You are wrong all along, possible worlds are not temporal in any way. Precisely because God is the choice making entity, god surveys all of them precisely at the same specious instant (known to the unwashed as ‘creation’.) Best From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Omar Kusturica Sent: 24 February 2015 12:02 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Mit mir nur rat ich, red ich zu dir If a different world came into existence, Leibnitz could say one of the following: a. Either the new world is no better than the old one b. Or, if the betterness of the new world is overwhelming, he could say that this world has now become possible and previously wasn't possible. It is now this world that is "the best of all possible worlds." Either way, he hasn't been refuted. O.K. On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 10:33 AM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx<mailto:Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>> wrote: The same argument applies the form. Such considerations can’t be held against my view since ain’t mine. best From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>] On Behalf Of Omar Kusturica Sent: 24 February 2015 11:14 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Mit mir nur rat ich, red ich zu dir Leibnitz does not say that this world is the only possible world but that it is "the best of all possible worlds." Hence the claim is not refuted by showing that other worlds are possible. On the other hand, he also does not say that it is the best of all imaginable worlds, hence he is not refuted by showing that better worlds can be imagined. O.K. On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 9:50 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx<mailto:omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>> wrote: It hasn't been claimed, on my part, that all metaphysical statements are unfalsifiable. There is a logical and practical difference between 'some' and 'all.' Among those some that are unfalsifiable we find "Das Nicht nichtet," which on a charitable reading turns out to be tautological and hence irrefutable, and "There are natural laws" which is a positive existential statement and hence unfalsifiable. Leibnitz's claim that the existing world is the best of all possible worlds *may* be falsifiable or refutable but presumably this cannot be done by exposing the evil in the world, as Voltaire does in Candide, because these are empirical and not metaphysical observations. It is not clear though what is meant by "the best" and whether this is not too subjective an evaluation to be refuted. O.K. On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 9:26 AM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx<mailto:Palma@xxxxxxxxxx>> wrote: Two claims were made to the effect that metaphysical statements are “useless”, “senseless”, or according to some “non falsifiable”, the silliest ones are those who claim that there is some “violation” of maxims, grammars and assorted junk. So, consider an easy case, which arguably is beyond doubt metaphysical. Leibniz claimed, actually, twice, that the actual world is the best of any particular other one and of the totality of possible worlds not severally taken. (you have traces in monadology and in the version of theocidees) Now can this be falsified? I fail to see why not. In fact there are two wasy. 1. Is historical, namely take a time slice of actuality, fix one parameter of what you take improvement and you get an order of goodness out of it, hence the actual world or wold slice is not the best 2. Deny that goodness is anywhere, hence all worlds are equally bad or good since such moral predicates do not apply to any one of the possible world 3. The cheap shot approach (Candide): there is Heidegger, earthquakes, hitler, lady gaga hence there can be a world devoid of Heidegger, lady gaga since it is not inconsistent to eliminate buttmann/Heidegger, his wife, his children, lady gaga, his students, imbecils assorted und so weiter. Hence the actual is not the best, we can have betterments. We have both truth conditions and possible refutations. Now immediately will be told that the “best of all” is not a metaphysical statement, there you’ll see immediately the deep profound mental bankruptcy of these so called theories with “language maxims” “criteria of rationality” and similar anglo teutonic junk. From: lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> [mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>] On Behalf Of Omar Kusturica Sent: 24 February 2015 10:08 To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx<mailto:lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Subject: [lit-ideas] Re: Reading Heidegger See you soon. Omar On Mon, Feb 16, 2015 at 6:33 PM, <cblists@xxxxxxxx<mailto:cblists@xxxxxxxx>> wrote: One of the best things that I have read about Heidegger's 'obscurity' is the following: "Then again, there is the matter of Heidegger's famous 'obscurity', which would seem to require that special comment be made upon him. A great deal of this 'obscurity' is a matter of translation, and disappears when Heidegger is read in German. To be sure, his German is at times a very highly individualized vehicle of expression: Heidegger does coin his own terms when he has to, and usually these are coinings that stick very close to the etymological roots of German. Heidegger thinks very much within the matrix of the German language, and his expressions hugs the particularity of this language to its bosom. All of this makes for difficulty in translation . . . . [I]f we compare Heidegger with two classical German philosophers, like Kant or Hegel, his sentences are remarkably compact and incisive, his expression notably terse. Very often, in reading Hegel, we get the feeling . . . that the philosopher is deliberately willing to be obscure. One never gets this impression from Heidegger: he is struggling to communicate, and his command of his own means of communication is powerful and impressive. The difficulty comes, rather, from the obscurity of the matter with which Heidegger is grappling. "That there are obscure matters at all in our experience is a contention that rubs against the prejudice of some positivistic philosophers that whatever cannot be said clearly and distinctly cannot be said at all and the effort to say it can only result in 'meaningless' verbalism. Every philosopher, in this view, ought to be able to express himself with the simple-minded clarity of, say, Bertrand Russell. and if the philosopher does not do this, it is a clear sign of intellectual incompetence. All this, of course, is oversimplified psychologizing. A philosopher may be quite capable of mastering one or the other of the clear and distinct dialects of philosophy and bouncing the ball of dialectic deftly back and forth across the net; but he may be drawn by other subject matters into following a quite different path in philosophy. From the point of view of a philosopher like Heidegger there are parts of our experience that ordinary language finds itself hard put to express, if it can express these matters at all; indeed, this ordinary language seems to have been formed out a kind of conspiracy to cover over or forget these parts of experience altogether." - William Barrett in his introduction to the 'Phenomenology and Existentialism' section of William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, eds., _Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Anthology_, (New York: Random House, 1962); Vol. 3, pp. 152-3. I can attest to Barrett's claims about reading Heidegger 'in the original', and indeed would go farther than he does. I do not claim that one cannot come to some understanding of Heidegger's thought, or critique his views in interesting and insightful ways, without reading him in German. But I will say categorically and unequivocally: if you have not read Heidegger in German, you have not read Heidegger. - Chris Bruce Kiel, Germany -- ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html<http://www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html>