar as its constitutes a success for a falsifiable theory where
it passes a test that could falsify it. This is the falsificationist version
of "confirmation" or "confirmability", and it is non-inductive. The
falsificationist version of "confirmation" or "confirmability" is, logically
and
correctly, the only version that explains their value properly - and then
only in terms of how they serve as an adjunct to falsifiability [i.e. the
only valuable "confirmation" is where the "confirmation" is a success in the
face of attempted falsification]. Why is confirmation not otherwise
valuable? We've already seen why: its because mere "confirmatory potential is
logically irrelevant" in any logical sense of testing. [Some of Speranza's]
bare assertions are just inductive make-believe that do not withstand careful
scrutiny. It is possible to write screeds of stuff based on this
make-believe and many philosophers have done so: with very few exceptions
(Quine may
be one) it is because they do not understand - as Wason did understand -
that mere "confirmatory potential is logically irrelevant" in any logical
sense of testing. What may be said is that 'confirmation bias' plays a part, a
negative part, in everyday "reasoning": but this is different from
pretending 'confirmation bias' and the like are a form of logic and that
"Nearly
all reasoning in everyday life is inductive.""
OK. I'll re-read Johnson-Laird and Wason!
Meanwhile, I thought to points of my previous post may have special
Popperian relevance (if anti-confirmatory).
One was the basis on what Popper would have as w1, i.e. the brain, and the
experiments by Prado and associates ((A) below). Grice called himself one
who was for 'reductive' analysis, never 'reductionist' analysis, but Popper
would not buy this fine distinction!
The other is the remark that 'it all depends on what you mean by
'rational'' that a Popperian may refudiate as merely definitional (and strictly
unrefudiable). (Point (B) below).
Cheers,
Speranza
----
(A)
Prado finds the brain system for deductive reasoning is centred in the
left hemisphere involving frontal and parietal areas.
Specific brain areas activated during deductive reasoning included the
inferior frontal gyrus; the middle frontal gyrus; the medial frontal gyrus;
the precentral gyrus; and the basal ganglia. (And Geary thinks we think
with our fingers!)
Goel studies patients having damage to left or right parietal cortex.
Those with left-side damage perform worse than those with right-side
damage on reasoning tasks in which complete information is provided.
Prado finds the precise brain areas associated with deductive reasoning
depended to a large extent on the nature of the task.
Prado also finds that the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA9/44) is more
activated during the processing of categorical arguments.
Prado finds found the left precentral gyrus (BA6) was more activated with
propositional reasoning than with categorical or relational reasoning.
Language seems to play little or no role in processing of reasoning tasks
post-reading (Monti and Osherson).
Reverberi identifies three strategies used in categorical reasoning.
One strategy is sensitivity to the logical form of problems (the left
inferior lateral frontal (BA44/45) and superior medial frontal (BA6/8) areas).
A second strategy is sensitivity to the validity of conclusions (i.e.,
accurate performance) -- the left ventro-lateral frontal (BA47) area.
In the use of heuristic strategies, no specific pattern of brain
activation.
More intelligent individuals exhibit less belief bias because they make
more use of analytic processing strategies (Neys).
Individual differences in performance accuracy (and thus low belief bias)
are strongly associated with activation in the right inferior frontal
cortex under low and high cognitive load conditions (Tsujii and Watanabe).
Fangmeier uses mental model theory as the basis for assuming the
existence of three stages of processing in relational reasoning.
Different brain areas are associated with each stage, i.e. premise
processing: temporo-occipital activation reflecting the use of visuo-spatial
processing.
Then there's premise integration: anterior prefrontal cortex (e.g.,
BA10), an area associated with executive processing.
Finally, there is Validation: the posterior parietal cortex was
activated, as were areas within the prefrontal cortex (BA6, BA8) and the
dorsal
cingulate cortex.
Bonnefond studies the brain processes associated with conditional
reasoning focusing on modus ponens.
There is enhanced brain activity when premises and conclusions do not
match and anticipatory processing before the second premise occurs when they
match.
Limited progress has been made in identifying the brain systems involved
in deductive reasoning.
This is because of simple task differences and individual differences
that affect the results.
(B)
Those who are incompetent have little insight into their reasoning
failures.
This is the Dunning–Kruger effect.
Deciding whether humans are rational depends on how we define
"rationality", with which Popperians might not agree.
Sternberg points out that few problems of consequence in our lives had a
deductive or even any meaningful kind of "correct" solution.
Normativism is the idea that human thinking reflects a normative system
one conforming to norms or standards against which it should be measured and
judged (Elqayam and Evans).
An alternative approach is that human rationality involves effective use
of probabilities rather than logic. And then there's further study on
Johnson-Laird's and Wason's cards.
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