[lit-ideas] Re: Mit mir nur rat ich, red ich zu dir

  • From: Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 24 Feb 2015 15:34:53 +0100

So be it.

On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 3:24 PM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>  You are plainly confused.
>
> All words up to consistency exist. One is actualized, called for brevity
> ‘this one’.
>
> God made the wise and benevolent choice of selecting it as the best.
>
> That is all
>
>
>
> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
> lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Omar Kusturica
> *Sent:* 24 February 2015 11:14
> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Mit mir nur rat ich, red ich zu dir
>
>
>
> Leibnitz does not say that this world is the only possible world but that
> it is "the best of all possible worlds." Hence the claim is not refuted by
> showing that other worlds are possible. On the other hand, he also does not
> say that it is the best of all imaginable worlds, hence he is not refuted
> by showing that better worlds can be imagined.
>
>
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 9:50 AM, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
> wrote:
>
> It hasn't been claimed, on my part, that all metaphysical statements are
> unfalsifiable. There is a logical and practical difference between 'some'
> and 'all.' Among those some that are unfalsifiable we find "Das Nicht
> nichtet," which on a charitable reading turns out to be tautological and
> hence irrefutable, and "There are natural laws" which is a positive
> existential statement and hence unfalsifiable.
>
>
>
> Leibnitz's claim that the existing world is the best of all possible
> worlds *may* be falsifiable or refutable but presumably this cannot be done
> by exposing the evil in the world, as Voltaire does in Candide, because
> these are empirical and not metaphysical observations. It is not clear
> though what is meant by "the best" and whether this is not too subjective
> an evaluation to be refuted.
>
>
>
> O.K.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 24, 2015 at 9:26 AM, Adriano Palma <Palma@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> Two claims were made to the effect that metaphysical statements are
> “useless”, “senseless”, or according to some “non falsifiable”, the
> silliest ones are those who claim that there is some “violation” of maxims,
> grammars and assorted junk.
>
> So, consider an easy case, which arguably is beyond doubt metaphysical.
>
> Leibniz claimed, actually, twice, that the actual world is the best of any
> particular other one and of the totality of possible worlds not severally
> taken.
>
> (you have traces in monadology and in the version of theocidees)
>
> Now can this be falsified? I fail to see why not. In fact there are two
> wasy.
>
> 1.     Is historical, namely take a time slice of actuality, fix one
> parameter of what you take improvement and you get an order of goodness
> out of it, hence the actual world or wold slice is not the best
>
> 2.     Deny that goodness is anywhere, hence *all* worlds are equally bad
> or good since such moral predicates do not apply to any one of the possible
> world
>
> 3.     The cheap shot approach (Candide): there is Heidegger,
> earthquakes, hitler, lady gaga hence there can be a world devoid of
> Heidegger, lady gaga since it is not inconsistent to eliminate
> buttmann/Heidegger, his wife, his children, lady gaga, his students,
> imbecils assorted und so weiter. Hence the actual is not the best, we can
> have betterments.
>
>
>
>
>
> We have both truth conditions and possible refutations.
>
> Now immediately will be told that the “best of all” is not a metaphysical
> statement, there you’ll see immediately the deep profound mental bankruptcy
> of these so called theories with “language maxims” “criteria of
> rationality” and similar anglo teutonic junk.
>
>
>
> *From:* lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:
> lit-ideas-bounce@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] *On Behalf Of *Omar Kusturica
> *Sent:* 24 February 2015 10:08
> *To:* lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
> *Subject:* [lit-ideas] Re: Reading Heidegger
>
>
>
> See you soon.
>
>
>
> Omar
>
>
>
> On Mon, Feb 16, 2015 at 6:33 PM, <cblists@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> One of the best things that I have read about Heidegger's 'obscurity' is
> the following:
>
> "Then again, there is the matter of Heidegger's famous 'obscurity', which
> would seem to require that special comment be made upon him.  A great deal
> of this 'obscurity' is a matter of translation, and disappears when
> Heidegger is read in German.  To be sure, his German is at times a very
> highly individualized vehicle of expression: Heidegger does coin his own
> terms when he has to, and usually these are coinings that stick very close
> to the etymological roots of German.  Heidegger thinks very much within the
> matrix of the German language, and his expressions hugs the particularity
> of this language to its bosom.  All of this makes for difficulty in
> translation . . . .  [I]f we compare Heidegger with two classical German
> philosophers, like Kant or Hegel, his sentences are remarkably compact and
> incisive, his expression notably terse.  Very often, in reading Hegel, we
> get the feeling . . . that the philosopher is deliberately willing to be
> obscure.  One never gets this impression from Heidegger: he is struggling
> to communicate, and his command of his own means of communication is
> powerful and impressive.  The difficulty comes, rather, from the obscurity
> of the matter with which Heidegger is grappling.
>
> "That there are obscure matters at all in our experience is a contention
> that rubs against the prejudice of some positivistic philosophers that
> whatever cannot be said clearly and distinctly cannot be said at all and
> the effort to say it can only result in 'meaningless' verbalism.  Every
> philosopher, in this view, ought to be able to express himself with the
> simple-minded clarity of, say, Bertrand Russell.  and if the philosopher
> does not do this, it is a clear sign of intellectual incompetence.  All
> this, of course, is oversimplified psychologizing.  A philosopher may be
> quite capable of mastering one or the other of the clear and distinct
> dialects of philosophy and bouncing the ball of dialectic deftly back and
> forth across the net; but he may be drawn by other subject matters into
> following a quite different path in philosophy.  From the point of view of
> a philosopher like Heidegger there are parts of our experience that
> ordinary language finds itself hard put to express, if it can express these
> matters at all; indeed, this ordinary language seems to have been formed
> out a kind of conspiracy to cover over or forget these parts of experience
> altogether."
>
> - William Barrett in his introduction to the 'Phenomenology and
> Existentialism' section of William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, eds.,
> _Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Anthology_, (New York: Random
> House, 1962); Vol. 3, pp. 152-3.
>
> I can attest to Barrett's claims about reading Heidegger 'in the
> original', and indeed would go farther than he does. I do not claim that
> one cannot come to some understanding of Heidegger's thought, or critique
> his views in interesting and insightful ways, without reading him in
> German.  But I will say categorically and unequivocally: if you have not
> read Heidegger in German, you have not read Heidegger.
>
> - Chris Bruce
> Kiel, Germany
> --
>
>
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