[lit-ideas] Re: Logical Corpuscularism

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sat, 5 Sep 2015 11:08:10 -0400

Boyle was a corpuscularist; Witters was a logical corpuscularist (he
suggests that logical corpuscules might be 'countless' (i.e. many)). Was he
being prudent? (as R. P. seems to suggest) Or was he 'showing' off? (as McEvoy
seems to suggest) ("That is the question" -- Geary).

(And the ";" is a logical constant).

In a message dated 9/5/2015 9:59:28 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx writes: "So JLS can disagree all he likes, but he is
wrong
in thinking the Buehler/Popper theory is at all "corpuscularist"".

Touché. I will re-read McEvoy's post to elaborate on his interesting posts
as to where corpuscularism applies and when it doesn't.

For the record, the Buehler reference was brought as a commentary to
Geary's fourfold taxonomy of the uses of language. Like Witters's, Geary's
taxonomy is "non-final". The fact that he ends his taxonomy with "Amen"
compares
with Witters's, too, whose last mentioned example is 'praying'.


McEvoy, in "Re: Boyleiana":

"the central and abiding problem for our new School is determining how far
'logical corpuscules' can be further divided, and in what ways? This will
be discussed ad nauseum in our house journal, "The Corpusclar Review"
(incorporating "Logical Entities Monthly" and "Divisibility Weekly")."

"Logical Entities Monthly" reminded me of what H. Paul G. calls
"ontological marxism": his criterion to allow for an entity to exist: if they
work,
they exist.

I like that, even if H. Paul G.'s obituary read, "Professional philosopher
and amateur cricketer" -- recall that in England, for many years, only
gentlemen could be real cricketers or yachtsmen or polo players or what have
you).

In H. Paul G's words, as we decide on what logical entities to include this
month:

"I am not greatly enamoured of some of the motivations which prompt the
advocacy of psychophysical identifications; I have in mind a concern to
exclude such ‘queer’ or ‘mysterious’ entities as souls, purely mental events,
purely mental properties and so forth. My taste is for keeping open house
for all sorts of conditions of entities, just so long as when they come in
they help with the housework. Provided that I can see them work, and provided
that they are not detected in illicit logical behaviour (within which I do
not include a certain degree of indeterminacy, not even of numerical
indeterminacy), I do not find them queer or mysterious at all…. To fangle a
new
ontological Marxism, they work therefore they exist, even though only some,
perhaps those who come on the recommendation of some form of
transcendental argument, may qualify for the specially favoured status of
entia
realissima. To exclude honest working entities seems to me like metaphysical
snobbery, a reluctance to be seen in the company of any but the best objects."


Cheers,

Speranza


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