[lit-ideas] Re: Logical Corpuscularism

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2015 13:34:08 -0400

Schroedinger's cats were made of corpuscules.

So how does Popper reconcile corpuscularism at the quantum level with free
will?

Let's consider the quotes from Doyle's site.

Popper writes:

"First of all, I do of course agree that quantum-theoretical INdeterminacy
in a sense can NOT help, because this leads MERELY to probabilistic laws,
and we do not wish to say that such things as free decisions are just
probabilistic affairs."

Oddly, that above is one of the instances where 'way' seems to do better
than 'sense'. I was arguing that if p =1 we can still may wish to say that
such a thing as a free decision is a probabilistic affair. Or perhaps
Popper is having trouble with 'law', because, as such, there are no
psychological laws (Only legal laws, as Hart would say).

Popper continues: "The trouble with quantum-mechanical INdeterminacy is
twofold. First, it is probabilistic"

-- as opposed to what? Popper seems to be implicating that there is
indeterminism which is not probabilistic.

"and this doesn't help us much"

-- a little?

"with the free-will problem, which is NOT JUST a chance affair."

But does include as per logical necessity, a chance affair, when we say
that something stands no chance there's little will (free or other) can do
about it.

Popper: "Second, it only gives us INdeterminism, not openness to World 2."

Chomsky used 'openness', but this must be a different way of using
openness. It's openness to w2.

Popper: "However, in a roundabout way I do think that one may make use of
quantum-theoretical INdeterminacy without committing oneself to the thesis
that free-will decisions are probabilistic affairs."

How? Here is Popper's way out:

"The selection of a kind of behaviour out of a randomly offered repertoire
may be an act of choice, even an act of free will. I am an indeterminist;
and in discussing INdeterminism I have often regretfully pointed out that
quantum INdeterminacy does not seem to help us [...]." "For the
amplification of something like, say, radio-active disintegration processes
would
not lead to human action or even animal action, but only to random
movements."

This seems to relate to G. E. M. Anscombe on brute facts, or a behaviour
"under a description". Grice hitting the cricket ball may be seen as a
movement (involving chance, in that Grice could never HAVE known if each
cricket game he was going to engage in would have him as a winner or a loser
--
cfr. billiards).

Popper: "I have changed my mind on this issue (See p. 540 of J. C. Eccles
and K. R. Popper, The Self and Its Brain (Berlin, Heidelberg, London, New
York: Springer-Verlag, 1977).

It's in the final Popper's quote by Doyle that we get the keyword:
downward causation.

Popper: "A choice process may be a selection process, and the selection
may be from some repertoire of random events, without being random in its
turn."

If it's not random, p = 1.

"A choice process", such as Grice's choice to attend a cricket match
rather than an important lecture by an important philosopher, "may be a
selectin
process" (for Grice must deliberate: "what will be good for me in the end?
To attend a boring lecture by a boring professor or enjoy myself at
Lord's?").

"[A]nd the selection may be from some repertoire of random events" --
'attend a cricket match, attend a philosophy lecture, stay home, ...' "without
being random in its turn".

It may still be deemed random as long as the colloquial phrase, Grice
"could have done otherwise", APPLIES. For only ex-post-facto, does Grice
having
attended a cricket match rather than a philosophy lecture attend some
degree of necessity.

If Aristotle seems to have had a problem with the future naval battle,
Popper seems to be wanting to find a way out for the alleged problem of the
past naval battle?

Popper concludes: "This seems to me to offer a promising solution to one
of our most vexing problems, and one by downward causation."

So, Popper is not offering the solution, but telling the reader that this
may LEAD to a solution -- a solution, he adds, without providing the
specific steps of analysis -- that relies on the concept of 'downward
causation'
-- by which, in this context, Popper seems to mean that items in w2 (e.g.
Grice's freewill decision to attend a cricket match rather than a boring
university lecture) CAUSE (non-deterministically) Grice's 'action' (and not
'movement') of heading for Lords rather than Merton?

Cheers,

Speranza

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