Donald Kagan begins his account of the causes of the Second World War, as any history of that war must, with the conclusion of World War One. On page 282 he writes, ?The Allies checked the German assault and took the offensive themselves. Before they could break through on the Western front, however, the collapse of the Central Powers? armies in the Balkans forced the Germans to seek peace. General Erich von Ludendorff, the effective commander of the German Army and virtual dictator of Germany, told his government that ?the conditions of the army demands an immediate armistice in order to avoid a catastrophe.? He urged that they approach President Woodrow Wilson of the United States at once to begin peace negotiations on the basis of his Fourteen Points. He also recommended the establishment of a more representative and liberal government, in part because he thought only such a regime could gain an acceptable peace or rally the nation to resist an unacceptable one, in part, also, to lay the blame for Germany?s defeat not on the military leadership and their political allies but on the democratic parties that would form the new government. ?Let them conclude the peace that now will have to be concluded,? he told the approving Kaiser. ?On October 3-4 the new government asked for an armistice. The Allies took some time to answer, for they did not all agree on the advisability of a cease-fire or on its terms if adopted. The day before he called for an armistice, when asked if he would grant such a request were he commander of the Allied forces, Ludendorff responded, ?No, certainly not; I would attack even harder.? The same view was taken by some Americans. The Commander of the American forces, General John Pershing, wanted to march his troops into Berlin. He wrote to Foch, ?We should take full advantage of the situation and continue the offensive until we compel [Germany?s] unconditional surrender.? Comment: In retrospect the Wilsonian ?kind? response to Ludendorff was a colossal blunder. While Ludendorff and Wilhelm II were chuckling to themselves over getting a naïve German government to negotiate the defeat, the German rank and file were full of resentment. They weren?t sophisticated enough to understand that Ludendorff called a halt ?to avoid a catastrophe.? This was all too complicated for them; so they sought people and forces to blame and the seeds were sown for World War Two. Peace would have been assured (at least a longer peace than the one the world got) if what Ludendorff said was carried out by the Allies, that is, that Pershing, Folk and Haig be allowed to ?attack even harder,? attack until Germany surrendered unconditionally. That would have permitted the soldiers to experience the defeat and understand the need for surrender. It would have taken Hitler?s argument away from him. Was Wilson an incipient Gearyite? Did he mentally brush aside questions of strategy and how best to assure a peaceful future and rush straight ahead into the embrace of Peace? It would seem so. He did his best, but he just didn?t have the knowledge or the experience and he wasn?t willing to delegate matters to people who had them. Wilson was an idealist with little experience in working out practical political details. I remember reading Fromkin?s A Peace to End All Peace in which Fromkin describes the clever Lloyd George manipulating the inexperienced Wilson. Fromkin was concerned about the ?Creation of the Modern Middle East? and what a mess the Americans (Wilson), the British (Lloyd George) and the French (Clemenceau), and Italians (Orlando) made of their imposed peace, but we don?t need to stop there. Fromkin?s sarcastic title conveys his impression of it and his sarcasm would fit all of Europe as well as the Middle East. The opportunity was there for the allies to do something momentous. Instead they messed up Europe and the Middle East for years to come. Not only did they contribute mightily to the origins of World War Two, but they mucked up the Middle east so badly that we are still paying for their bungling ? but notice: their hearts were in the right place. They embraced peace. It is plain to us now that one can dispense with a heart for peace if one has a head for it. None of the allies mentioned in the preceding paragraph could qualify as brilliant political thinkers. They were all short-sighted bunglers. Wilson had the greatest heart but a weak head. Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando were all out for punitive damages ? to make Germany pay; also, to grab as much territory as possible. In the end they ?imposed a peace? that guaranteed that there would be no peace. Their ?peace? ended the chance of peace. So what should they have done? Once again, they should have continued fighting the war until Germany surrendered unconditionally. This will grate on a Gearyite, but by continuing the war to a palpable conclusion, one every German would be able to feel and understand, any political firebrand like Hitler would then have only small audiences if he tried to argue that Germany surrendered because they were betrayed and that they never really lost the Great WAr. Lawrence Helm San Jacinto