[lit-ideas] Re: Moral Judgment and Perceptual Metaphor -- Good to Think?
- From: Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 6 Aug 2010 01:00:08 EDT
Interesting to have R. Paul's recollections and thoughts on the
subject-matter of ethics. He is commenting on Wager.
In a message dated 8/5/2010 10:20:59 P.M., jwager@xxxxxxxxxx writes:
"What is ethics? What place do concepts or principles have in ethics?
What do we do when we practice “ethics” as a thoughtful process? Many
philosophers try to begin with the “theory” that would allow us to predict
what
general form “X is right” would have. If I am treating someone fairly,
then “X” is the right thing to do. If I am maximizing happiness, then “X”
is right. If “Happiness” implies “X,” and “Happiness” is the correct
view, then “X” follows. Our old friend Modus Ponens. But I don’t think this
is the way we always operate when we try to do ethics as a rational
process. Sometimes we start with the conclusion, and then try to argue back
to
the premises. “Y” is wrong. Ooops! I hadn’t ever had to deal with “Y”
before, but clearly “Y” can’t possibly be the right thing to do!"
----
Another thing that bothers me: is when 'legal' strikes in.
As we were saying with J. Evans: It is up to New Yorkers to decide if
Park51 is the right thing to do. Surely we mean the 'legal' thing. So then we
hear of Habermas, "Morality and Legality". And we wonder that it is just
IMPOSSIBLE to have something which is ILLEGAL and moral.
But this may depend on one's conceptions of legality. J. Evans is an expert
in political philosophy, so here I would think Kelsen's positivism comes
to mind. What is ACCEPTED (as legal, as a matter of fact, de facto) may
still not be what is acceptABLE (qua moral, as a matter of iure). But I'm
talking vaguely or confusedly.
Wager goes on:
"Ooops again; it looks like “Happiness” implies “Y.” What to do? Our
old friend Modus Tollens: If “Happiness” then “Y.” Not “Y.” Therefore,
not “Happiness.” What this means in practice is that most of us are more
than willing to throw out a theory when it conflicts with some deeply held
idea of the immorality of a particular practice, no matter what theory might
say it’s the right thing to do. (At least, that seems to me what I have
done in the past, and what I see as a reasonable prospect for following in
the future.)"
---- Besides the moral/legal issue, which may not be relevant to what J.
Wager is talking about, I would think what Wager IS talking about, in my case
at least to me, relates with Ross's sort of INTUITIONISM.
Moral intuitionism (Ross, Prichard, and a few others -- popular at Oxford
in the pre-Grice days) precisely holds intuitions to be prior. I would even
call a non-naturalist like G. E. Moore an 'intuitionist' in this sense. The
Scots idea of a 'moral sense'.
The problem with intuitionism is that it becomes irrefutable, incorrigible
and a matter of privileged access. If you INTUIT x is right (or wrong),
then x IS right (or wrong). Your intuitions cannot 'go' wrong. But I
disagree. I think intuitions -- or so-called intuitions CAN go wrong. My
favourite
case here is Flanders/Swann's reluctant cannibal ("Eating people is wrong"
-- also title of, typically, an academic novel by Bradbury -- only
academics like J. L. Mackie, "Inventing right and wrong" -- a favourite with
Grice
-- care about meta-ethics and what makes a moral intuition the wrong sort
of thing to start one's moralising with.
Wager:
"It also seems to be how philosophers write journal articles; they try to
modify the theory to allow for its use in situations where the theory seems
to allow “Y” so that the theory no longer allows “Y” to be seen as the
right thing to do. I think that this is similar to Turner's two "poles" of
"concepts" and the "sensory" component. We change both as we go. We need
both as starting-points for ethics. What say other others?"
I think the way philosophers write journal articles may be more complicated
than that -- but not TOO MUCH more complicated. There is indeed a lot of
ad-hocness (a moral philosopher proving that an alleged counterexample to
rule-utilitarianism, say, is not a REAL counterexample) and there is a lot of
'nitpicking'.
My favourite nitpicker, who writes pretty good moral essays, is Sinnott
Armstrong, of Dartmouth. My favourite ad-hoc nitpicking must be his now
classic:
"Ought Conversationally Implies Can" (Philosophical Review).
Surely we know from R. M. Hare (the Language of Morals) that 'ought' is the
moral word par excellence (etymologically, "I ought" --> "I owed").
Sinnott-Armstrong is applying Grice's minimal requirements of rationality in
the
utterance of 'ought'. Ought does not entail can, does not presuppose can.
It merely 'implicates' it conversationally. The gist of Sinnott-Armstrong's
essay then is a mixture of his 'intuitions' which not only come out as
'moral' now but as 'linguistic'. When are we justified to see if we are using
'ought' correctly?
Grice thought that 'ought' is not necessarily the MAIN moral concept. He
preferred, "must" (and 'should'). His example, "Nixon should be teaching
moral philosophy at Oxford" (Aspects of Reason). Grice viewed 'must' as
encompassing this sense of 'necessity' that we adjudicate to our moral
judgements
when uttered in Kant's favourite universalistic vein.
Of course Grice knew he could only do that because S. N. Hampshire, with
his relativism, had cleared the ground for him. Warnock, too, in his "The
object of morality".
---------- If one learns from these Oxonian meta-ethicists, it is how
'clever language is'. It would turn out that the immoral person is the one that
cannot speak properly. Or something.
Cheers
Speranza
Bordighera
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