Walter writes (not surprisingly): "Universality is constitutive of morality and as such is not itself open to decision, judgement or debate." I'm glad that he's wrong. I would hate to think that what passes for morality in the world, is universally true. My morality seems to vary quite a bit from quite a few others. Standing in another's shoes is standing in another universe -- oh, I get it now! Mike Geary not even universally himself most days. On Sun, Oct 9, 2011 at 11:32 PM, Walter C. Okshevsky <wokshevs@xxxxxx>wrote: > Well, since we all seem to be online while the turkey is on a low heat, > here's a > few thoughts and reminiscences inspired by Robert's final sentence below. > > I agree. Our affective responses to others' actions bake no epistemic > bread. > That I respond with indignation to your accusation says nothing about the > justifiability of your accusation or the justifiability of my emotive > response. > (I once lost a lovely and promising French girlfriend in the days of my > Montreal > youth because I told her that she had no right to feel the way she did as a > result of a comment I made. Her reply: "Who the hell do you think you > are?!! > You want to legislate how I feel and don't feel??!! It was all the more > dramatic and slightly terrifying as she was yelling in French and > everything > sounds more dramatic and slightly terrifying in French. She then proceeded > to > grab the very nice bottle of Beaujolais she brought over - Nuit St. Jean, > if > memory serves - and stormed out the door, long brown hair and plaided > skirts > flying. Verily was it a dark and stormy night.) > > > Returning from laments over lost prospects to philosophy: > > I think that when writers like Strawson and Habermas point to our passions > as > moral markers, they are primarily referring to the cognitive judgements > that > underly and animate our passionate responses. (I.e.: 1) No feeling of > indignation possible without some conception of justice. 2) My resentment > at > your comment morphs into a different emotion once I see that I misread your > comment.) > > But now should we not ask what we are to make of the dictum that "Reason is > and > ought to be the slave of the passions?" > > > Living the Husserlian projective and retentive life in the present, > > Walter O. > > > Quoting Robert Paul <rpaul@xxxxxxxx>: > > > Donal wrote > > > > > As to the argument that a problem with a clear-cut answer is less of a > > > problem than one less 'black and white', it seems to me that ethics is > > > the field where this is most dubious. If we take it as clear cut that > > > genocide is morally wrong (for example, murdering people in the > > > interests of ensuring racial purity) that may not make it less of a > > > problem when we are forced to go to war to oppose such genocide. In > > > fact, we might say that - for practical reasons - we should focus our > > > ethical energies, especially in the public sphere, on the more > > > clear-cut evils of the world rather than those where the ethics are > > > much greyer. More generally, going beyond the field of ethics, it is > > > often important to make sure we get the supposedly clear cut correct, > > > for if we get the more simple and obvious case wrong we are not likely > > > to get right more difficult cases [the legal expression "Hard cases > > > make bad law" may be understood as expressing the wisdom of > > > starting-out from the apparently straightforward and clear cut before > > > addressing harder cases]. > > > > I agree with most of what Donal says here (leaving open the possibility > > of, once enlightened, agreeing or disagreeing with the parts that I > > don't now understand). The clear cut, the obvious, cases are those that > > make morality intelligible, and they are, moreover, those against which > > moral theories are measured: if a moral theory---adhering to > > one---allows the innocent to be tortured, e.g., it fails and adhering to > > it makes one a moral idiot, or at best a poseur when it comes to ethical > > questions. How one should tell one's lover in a sensitive and > > understanding way, that it can't go on, may be harder than it is to > > judge that Bernard Madoff did a lot of harm to a lot of people, or that > > Stalin's 'Moscow Trials' were the work of a villainous man; but this > > doesn't mean that the more difficult (the more 'intricate'?) cases are > > thereby 'more important.' (I don't believe that there is a sort of moral > > 'continuum,' although maybe if one reads comic books one will have a > > comic book morality, and if one reads Henry James, e.g. The Golden Bowl, > > one will have something else. > > > > > JLS's deprecatory remarks on the use of "imagination" are also > > > questionable: for philosophers like Popper "imagination" is a most > > > important requirement for understanding, in part because what is > > > understood is not a "given" but a construction, and a theoretical one > > > at that. Without "imagination", for example, how I can ever know that > > > genocide is wrong by imagining what it is like to be a victim of it? > > > > If this were really true, then I could not honestly say that I know > > genocide to be wrong. It is as useless as a parent's saying to a child, > > 'How would you like it if Sally pulled /your/ hair?' The child has not > > been taught any sort of 'moral lesson in this drama. No more does my > > shuddering at descriptions and depictions of life in Auschwitz make that > > an important part of my knowing that to subject human beings to such a > > life is wrong, was wrong, and will be wrong, no matter what the casuist > > may try to say. > > > > Robert Paul, > > living a life > > > > > > > > > > > This electronic communication is governed by the terms and conditions at > http://www.mun.ca/cc/policies/electronic_communications_disclaimer_2011.php > ------------------------------------------------------------------ > To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, > digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html >