Walter wrote: "Perhaps in simpler terms, if what you're doing is wrong, the "wrongness" of your action (and will) consists in the fact that interlocutors engaged in discourse, under the epistemic conditions identified by Habermas, could not find your action justifiable." It seems to me that this isn't quite right. The failure of an action to satisfy the criteria of Habermas' discourse morality doesn't necessarily mean that the action is wrong, only that it doesn't rise to the level of morally justified. From what I understand, Habermas grounds 'wrongness' in a moral intuition, a non-rational response of being offended by an event even though we are not directly affected by it. In my opinion, this asymmetry between the moral intuition of being offended and Habermas' account of a rational procedure for arriving at morally justified actions as a response to said offense, is a serious problem for Habermas' project. In particular, there are the cases of people who have been 'wronged' but are unable to engage in discourse practices because they don't have the necessary abilities, or their abilities are limited, or in the extreme, the people are dead. Habermas, himself, has noted that a weakness of his account is its inability to account for those who cannot speak up for themselves. Sincerely, Phil Enns Yogyakarta, Indonesia ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html