Lawrence, I have no objection to parsing the Iraq Invasion as part of one continuous war that began under Bush, Sr. On the other hand, what impressed me about Danner's article is the way he explicated the Iraq occupation mistakes pre-Petraeus, which were not rooted in de-Baathification per se, but in purely structural errors, organizational errors of the kind a more managerial President would have avoided. He quotes Colin Powell: "...You have to understand that when you have two chains of command and you don't have a common superior in the theater, it means that every little half-assed fight they have out there, if they can't work it out, comes out to one place to be resolved. And that's in the Pentagon. Not in the NSC or the State Department, but in the Pentagon." "[H]ow could U.S. officials," asks Danner, "repeatedly and consistently make such ill-advised and improbably stupid decisions, beginning with their lack of planning for the "postwar.'?" Danner continues, "The Iraq occupation would have all the weaknesses of two chains of command, weaknesses that became apparent [when Sanchez and Bremer took over], leaving the occupation in the hands of two officials who despised one another and hardly spoke." ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html